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On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon, an oil tanker flying the flag of Liberia and 
carrying thirty million gallons of crude oil, smashed onto rocks off the coast of the United 
Kingdom. The oil spill metastasized into an environmental catastrophe, and this event became 
the first major environmental disaster of the electronic media age. As a direct result of the Torrey 
Canyon catastrophe, two treaties were signed in November 1969, at a conference in Brussels 
sponsored by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), a United 
Nations Specialized Agency. The first treaty (the public law treaty) dealt with the right of a State 
to intervene on the high seas in the event of potential damage from an oil spill, while the second 
treaty (the private law treaty) dealt with the issue of financial liability of the owner (or charterer) 
of a ship to those damaged by an oil spill.  
The second treaty was and remains unique in that the participants agreed to a legally 
enforceable compensation scheme in an amount of up to fourteen million dollars per incident 
(subsequently raised over the years to several hundred million dollars) to damaged parties. 
Moreover, the Brussels system of legal liability and mandatory compensation, despite the growth 
of the environmental movement in the second half century after the Torrey Canyon incident, has 
 v 
not been replicated by other proposals or treaties (e.g., the Paris Climate Accords). Therefore, the 
central question for analysis is to explain and trace the factors that produced the treaty and its 
compensation scheme, and further, to explain the relevance of these processes to regime theory 
and regime formation. 
Accordingly, this dissertation examines the intense bargaining among States, IMCO, and 
Non-State Actors in the establishment of the international regime at Brussels. Particular 
emphasis is placed on the roles of the Non-State Actors, primarily shipping interests, 
international insurance companies, and oil companies, in attempting to safeguard their sectoral 
interests during the regime formation process. Further, individuals who held leadership positions 
in some of these Non-State Actors also had professional relationships that overlapped with their 
roles as members of State delegations and their official roles within IMCO. These interactions 
are examined through concepts in interest group theory as developed by political scientists, 
especially clientism, regulatory capture and non-decisions. 
The bargaining process itself is analyzed through the neoliberal approach to regime 
formation, which emphasizes negotiations and bargaining among the parties. This is in 
contradistinction to a realist approach, which would center on a solution being imposed by the 
strongest party. This approach also differs from the cognitivist approach, which would emphasize 
that the participants were using a knowledge-based strategy, such as working to develop a 
solution to marine pollution based on a common belief that the environmental integrity of the 
oceans represents the highest good. 
The dissertation further examines the impact on regime resilience of exogenous events, 
such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, which, for all practical purposes, resulted in the 
United States abandoning the multinational approach created at Brussels in favor of unilateral 
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domestic legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The American unilateral approach, the 
Brussels structure, and the alternate independent entities established by Non-State Actors (the 
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution representing 
shipping interests, and the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil 
Pollution representing oil interests) all combined to form a regime complex with multiple power 
centers. 
Finally, on a broader theoretical basis, this study relies on a critical case study. While the 
utility of critical case studies has been debated for decades among social scientists, its usefulness 
as a tool in analyzing the regime complex first established a half century ago at Brussels is 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
I. The Scope of the Inquiry 
 
 
 This dissertation centers on the establishment of an international regime in 1969 
to deal with the problem of oil spills resulting from oil tanker crashes on the seas. A crash 
(in common parlance “an accident”) differs from deballasting, a routine maritime 
maneuver, which is defined as the deliberate discharge of oily water from a ship and is 
the subject of a different international regime.1 Accordingly, deballasting is discussed 
briefly in this dissertation only in the broader context of international environmental 
issues. The issue of maritime oil pollution resulting from ship crashes gained significant 
traction after the Torrey Canyon episode of March 18, 1967, in which a massive oil 
tanker smashed onto submerged rocks off the coast of the United Kingdom. The collision 
resulted in enormous environmental damage, and concomitantly became a worldwide 
news story.2 
 This proposed international regime was formalized by the signing of two treaties 
in Brussels in November 1969 at a conference (“the Brussels Conference”) sponsored by 
the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (“IMCO”), a specialized 
agency of the United Nations. Each treaty dealt with a different aspect of the issue of 
maritime oil spills. The first treaty, the International Convention Relating to Intervention 
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (“public law treaty” see Appendix 
1) dealt with the Public International Law issue of the right of a State to intervene on the 
seas against a vessel registered in another State, which vessel (typically an oil tanker) was 
causing significant environmental damage to the seas, and to the coastal regions of the 
 
2 
impacted State.3 As will be demonstrated below, the right of intervention against an 
offending vessel overturned centuries of traditional Public International Law. 
 The second treaty, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (the “private law treaty” or the “civil law treaty” see Appendix 2), 
dealt with the financial liability of the offending ship owner/charterer/cargo owner to 
third parties for environmental damage, including cleanup costs and damages sustained 
by governments and non-State entities.4 
 This dissertation's primary focus is on the private law treaty and its unique 
provisions, which established liability against a ship owner or charterer of up to fourteen 
million dollars per episode and which further incorporated the onerous strict liability 
standard rather than a lesser negligence standard. Accordingly, the private law treaty 
stands separate and apart from other environmental treaties, which for the most part 
center on technical matters or the establishment of voluntary goals by the signatories.5 
 Therefore, the central question for analysis is to identify the factors that led to the 
formation of this international regime at Brussels in 1969. 
 A prerequisite to answering this question requires a definition and understanding 
of international regimes, which were defined by Stephen Krasner as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations...Decision making 





II. The Research Questions 
 
 As previously stated, the major research question is: which factors led to the 
formation in 1969 at Brussels of the international regime that addressed the twin issues of 
intervention on the high seas against ships spilling oil as a result of a crash, and the and 
financial liability of ships for damages resulting from these oil spills? Additionally, the 
related question is: of which factors and interests (e.g., bargaining resulting from the 
conflicting interests of coastal states versus maritime states versus the interests of 
powerful Non-State Actors) led to the incorporation of specific provisions of the public 
law and private law treaties? Among the possible answers are: 
 a. The emergence in the period 1941 to 1966 of norms of Public 
International Law based on a “polluter pays principle,” essentially opening up the 
possibility under international law of a victim of oil pollution obtaining 
compensation for injuries from the ship that caused the injury; 
 b. The emergence of environmentalism as an issue on the public agenda, 
particularly the issue of oil spills resulting from tanker crashes, which as will be 
demonstrated below, became part of the public agenda through an inordinate 
amount of media coverage; 
 c. The inadequate remedies for compensation to victims of oil pollution 
damage under existing domestic laws and institutions; 
 d. The interactions among States, IMCO, and Non-State Actors (insurance, 
shipping, and petroleum) who, in the case of Non-State Actors, were guided by 
market forces that led to inclusion in the private law treaty of terms based on 
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these market forces to the exclusion of other possible factors, such as an approach 
to the issue based on environmental integrity being the highest good, irrespective 
of the financial cost involved. 
These interactions among States, Public International Organization, and Non-
State Actors will demonstrate that the neoliberal approach on international regimes7 has 
much to offer in the analysis of the Brussels Conference, particularly as it shall be viewed 
through the paradigm of States, Public International Organization and Non-State Actors 
“as rational egoists who care for only their own (absolute) gain.”8 Conversely, it will be 
argued that despite an ostensible purpose of constructing a regime based on a common 
awareness of the environmental dangers posed by massive oil spills (an “only one earth” 
perspective), the cognitive approach is somewhat irrelevant because many of the 
participants at Brussels had other priorities, such as maintaining the status quo, which led 
to a dilution of treaty provisions dealing with liability of tankers for oil spills.9 
 A concomitant question is, why was the regime established at Brussels not 
resilient or robust, and accordingly, why did it begin to disintegrate within twenty 
years?10 Why is the private law treaty as was amended sui generis, and has not been 
replicated or expanded by subsequent environmental treaties? Why did the United States 
not sign the private law treaty, and instead opt for a policy of unilateral action? 
 Among the variables to be explored to answer this question are: 
 a. The input of the Non-State Actors into the private law treaty reflected the 
parochial needs of Non-State Actors instead of broader environmental concerns, and 
therefore was not sustainable in the long term. More to the point, the weakness of the 
private law treaty's compensation scheme became apparent after the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
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catastrophe, which prompted the United States to take unilateral action, which bypassed 
Non-State Actors like insurance companies and relied on a tax on oil to establish a trust 
fund to be used to pay for oil cleanup costs; 
 b. The initial reluctance of coastal States such as Canada and Ireland to 
participate based on an initial perception that the regime was inadequate to compensate 
victims in the event of a major oil pollution disaster. 
 
III. The Use of a Critical Case Study 
 
 The analysis of the proceedings of the Brussels Conference and the significance 
of its results utilizes the case study method, which is defined as “the detailed examination 
of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events.”11 
 The threshold question is whether a single case, such as the Brussels Conference, 
can be used to develop an explanation of environmentalism, international regimes, or 
anything else. In their landmark book, Designing Social Inquiry, Gary King, Robert D. 
Keohane and Sidney Verba12 argue, essentially, that it is not possible. Picking up on 
Harry Eckstein's statement that a crucial case study based on “a single measure on any 
pertinent variable,”13 they argue that a crucial case is not reliable because of the existence 
of alternative explanations, errors in measurement, and simply because the world is not 
deterministic – there are always unknown, omitted variables.14 Based on this approach, 




 There are two approaches to justifying the use of a critical case study. First, in 
practical terms, the private law treaty is sui generis. The incorporation into an 
international treaty of a “polluter pays” principle,15 requiring offenders to pay up to 
fourteen million dollars to the victims of marine pollution is not only unprecedented, but, 
as will be seen in Chapter IV, simply not replicated. None of the well known 
international environmental initiatives such as the United Nations Environmental 
Programme, the Stockholm Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change (to name but a few) contain enforcement provisions even remotely 
comparable to the private law treaty. Accordingly, the utility of using other cases in a 
discussion of the Brussels private law treaty is questionable. 
 Further, the criticisms of the utility of a critical case study in Designing Social 
Inquiry were addressed by, among others, Bent Flyvbjerg in “Five Misunderstandings 
About Case-Study Research,”16 which reviewed the King, Keohane, Verba arguments, 
and proceeded to highlight flaws in their approach, and accordingly justified the use of a 
critical case study. 
 Needless to say, a descriptive case study is not an end onto itself. Rather, a case 
study is combined with process tracing, which “is a set of procedures for formulating and 
testing explanations.”17 This allows the researcher “to made causal inferences about a 
single case or a small number of cases,”18 which, in turn enable one to engage in theory 
testing or theory development.19 
 All of the methodological issues raised in this introduction will be reviewed and 
amplified in Chapter III of this dissertation. Before addressing these methodological 
matters, however, the background of this study, including the emergence of the 
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environment as a policy issue, the development of international environmental law in the 
mid-twentieth century, and the actual dynamics of the Torrey Canyon catastrophe, will be 
reviewed and analyzed in Chapter II. 
 
IV. Structure of the Dissertation 
 
 After this introductory chapter, the dissertation continues with a discussion of the 
policy issue of the environment in general, and a specific inquiry into the phenomenon of 
marine pollution with specific emphasis on oil pollution of the seas. Thereafter, since the 
Brussels Conference formulated two treaties that were based upon and actually expanded 
norms of international law, an analysis will be made of which provisions of international 
law were relevant to the creation of an international regime regulating oil pollution of the 
seas. Emphasis will be placed on the fact that during the twenty-five-year period 
immediately prior to the Torrey Canyon (1941 to 1966), principles of international law 
emerged that formed the legal basis of the two conventions signed at Brussels. The 
chapter concludes with the Torrey Canyon incident itself – what happened, why the event 
made such a major impact and what were the shortcomings of existing legal remedies that 
led to the approach culminating in the Brussels Conference. 
 Chapter III discusses the existing literature on the Torrey Canyon and the Brussels 
Conference, most of which is based upon interpretations of the legal implications of the 
private law treaty. Since the existing literature does not view the Brussels Conference 
through the paradigm of regime formation, there is a review of the literature of regime 
formation and the schools of thought on regimes (realism, neoliberalism, and 
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cognitivism). Further, there is a review of the literature on interest groups, especially as it 
relates to regulatory capture, and overlapping memberships between the public and 
private sectors, as well as a discussion of regime complexes, which are defined simply as 
“a collective of partially-overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes.”20 
 This material is then integrated into an analysis of what the existing literature on 
the Brussels Conference lacks, which, as previously indicated, is legalistic and generally 
fails to analyze the Brussels Conference in regime formation terms. 
 Additionally, since the dissertation is based on a single critical case study, there is 
a review and analysis of the existing literature on case studies, as well as a discussion of 
why the critical case study is an appropriate vehicle to frame this dissertation. 
 Finally, since much of the material on the actual events at Brussels was obtained 
from a series of interviews with elite actors who had first hand or intimate knowledge of 
Brussels, there is a brief discussion of elite interviewing. (No other study of the Brussels 
Conference was found that was based on elite interviews of some of the participants.) 
These interviews were conducted in 1972 and the subjects included: 
1. Claiborne Pell, United States Senator from Rhode Island, who sat on the United States 
Committee on Foreign Relations, and chaired its subcommittee dealing with maritime 
affairs; 
2. Arvid Pardo, the United Nations Ambassador from Malta and known as “the father of 
the law of the sea;” 
3. Peter Ghee, Chief Maritime Counsel, Mobil Oil; 
4. Robert Neuman, United States Department of State, and head of the American 
delegation to the Brussels Conference, as well as three of his aides; 
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5. Allan I. Mendelsohn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Transportation Affairs) of 
the United States Department of State. 
 Chapter IV is a study of the Brussels Conference as regime formation. The key 
questions include: who were the actors (State, Public International Organization, Non-
State Actors – shipping, petroleum and insurance); what were the preferences of the 
actors; and which resources did they utilize in the bargaining process? In which way did 
the private law treaty reflect the preferences of the participants in the bargaining process; 
and which school of thought of regime formation (realism, neoliberalism, or cognitivism) 
best explains the process? 
 Additionally, with the Exxon Valdez episode in 1989 (the American counterpart 
to the Torrey Canyon), why did the United States decide to abandon entirely the 
multilateral regime established at Brussels, and instead acted unilaterally by passing the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990? Concomitantly, why was the international regime that was 
centered on the private law treaty not resilient or robust enough to survive an Exxon 
Valdez environmental catastrophe? What does this demonstrate about regime formation?  
The dissertation concludes with a final chapter which summarizes the findings of 
this study, and its importance to the field of international relations. As will be seen below, 
the contours of the international regime created at Brussels in 1969 were shaped by 
competing forces consisting of participating States, IMCO, and most importantly Non-
State Actors, primarily shipping interests, marine insurers, and international oil 
companies. Moreover, an unforeseen event, the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, prompted 
the United States to abandon entirely the multilateral approach, and opt instead for 
unilateral action through the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I 
                                               
1 Deballasting is covered by the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of 
the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), which was amended in 1962 and 1969, and was succeeded in 1973 by 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL). It should be 
emphasized that in contradistinction to the private law treaty signed at Brussels, neither OILPOL 
nor MARPOL contain sanctions for violation of the terms of either Convention. Rather, any 
penalties are left to the individual States. Ronald B. Mitchell’s scholarly work, International Oil 
Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance discusses compliance with the 
provisions of OILPOL and MARPOL. 
2 See Chapter III for some of the details of the coverage of the Torrey Canyon as the first 
international environmental catastrophe media event. 
3 The text of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties is reproduced in the Appendix of this dissertation. 
4 The text of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage is 
reproduced in the Appendix of this dissertation. 
5 This point was effectively made by Jessica F. Green in Rethinking Private Authority: Agents 
and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014). 
6 Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 2. 
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Chapter 2: Evolution of Environmental Issues and Legal-Political Response 
I. The Emergence of the Environment as a Policy Issue 
 
In the late 1960s, much public attention in the United States, as well as in other 
industrialized and non-industrialized states, became focused on problems of the environment.1 
According to Oran Young, an early pioneer in the study of global environmental issues and 
related regime formation and governance issues in international politics, “international 
environmental problems sets” can be grouped into four clusters: international commons; shared 
natural resources; transboundary externalities; and linked issues.2  
Overpopulation, climate change, pollution of air and the seas, inadequate methods of 
waste disposal, depletion of fish stock and renewable resources, biodiversity, and sustainable 
development became matters of concern to private citizens and Non- State Actors, as well as to 
governments of different countries and various levels. Whether or not the apocalyptic vision of a 
world suffocating under its wastes, which some early proponents of ecological reform believed 
would become reality unless drastic measures were promptly taken, represented an exaggerated 
view of the situation, it is clear that the question of environmental degradation has become an 
increasingly important component of political debate.3 
The environmental challenges raised the issues of both cause and response. Although the 
challenge, its cause, and its response can all be global in scale, and therefore fall into the concern 
of political scientists, a subtle difference over emphasis does exist: causal explanations have 
attracted more biological and natural scientists, while responses and solutions offer opportunities 
to politicians and political scientists. The multiplicity of governmental environmental initiatives 
has been staggering. Take the United States as an example: “Since the first Earth Day in April 
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1970, federal, state and local governments have adopted dozens of major laws and hundreds of 
regulations to protect natural resources and foster sustainable approaches to economic 
development. New institutions, such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), have been created, and governments have assumed a wide range of new 
responsibilities.”4  
Needless to say, the environmental movement was not born in 1970. Naturalist and 
conservationist John Muir founded the Sierra Club in 1892. In the United States during the early 
twentieth century, the conservation movement bore fruit in the establishment of a vast network 
of national parks. Further, almost a decade prior to the first Earth Day, Rachel Carson wrote the 
best-selling book Silent Spring (1962), which described in vivid detail the far-reaching 
consequences of the widespread use of chemicals, especially insecticides, on the environment.5 
As Robert Gottlieb observed in Where We Live, Play, and Work (1993): 
Pollution issues are not just a recent concern; people have recognized, thought about, and 
struggled with these problems for more than a century in significant ways. A history that 
separates resource development and its regulation from the urban and industrial 
environment disguises a crucial link that connects both pollution and loss of wilderness.6   
Similarly, States in other parts of the globe have likewise added provisions to their constitutions, 
enacted legislation and established bureaucracies that deal with environmental matters.7 Thus, in 
the nineteenth century, the River Commissions for the Rhine and the Danube started to address 
environmental issues of rivers and waterways in Europe. Article 48A of the Constitution of 
India, which was enacted in 1976, provides that, “The State shall endeavour to protect and 
improve the environment.”8 China has undertaken numerous environmental initiatives including 
a broad statute from 1995 called the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention 
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and Control of Atmospheric Pollution.” The Japanese government has a Ministry of the 
Environment to administer the Basic Environment Law of 1993, which provides a broad plan for 
control of environmental issues. Additionally, Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of The 
European Union encompasses a requirement that “Environmental protection requirements must 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.” Further, Articles 191 to 193 of 
this treaty amplify the general goals in environmental matters of the European Community.  
In the area of international relations, there has been a proliferation over the past fifty 
years of treaties, conferences, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements concerned with 
environmental degradation. Starting in 1972 with the Conference on the Human Environment 
held in Stockholm, the United Nations has held a series of conferences that included the 
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1993, a General 
Assembly Special Session on the Environment in 1997, and the Climate Change Conferences 
held in Durban in 2011 and in Paris in 2015. In addition, the United Nations has created an 
agency, the United Nations Environment Programme, to act in environmental matters. Further, 
numerous regional and bilateral arrangements have been created to deal with environmental 
matters.9 
Skirting the question of the origin of the environmental movement, the threshold issue is 
one of definition. The central issue is environmental degradation which is caused by a society’s 
economic and/or social behavior and is simply defined as, “any reduction in the environment’s 
contribution to economic well-being.”10 The degradation can be total, which is termed 
“exhaustion,” or partial, which is termed “depletion.”11 Conversely, if a society engages in 
economic and/or social behavior that results in the needs of the present generation being met 
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without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, such a society is 
engaging in sustainable behavior.12 Therefore, “a sustainable society does not use natural 
resources or produce wastes faster than they are regenerated or assimilated by the 
environment.”13 
Needless to say, there is a tension between development and sustainability. It is, by way 
of example, difficult to reconcile two provisions of The Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development. Specifically, Principle 2 provides: 
States have, in accordance, with the Charter of the United Nations, and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies.14 
Simultaneously, Principle 4 provides that: 
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an 
integral part of the development and cannot be considered an isolation from it.”15 
The key point about these institutions and activities is, however, that there exists no 
central international entity regulating the environment. This stands in contrast to the World Trade 
Organization, which was established in 1995 and has 153 States as members, and not only 
facilitates trade among its members, but also monitors compliance. Because of the complexities 
of environmental issues, international environmental law has not focused on compliance and 
enforcement. Instead, the three major areas of activity center on the holding of international 
conferences that articulate general principles designed to guide states towards environmental 
protection, the drafting of treaties to deal with specific environmental problems with an aim of 
establishing technical guideline on dealing with the particular problem, and the creation of 
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voluntary self-regulatory regimes by Non-State Actors for environmental impact and risk 
assessment.16 
 
II. Sources of Marine Pollution 
 
 Since this dissertation centers on the establishment of a regime to deal with oil spills on 
the high seas, sources of ocean contamination should be briefly reviewed. Oceans, which occupy 
three fourths of the earth’s surface, are probably the key portion of the biosphere. Particularly 
vital is their role as a medium for the growth of fish, which provide significant amounts of 
protein and other nutrients for much of mankind. Fish, however, are the end result of a food 
chain process that originates at the level of phytoplankton, tiny organisms that serve as nutrients 
for more complicated forms of life. In the North Atlantic area, 1,000 pounds of phytoplankton 
produce:  
One hundred pounds of zooplankton or shellfish;  
Fifty pounds of anchovies and other small fish and ten pounds of small carnivores;  
One pound of carnivores harvested by man.17 
Phytoplankton, however, also has the ability to attract, absorb, and retain extraneous 
substances. Heavy metals such as aluminum, copper, and lead can be concentrated by the 
phytoplankton at levels up to one hundred thousand times the concentration in the surrounding 
environment.18 By destroying the phytoplankton, the rest of the food chain suffers 
commensurately. Besides the food factor, mankind benefits from the oceans in other ways. 
Oceans provide recreation for swimmers and surfers, livelihoods for fishermen and sailors on 
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merchant vessels, and most precipitation originates as evaporation and condensation of ocean 
waters. Many biologists maintain that life itself originated in the oceans.  
Conversely, oceans have also served as humanity’s ultimate sewer. Because of a 
prevailing belief that oceans can accommodate a limitless flow of man’s wastes, enormous 
quantities of refuse, sewage sludge, industrial wastes, and dredging spoils are continuously being 
emptied into the seas. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, at the time of the Torrey Canyon 
episode, the Brussels Conference and the ocean protection regulation enacted by the United 
States and Canada, the environmental degradation of the oceans was horrific. A report prepared 
in 1970 by the Dillingham Environmental Corporation for the Bureau of Solid Waste 
Management estimated that the yearly amount of wastes discharged from the coastal regions of 
the United States totaled 48,210,710 tons.19 Impressive scientific evidence was being 
accumulated that indicated that oceans’ capacity to absorb wastes was not unlimited. On a more 
impressionistic basis, in 1970, Thor Heyerdahl, after crossing the Atlantic Ocean on the Ra, 
noted that oil globs and manmade debris virtually carpeted the ocean.20 In 1970, governmental 
officials and scientists publicized the existence of the New York Bight disposal area where 
sludge had accumulated for over forty years. The conditions were so severe that it was termed a 
dead sea and oxygen levels were not deemed sufficient to support various forms of aquatic life 
including shellfish.21 Other detrimental results of certain pollutants include mutant forms of fish 
and fish with cancerous growths.22  
The problem of maritime pollution was summed up best by Barbara Ward and Rene 
Dubos. “Every ounce hitherto dumped or channeled into the sea, from the very morning of time 
until the modern age of general industrialization, has accumulated in one form or another inside 
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the same landlocked sea, the lowest section of our biosphere and the only one with no outlet for 
refuse.”23  
There exist at least three major categories and/or sources of ocean pollutants. The first 
two—chlorinated hydrocarbons and waste dumped from vessels—while significant, are not, 
however, relevant to this study.24 Oil pollution, however, is a significant ongoing problem and 
forms the core of this study. The most common ways in which oil enters the marine environment 
are:  
a) Naturally, via seepage and from the decay of marine and animal life. 
b) Off shore oil exploration. 
c) Deballasting by tankers. 
d) Tanker break-up. 
e) Loading accidents in port. 
f) Wastes from land-based petroleum use and refining being dumped into the seas. 
While the exact quantity of oil discharged into the seas is unknown, it has been estimated 
that about one million metric tons of oil are spilled annually into the seas from oil transport, and 
the total from all of man’s activities is probably ten times that figure.25 The largest single source 
of oil in the sea probably comes from deballasting and other cleaning operations by tankers and 
other ships.26  
Yet, it should also be noted that oil seepage occurs in large quantities naturally. Oil was 
observed in the Santa Barbara Channel off California as early as 1793, years before oil was used 
in significant quantities.27 Nonetheless, with the increase in size and number of tankers, and the 
acceleration of the development of offshore petroleum exploration, it is these sources of 
pollution by oil that are becoming increasingly significant. Thus, in the late 1960s the average 
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tanker weighed 12 thousand to 13 thousand tons. By 1972, there were four tankers in operation 
of 325 thousand tons, and plans were being developed for 800 thousand-ton tankers.28 If but one 
of these super tankers were to spill its cargo, the total pollution from tankers would increase by 
twenty-five percent.29  
When the Torrey Canyon became grounded off the English coast in 1967, thirty million 
gallons of oil were spilled. The 1969 Ocean Eagle disaster near Puerto Rico resulted in a spill of 
three million gallons.30 In addition, with the increase in offshore oil drilling, more accidents 
became inevitable. The Santa Barbara disaster of January 1969, resulted in a spill estimated at 
one to three million gallons.31 The 1989 Exxon Valdez grounding and the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig explosion dwarfed the magnitude of these events. To sum up, at the time of the 
Torrey Canyon disaster, there occurred worldwide about ten thousand oil spills per year, two 
thirds of which occurred in port and harbor areas, and the short-range prospect was for 
proliferation of these discharges.32  
 
III. Environmental Degradation and International Law 
 
If oil pollution of the seas is a significant international environmental issue, the point of 
departure in acting in concert to devise a solution is to determine whether Public International 
Law offers any agreed upon principles and guidelines upon which to craft an appropriate 
response. As it turns out, the years from 1941 to 1966 (immediately prior to the Torrey Canyon 
episode) marked a particularly fruitful time period in which Public International Law developed 
to meet the challenge of environmental degradation. 
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The threshold question, simply put, is whether the mere act of an oil tanker polluting the 
seas through discharges of oil contravenes any principle of international law. Further, if such a 
principle exists, is the ship- (or cargo-) owner financially liable to the entities or parties injured 
by the oil spill? While a response might simply be that it is just plain wrong for a State or Non-
State Actor to degrade the biosphere, the answer is far more complex. 
The more precise question is whether there exists a duty under the norms of Public 
International Law not to degrade the biosphere, and if so, what are the consequences of 
breaching this duty? Would such a breach of duty rise to the level of delictum iuris gentium, 
"wrong against the law of nations"? To clarify, it is a fundamental principle of western 
jurisprudence that liability accrues to a tortfeasor if a duty to others has been breached.33 
Conversely, as general rule, no liability accrues in the absence of a breach of duty.34 The 
counterpart principle in Public International Law is State Responsibility. Article 3 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility provides: 
Article 3 
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State 
There is an intentionally wrongful act of a State when: 
(a) conduct consisting of an act of omission is attributable to the state under international 
law; and (b) that conduct constitutes a breach of international obligation of the State.35  
 
While rules and laws enjoining environmental damage by polluters in the domestic law 
context can be traced to antiquity,36 there historically have been no counterpart prohibiting 
pollution causing activities in Public International Law. The only exception is a generic 
principle that a State has a duty not to cause harm or permit activities from its territory that 
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cause harm to another State. (Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.)37 It has been observed that 
the classical writers and commentators on Public International Law essentially had little, if 
anything, to say on pollution-causing activities.38 The paucity of international norms is best 
summed up as follows: 
The classical references to pollution are few, and even then, in a context which makes 
them to appear to be little more than footnotes to rules on warfare. Neither Grotius nor 
any of the other classical writers appear to express any concern for the non-intentional 
pollution of the environment. Their frame of reference was purposeful pollution as a 
possible tactic of warfare, not pollution as the by-product of an industrial world.39 
During the twenty-five-year period from 1941 to 1966, however, this absence of Public 
International Law norms governing the pollution of transnational resources began to change 
when three significant contributions were made to the body of international law governing the 
pollution of transnational resources. The first resulted from a case of arbitration – the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration – between the United States and Canada (1941). The second was a 
multinational treaty – the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil (1954). The third resulted from the promulgation of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the 
Waters of International River by the International Law Association (1966). While each of these 
three, especially in its own time, may not have been viewed as groundbreaking, their combined 
effect was the establishment of a norm of Public International Law restricting the freedom of a 




A. The Trail Smelter Arbitration – March 11, 194140 
 
The Trail Smelter Arbitration arose out of the following circumstances. The 
Consolidated Mining and Smelter Company owned a smelter located in Trail, British Columbia 
(at that time still called the Dominion of Canada). The smelter, which was used to process zinc, 
lead, and other metals, discharged fumes that caused damage to crops and forests in the State of 
Washington. To resolve the issue of liability and the extent of damages, it was decided, pursuant 
to a 1935 Special Agreement between the two counties, which established a three-person 
arbitration panel to resolve all issues.  
Article III of the Agreement empowered the Tribunal to decide four questions:41 
1. Whether damage caused by the Trail Smelter to the State of Washington has 
occurred since the first day of January 1932, and, if so, what indemnity should be paid 
therefor? 
2. In the event of the answer to the first part of the preceding Question being in the 
affirmative, whether the Trail Smelter should be required to refrain from causing damage 
in the State of Washington in the future, and, if so, to what extent? 
3. In the light of the answer to the preceding Question, what measures or regime, if 
any, should be adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter? 
4. What indemnity or compensation, if any, should be paid on account of any 
decision or decisions rendered by the Tribunal pursuant to the next two preceding 
Questions? 
The tribunal was authorized to answer the questions based on the law of the United 
States as well as international law and practice. Further, each country was authorized to use 
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scientists and technical experts to come to its conclusion, and, in fact, the Decision of Tribunal 
incorporated expert testimony based on the data amassed by the scientists and technical 
experts.42 
The uniqueness of the task given to the tribunal was expressed in its final decision when 
the Tribunal concluded, "No case of air pollution dealt with by an international tribunal has been 
brought to the attention of the Tribunal nor does the Tribunal know of any such case. The 
nearest analogy is that of water pollution. But, here, also, no decision of an international tribunal 
has been cited or has been found."43 
Since no precedent was available, the Tribunal used the reasoning of Professor Eagleton, 
who wrote in Responsibility of States in International Law, "A State owes at all times a duty to 
protect other States against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction." Further, 
the Tribunal incorporated decisions of the United States Supreme Court in cases like State of 
Missouri v. State of Illinois (200 U.S. 496,521), Kansas v. Colorado (185 U.S. 125), the State of 
New York v. the State of New Jersey (256 US. 296, 309), the State of Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Company and Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company, Limited (206 U.S. 230), 
which dealt with diversion of rivers, pollution of New York Bay, and air pollution crossing from 
a one state to a second state.44 
Therefore, the Tribunal held that "under the principles of international law, as well as the 
law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence."45 
Within this legal framework, the Tribunal answered the four questions as follows: 
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1. Sulfur dioxide from the Trail Smelter had drifted into Washington State. The 
scientific experts concluded that the sulfur dioxide impacted negatively on crop 
development and forests. The American standard for computation of damages was 
utilized by the Tribunal and was based on the reduction of the value of the land 
(diminished crops, and diminished lower rentals for properties). No damages, however, 
were awarded to the United States for violations of its sovereignty.46 
2. Initially, no decision was made on Question 2, and its resolution by the Tribunal 
was deferred until October 1, 1940. Thereafter, the Tribunal decided that the damages 
due from Canada to the United States amounted to $78,000. Ultimately, after protracted 
negotiations between the United States and Canada, a government payment in the amount 
of $350,000 was made.47 
3. The Arbitration Tribunal decided that permanent scientific instruments should be 
strategically placed in border areas so that meteorological and other conditions could be 
monitored, thereby ensuring compliance with the arbitration decision. Further, the 
instruments would be monitored by two technical consultants who had been appointed by 
their respective governments to assist the Tribunal experts in the fields of meteorology 
and agriculture.48 
4. The Tribunal noted that the international regime established by it would prevent 
further damage in the future. Moreover, as to any damages which, nonetheless, could 
occur in the future, the Tribunal held, "an indemnity shall be paid for such damage, but 
only when and if the two Governments shall make arrangements for the disposition of all 
claims for indemnity under Article XI of the Convention."49 
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While the Trail Smelter decision explicitly decided that a State would be financially 
liable for serious damages to another State, the decision was limited to the facts of that 
particular case, and there is no evidence that it was seen at the time as having any broader 
implication for the international system.50  
Yet, while it can be easily argued that while the participants in the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration did not see the results as particularly groundbreaking,51 it is clear that the 
Arbitrators’ decision had long-term significance in the rise of an environmental awareness, 
which in turn would form the legal and intellectual basis of the development of international 
regimes in the forthcoming decades.52 
Specifically, the principle that emerged from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, namely that 
the polluter is liable to his victims for harm caused by pollution activities (“polluter pays”) was 
loosely incorporated thirty-one years later into Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment, which declared: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.53 
 
It has been pointed out that this language does not replicate the Trail Smelter Arbitration 
principle in that the Stockholm Declaration omits the qualifying adjective "serious" (serious 
damage) in terms of what constitutes a breach of Public International Law.54 Fifty-one years 
after the Trail Smelter Arbitration, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992), the Rio 
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Declaration on Environment and Development was adopted, and while it did not use the 
adjective "serious," it clearly incorporated the principle of "polluter pays" as a principle of 
international environmental law. Specifically, Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development states: 
National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment.55 
Finally, when the International Law Commission promulgated the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, the Trail Smelter Arbitration was mentioned several times in the Commentary as 
a precedent for the incorporation of the principle of State responsibility for transboundary 
environmental damages.56 
 
B. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 
 
On May 12, 1954, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil was signed at a conference held in London.57 The Convention entered into force on July 
26, 1958, and was modified by Amendments in 1962. These Amendments entered into force on 
May 18 and June 28, 1967. 
The problem addressed by the Convention was the deliberate discharge of oil (a process 
known as deballasting) by ships in areas of the seas that were near coastal States but not part of 
the territorial seas. 
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Article III of the Convention addressed the issue of discharge of oil by ships in the 
following manner:58 
a) the discharge from a ship to which the present Convention applies, other than a  
  tanker, of oil or oily mixture shall be prohibited except when the following  
  conditions are all satisfied: 
(i) the ship is proceeding en route; 
(ii) the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content does not exceed 60 litres per  
 mile; 
(iii) the oil content of the discharge is less than 100 parts per 1,000,000 parts of the  
 mixture;  
(iv) the discharge is made as far as practicable from land; 
b) the discharge from a tanker to which the present Convention applies of oil or oily  
mixture shall be prohibited except when the following conventions are all 
satisfied: 
(i) the tanker is proceeding en route; 
(ii) the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content does not exceed 60 litres per  
 mile; 
(iii)      the total quantity of oil discharged on a ballast voyage does not exceed 1/15,000  
of the total cargo-carrying capacity; 
(iv)      the tanker is more than 50 miles from the nearest land  
 The Treaty established neither any criteria for liability, nor did it establish an international 
mechanism to punish offenders. It did not even incorporate the principle of "polluter pays" 
within its terms. Rather, it merely contained a provision that a violation of its provisions: 
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Shall be an offence punishable under the law of the relevant territory in respect of the 
ship in accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 11.59 
Appended to the Treaty were several Annexes that amplified its terms. Annex I set up the 
territorial locations where a discharge of oil would be a violation of the Terms of the Treaty. As 
a general rule, this area was within fifty miles off the coast of a contracting state. Further, the 
captain of each ship was required to keep a log of discharges of oil during each voyage. In 
addition, there was an Annex that contained specifications for the future construction of new 
ships and tankers so that oil discharges would be less likely in the future. 
While the Treaty did not establish negligence (as opposed to strict liability) as the 
standard for liability, it did contain an important escape clause in Article IV which provides in 
part: b) the source of oil or oily mixture resulting from damage to a ship or unavoidable leakage, 
if all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of 
the leakage for the purpose or minimizing the escape.60 
In other words, no liability would accrue in a scenario where a significant oil discharge 
had occurred, which damaged extensively fishing or recreational facilities, as long as the owners 
of the ship or tanker could argue that they had used reasonable measures to contain the discharge 
of oil. 
Another issue which the Convention dealt with was the all-important question of a ship’s 
nationality. The Convention provides "The present Convention shall apply to sea-going ships 
registered in any of the territories of a contracting government."61  
Needless to say, different governments have radically different standards to regulate 
shipping. Specifically, because of issues involving taxation (resulting in corporate inversions), 
labor standards (wages and hours) and safety standards, significant numbers of ships are 
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registered in countries that have a lax approach to these matters, which are generally termed 
"flags of convenience." The Marshall Islands, Honduras, Liberia, and Panama are among States 
that have lax standards. While the Geneva Convention on the High Seas62 provides that there 
should be a genuine link between a ship and the State of its registration, this provision is 
frequently ignored and certainly not enforced.63 
Further, it should be noted that the Convention is essentially impossible to police and 
enforce. A ship can deballast in a protected zone, and days or weeks may elapse before the 
resulting oil slick is detected, thereby allowing the offender to continue its voyage undetected. 
While the Convention was somewhat strengthened by the 1962 and 1969 amendments, 
and further strengthened by a successor treaty, the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution of Ships and its 1978 protocol (MARPOL), it is questionable nonetheless whether it 
has substantially alleviated the oil spill/discharge problem. Still, it should be viewed in the 
context of an era when comparatively few perceived that oil spills posed a significant problem, 
and even fewer believed that concerted international action was necessary to deal with the issue. 
Accordingly, it would be fair to characterize the Convention as an affirmative statement 
that certain transnational resources are protected from pollution damage. Nonetheless, the fact 
that enforcement provisions were in the hands of individual states, the exception to liability and 
the significant exception contained in Article III (b) makes the Treaty a relatively modest step. 
The 1954 treaty as it was subsequently amended, was the subject of a scholarly analysis 
by Professor Ronald B. Mitchell (International Oil Pollution at Sea), who described the 
amendments as effective multinational efforts to increase compliance, and, in general, improve 
the marine environment. He described compliance as, “an actor’s behavior that conforms to a 
treaty’s explicit rules.”64 What Mitchell glosses over, however, are the facts that the specific 
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“polluter pays” principle for damages (as promulgated in the Trail Smelter Arbitration), as well 
as sanctions for noncompliance, are omitted in the treaty and in its amendments. In other words, 
since there are no “explicit rules” providing for penalties and sanctions, there is no issue of 
noncompliance which, of course, is what differentiates the 1969 Brussels private law treaty from 
the 1954 convention, as well as from the 1996 London Protocol to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. The latter treaty 
incorporated Article 15, which merely recommended that the parties to the treaty meet and work 
out issues of liability. It is therefore submitted that the question of whether there is or is not 
compliance with a treaty’s terms is secondary to the issue of why certain terms are incorporated 
in a treaty and others are omitted. 
Therefore, the question arises as to why sanctions were omitted in the 1954 treaty as 
amended, in contradistinction to the 1969 private law treaty agreed to at Brussels, in which 
sanctions were incorporated. The solution to understanding the difference might lie in political-
economic analysis such as overlaps in decisionmakers among participating states and in IMCO, 
and whether IMCO was or was not a genuinely neutral agency. 
Finally, it is worth noting the notorious 1986 case of the Khian Sea, a ship which carried 
fourteen thousand tons of incinerated ash from Philadelphia, and traversed the seas for almost 
two years, searching for a place to dump its cargo. The ash was ultimately dumped on a beach in 
Haiti and in the Indian Ocean. Despite the existence of various conventions, no one was held 
legally accountable for any damages in this matter. 
Approximately four years after the Oil Pollution Convention was signed, the 1958 
Convention of the High Seas, which was perhaps the landmark treaty of that era governing the 
law of the sea, was agreed to in Geneva.65 
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Article 24 provides: 
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of 
oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the 
seabed and its subsoil, taking into account of existing treaty provisions on the subject.66 
Article 25 dealt with an agreement by the covenanting parties, "to prevent pollution of the 
seas from the dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account any standards and regulations 
which may be formulated by the competent international organizations.”67 
In addition, States pledged to "co-operate with the competent international organizations 
in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from 
any radio-active activities materials or other harmful agents."68 
In sum, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, at best, contained precatory language 
requesting States to draft regulations to prevent oil pollution of the seas, and to take measures to 
prevent the discharge of radio-active materials. Conversely, the Convention contained no 
provisions forbidding pollution of the seas or sanctions for violating its provisions.69 
 
C. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers  
 
The International Law Association (ILA), which was founded in Brussels, Belgium, in 
1873, is a private (non-governmental) group of international lawyers. Among its activities is the 
drafting of proposed rules of international law and conventions.70 Its objectives, as defined in its 
Constitution, are the "study, clarification and development of international law, both, public and 
private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect for international law." It 
has consultative status as an international non-governmental organization with a number of the 
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United Nations specialized agencies. The ILA holds biennial Conferences where the ideas 
promulgated at its committees provide a forum for discussion. To date, seventy-five of these 
conferences have been held.71 
At its fifty-second conference held in Helsinki, Finland, in 1966, its Committee on the 
Uses of Water of International Rivers offered a draft set of rules, The Helsinki Rules on the 
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. The Helsinki Rules covered the uses of international 
drainage basins. Article II defined an international drainage basin as a "geographical area 
extending over two or more States determined by the system of waters, including surface and 
underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."72 
Article III defined a basin state as, "a State, the territory of which includes a portion of 
an international drainage basin."73 
The governing principle of the Helsinki Rules was contained in the title of Chapter 2, 
"Equitable Utilization of the Waters of an International Drainage Basin." This principle was 
amplified in Article IV, which stated, "Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a 
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the drainage basin."74 
Article V sets forth the criteria for determining the equitable share of an international 
drainage basin. Among these, Article X dealt with pollution and provided: 
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an 
international drainage basin, a State: 
(a) Must prevent any new form of new water pollution or any increase in the degree 




(b) Should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in an 
international drainage basin substantially caused in the territory.75 
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to water pollution 
originating: 
(a) Within the territory of a state, or 
(b) Outside the territory of the State’s conduct. 
Article XI discussed compensation to the injured State: 
1. In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph 1 (a) of this chapter, the 
State responsible shall cease the wrongful conduct and compensate the injured co-basin 
State for the injury that has been caused to it; 
2. In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph I (b) of article X, if a State fails 
to take reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly to enter into negotiations with 
the injured State with a view towards reaching a settlement equitable under the 
circumstances.76 
Therefore, the Helsinki Rules incorporated the essence of the decision (“polluter pays”) 
in the Trail Smelter Arbitration – polluters are liable for damage caused to other States because 
of pollution-causing activities within its territorial boundaries.77 
Accordingly, by 1966, it was clear that there existed principles of international law 
governing the pollution of transnational resources. Specifically, responsibility under Public 
International Law attached to the State that permitted pollution-causing activities within its 
boundaries. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the establishment of this principle of international law 
did not have any institutional mechanisms attached to it that have provided for administrative 
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sanctions to deter and/or punish the polluters of transnational resources. Rather, the principle of 
"polluter pays" required voluntary adherence to a set of abstract principles without any operating 
guidelines. 
Specifically, while "polluter pays" became an accepted principle, it remains only an 
abstraction unless and until guiding principles were agreed upon and established. Among these 
principles are who is ultimately liable – the owner of a ship, the charterer of a ship, the owner of 
the cargo, or are they jointly and severally liable? Which standards should be used – negligence, 
gross negligence, willful acts, or strict liability? Who should be compensated – only States or 
private groups and individuals such as fishermen, beach property owners, or other private 
interests? Should there be limits to liability (such as found in the Warsaw Convention on 
liability to international airline passengers) or should liability be unlimited? 
In the absence of answers to these questions, the principle of "polluter pays" remains an 
abstract notion, in effect, an empty shell. Moreover, it should be noted that the development of 
these principles established in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, etc. must be placed in their proper 
historical context. Specifically, they occurred alongside many treaties, both bilateral and 
multinational, which governed many aspects of transnational resources, such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
on the Sea. the Standards for Training Certification and Watchkeeping, the International 
Convention on Bills of Lading, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
and the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Convention. Additionally, 
regional arrangements, such as the Rhine River Convention and the Treaty on Lake Constance, 
were all products of the early to mid-twentieth century. Most of these agreements were at that 
time seen as far more significant than the Trail Smelter Arbitration or the 1954 International 
 
35 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. (See Table II-1 for a summary and 
comparison of The Development of Principles of Public International Law Governing the 
Pollution of Transnational Resources.) 
 All of this changed forever on March 18, 1967, the day that the oil tanker, Torrey 
Canyon, smashed onto rocks off the coast of England, thereby causing a massive oil spill that led 
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IV. The Torrey Canyon Episode  
 
On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon, a supertanker of 120,890 deadweight tons, 
smashed onto the Seven Stones reef while it was traveling at full speed on a voyage from Kuwait 
to Milford Haven in Wales. The Seven Stones reef is a series of submerged rocks in international 
waters off the southwest coast of England between the Scilly Islands and Land’s End. The 
accident ruptured the Torrey Canyon’s tanks, and thousands of tons of oil escaped into the sea. 
Salvage operations were abandoned when the ship broke into three pieces, thereby becoming the 
largest shipwreck in history at the time. 
While the Torrey Canyon was only one of several major oil spill disasters in the 1960s, 
its impact transcended the physical damages it wrought.78 Although environmentalism had not 
yet become an important issue in the popular mind (the first Earth Day in the United States was 
not to occur for over three years), the Torrey Canyon disaster serves as a watershed incident in 
the development of an awareness of environmental degradation in general, and more specifically, 
in the problem of oil spills and the codification of sea law79 as applicable to environmental 
disasters. 
 The shipwreck became an international news story, with intensive coverage from print 
and electronic media. It received frontpage coverage in the New York Times (March 25, March 
28 and March 29, 1967), including a dramatic frontpage picture of the burning ship being 
bombed by the Royal Air Force in a vain attempt to halt the environmental catastrophe.80 
Decades later, Richard Hobbie, the president of the Water Quality Insurance Syndicate in New 
York, speaking at a seminar in New York sponsored by the American Institute of Marine 
Underwriters summed up the impact of the Torrey Canyon incident: 
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The graphic pictures that came out of the Torrey Canyon incident with the Royal Air 
Force attempting to bomb the vessel, and the oil washing onto the beach are still with us 
today. That event more than any other ushered in the modern era of pollution legislation 
and public awareness of the issue.81 
 It is revealing to note that as a general rule, oil spills from ships tended to be more highly 
publicized in the media than those emanating from other sources (with the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig catastrophe being a notable exception).  
While oil spills from vessels represented only about forty percent of the total amount 
discharged in recent years, they attracted disproportionate media scrutiny and public 
attention because they were more likely to be dramatic events in sensitive coastal waters 
affecting America’s shorelines. For example, while the COSCO BUSCAN spilled only 
about 54,000 (gallons) of oil in San Francisco Bay, it captured extensive media attention, 
prompted congressional hearings, and resulted in criminal convictions for both the vessel-
operating company and the pilot. By comparison, oil spills from non vessel sources, 
which have typically been more localized, have attracted less national media attention. 
For example the discharge of over 800,000 gallons of crude oil into the Kalamazoo River 
in Michigan on July 26, 2010 garnered little national attention,  
 More recently, the July 6, 2011 discharge of approximately 42,000 (gallons) of 
crude oil from Exxon Mobil’s Silvertip pipeline into the Yellowstone River in Montana 
attracted only modest media attention. It appeared to be handled as a routine incident by 
both the responsible party and government officials.”82 
 In retrospect, the Torrey Canyon episode was the first of numerous environmental 
disasters that received worldwide coverage. The Torrey Canyon itself, however, was a 
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nondescript oil tanker, one of thousands that traverse the oceans daily and are an integral part of 
the international petroleum industry. It was constructed in the United States by the Newport 
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in 1959. Originally, the ship had a deadweight 
tonnage of 65,920. In 1965, the ship was enlarged, or jumboized, in Japan by the Sasebo Heavy 
Industries Co. The vessel was cut in half and a new center section was added, increasing its 
deadweight to over 120,000 tons, thereby widening and lengthening her. At the time of the 
accident, the ship was only fifty-seven feet shorter than the Queen Elizabeth, the iconic ocean 
liner, which at that time was the largest passenger vessel in the world.83 
 The facts of the Torrey Canyon’s ownership and registration are indicative of the 
complexity of establishing liability in contemporary maritime litigation. Despite the fact that the 
ship had no physical connection whatsoever with Liberia, the Torrey Canyon was registered in 
Monrovia, Liberia, and flew that country’s flag. She was owned by the Barracuda Tanker 
Company of Bermuda, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Union Oil Company of California. On 
her last voyage, she was on charter to British Petroleum Ltd., and carried a Greek crew and an 
Italian captain. The crude oil cargo was loaded at Mena Al Ahmadi on the Persian Gulf. 
Although the disaster occurred in international waters, the resulting oil spill damaged beaches 
and property in France and Britain, as well as impacting negatively on the coastal fishing 
industry.84 
 The Liberian registry of the Torrey Canyon was not accidental. By registering the ship in 
Liberia, the owners were able to create a favorable climate for the business of transporting large 
quantities of crude oil. 
Traditionally, a ship is obligated to follow the law of its flag state; coastal and port states 
cannot impose their laws on a foreign vessel. The principle of flag state supremacy over 
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port or coastal states gives ships of a state with less stringent maritime laws some 
competitive advantage over ships from states with stricter laws.85 
 The environment consequences of the Torrey Canyon incident were monumental. Huge 
numbers of fish and seabirds were killed or injured. Livelihoods of fishermen and resort owners 
were upended. The cleanup cost for oil removal in the Channel Islands and Brittany was three 
million English Pounds. Beyond the specter of ecological disaster, important legal questions 
arose as thousands of tons of crude oil began polluting the seas and beaches:  
1. Did the British Government have a legal right to destroy the vessel in order to 
protect its coast and territorial seas? 
2. If the ship were to be destroyed as a result of British governmental action, were 
the British obligated to compensate the owners of the ship and/or its cargo for loss of 
vessel and cargo? 
3. What were the obligations of the owners and/or charterers of the Torrey Canyon? 
If they were found liable, to whom were they liable and for what amount? Where would 
the venue of the litigation be? 
 The answer to question number one appeared to be "no." At that time, no convention 
existed which permitted a State to intervene on the high seas against a vessel of another 
nationality in such a situation. While an "abatement theory" (the right, akin to self-defense, to 
intervene unilaterally to abate an imminent danger) might be utilized as a justification for such 
an action, this theory has generally not been accepted by international lawyers as a valid 
rationale for such actions.  
 In reference to questions two and three above, while these were highly technical 
questions involving domestic, as well as international law, it was evident that contemporary 
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practice absolved the shipping interests from assuming total liability in such a situation.  
 More specifically, the answer to the second question seemed to be no. The initial British 
position was that if such drastic action were undertaken, the government could be sued by a 
Dutch salvage company, which had contracted for salvage rights by British Petroleum, for loss of 
the cargo, and by Union Oil and its subsidiary, the Barracuda Tanker Corporation, for loss of the 
vessel. British Defense Minister Denis Healey stated, "We are not in a position to be able to set 
fire to the ship until they (the owners) give their agreement that this can be done."86 Instead, it 
afforded the Dutch salvagers several opportunities to refloat the vessel and also consulted with 
the owners. John Nott, a Conservative MP noted, "Can anyone believe, if a British tanker had 
gone aground outside New York harbor, President Johnson would still have been negotiating 
with the British owners ten days later?"87 
 Finally, after high winds had caused the ship to break into several sections and most of 
the cargo of oil had been discharged, the British government elected to bomb the vessel. The task 
was substantially more difficult than had been originally anticipated. Ultimately, 161 thousand-
pound bombs, eleven thousand gallons of kerosene, three thousand gallons of napalm, and 
sixteen rockets were utilized to destroy the wreck and the oil.88  
 Most troublesome was the question of liability for damages inflicted by the Torrey 
Canyon on the French and British coasts. Great Britain was a signatory to the International 
Convention Relating to the Liability of Owners of Sea Going Ships (Brussels, October 10, 1957). 
Under the terms of this treaty, 1,000 gold francs (about $67) was available per net ton of ship for 
all liability claims provided that there was no loss of life. If fatalities did actually occur, an 
additional 2,000 gold francs per net ton was to be made available to compensate for injury or 
death. The Torrey Canyon had a net tonnage of 48,427 tons. The treaty required that the weight 
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of the engine room be added to the figure, yielding a liability limit of about 4.2 million dollars, 
far short of the British cleanup costs, let alone compensation for claims for damages incurred as 
a result of the shipwreck.89 Further, because the United States had not ratified the 1957 Brussels 
Convention, and because an American corporation (Union Oil) was a party to the controversy, 
the role of American law was also relevant. In 1967, the American legislation that covered a 
contingency such as the Torrey Canyon was over a century old.  
 Specifically, in 1851, Congress passed a law stipulating that, in the absence of personal 
injury or death, an owner’s liability be limited to the value of the vessel.90 The American courts 
interpreted the law to mean the value of a ship after the disaster, Norwich Co v. Wright, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 104 (1871). Since the only salvageable portion of the Torrey Canyon was one lifeboat, 
the owner’s liability would be limited to fifty dollars.91Shortly after the disaster, Union Oil and 
the Barracuda Tanker Corporation filed a petition in a United States District Court to limit their 
liability to fifty dollars.92  
 The French and British governments, fearing that the oil and shipping interests might 
evade financial responsibility for their portion of the damages, commenced an intricate series of 
legal maneuvers. The Lake Pelourde, a sister ship of the Torrey Canyon, was seized first by the 
British and thereafter by French authorities in Singapore and Rotterdam, respectively, and was 
not released until a surety bond was posted in each case, which partially covered cleanup costs. 
Ultimately an out-of-court settlement was reached, and the owners and charterers indemnified 
the British and French governments with a total payment of seven million dollars, which 
probably did not cover half the costs of the cleanup, let alone losses sustained by fishermen, 
resort owners and other coastal economic interests.93  
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The environmental devastation caused by the Torrey Canyon demonstrated that a norm of 
Public International Law requiring a State to compensate another State was essentially 
meaningless in the face of an actual massive disaster. The need for the establishment of an 
international regime to confront the issue of oil spills on the seas was obvious, but two broad 
categories of issues had to be confronted and resolved prior to the establishment of such a 
regime. 
The first issue was a Public International Law issue. Could a State raise a response to the 
next level and proactively intervene against an offending ship that is threatening or actually 
causing severe environmental harm under the doctrine of self-defense, as promulgated in the 
Caroline Case?94 
The second issues were private law issues: Who was the responsible party to pay for 
damages – the ship owner, cargo owner, or another party? Who should be compensated for 
economic losses – governments, non-state interests, or both? Further, should there be a cap on 
compensation or should compensation be unlimited?  
These issues were addressed at the 1969 Brussels Conference, which was ostensibly 
designed to create an international regime to deal with the legal aspects of marine oil spills. 
Prior to examining the substantive results of Brussels, however, methodological issues such as 
approaches to regime formation and disintegration, and the use of a critical case study should be 
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Conference on Environment and Development. 
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War II, there were two unsuccessful multilateral attempts to regulate oil spills on the high seas. On July 1, 
1922, the United States Congress passed a Joint Resolution requesting the President to convene a 
conference of the major maritime States to discuss the problem of oil spills in navigable waters. In June, 
1925, the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters met in Washington, D.C., and 
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proposed a treaty which would have banned oil discharged by vessels within fifty to one hundred miles 
from coastal regions. While the treaty was never adopted, it is doubtful that its adoption would have been 
successful in resolving any problems. One incisive observer noted, “oil patches move and to trace the 
culprit who discharged the oil, perhaps months ago and miles away, will be in most cases impossible."  
A second attempt was undertaken by the League of Nations in 1934. Great Britain initiated a discussion 
of the issue of oil pollution in July 1934 in the League of Nations; subsequently the Assembly of the 
League proposed that the Communication and Transit Organization of the League investigate the 
problem. A conference of Experts from Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom was held 
in Geneva in November 1934, and concluded that oil pollution of the seas, was, in fact, a significant 
problem. A second meeting of the Committee of Experts was held in October 1935, and a new draft 
convention, based largely on the 1926 Washington recommendations, was proposed. The League’s 
Advisory and Technical Committee favored holding a conference on the matter, and the League Council 
announced plans to convene a conference to consider the treaty. The conference was not held because 
Germany and Italy "…whose participation was considered necessary from a technical point of view, were 
not in a position to attend a conference convened under the auspices of the League of Nations." Finally, 
on account of the outbreak of World War II, the matter was not pursued further. 
58 International Convention for the Prevention of the Sea by Oil, Article III. 
59 Ibid., Artic1e III (3). 
60 Ibid., Article IV (b). 
61 Ibid., Artic1e II.  
62 United Nations Treaty Series, (vol. 450, p.11) done at Geneva April 1958, entered into force on 
September 30, 1962. Convention on the High Seas (958) Article V. 
63 At the time of this writing, approximately forty percent of the world’s sea going fleet are registered in 
Liberia, Honduras, and the Marshall Islands. Conversely, despite the fact the United States is a major 
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industrial and transportation power, only about one percent of the world’s sea going fleet is registered in 
the United States. 
64 Ronald B. Mitchell, International Oil Pollution at Sea (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), 30.  
65 Convention on the High Seas  
66 Ibid., Article 24. 
67 Ibid., Article 25. 
68 Ibid. 
69 The details of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was agreed to 
in 1982 and came into effect in 1994, are beyond the scope of this dissertation. It should be noted that a 
lengthy Section 5 (International Rules and National Legislation to Prevent, Reduce, and Control Pollution 
of the Marine Environment) was added. Nonetheless, the thrust of this section is towards individual States 
and regions adopting laws and regulations to deal with marine pollution. Conversely, UNCLOS is silent 
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Trail Smelter Arbitration) Moreover, sanctions (“polluter pays”) are not mentioned. For a detailed 
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77 Ken Conca, in Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), writes about international drainage basins (among other types of 
water resources) and the relative paucity of effective agreements regarding their regulation, which he 
attributed to the existence of political conditions inhibiting their creation. 
78 Other oil spills of the 1960s include (bbl = 42-gallon barrel): 
Argea Prima 07/17/62 28,000 bbl. 
R.C. Stone  09/07/67 R.C. Stone 09/07/67 143,000 bbl. 
Keo 11/05/69 Keo  11/05/69 210,000 bbl. 
Because of larger oil tankers and more efficient methods of oil drilling, as well as the 1990 Gulf War, the 
size of oil spills grew significantly over the ensuing decades. By 2014, the largest oil spills included: 
 The Sea Star Oil Spill  (1972)  35.3 million gallons 
 Amoco Cadiz   (1978)  69 million gallons 
 Atlantic Empress Oil Spill (1979)  90 million gallons 
Nowuz Oil Field Spill  (1979)  80 million gallons 
Gulf Oil Spill (2010) Kolva River Oil Spill  (1983)  88 million gallons 
 Castillo de Bolivar Oil Spill (1983)  79 million gallons 
 Odyssey Oil Spill  (1988)  40.7 million gallons 
Persian Gulf War  (1991)  380-520 million gallons 
 ABT Summer Oil Spill  (1991)  51-81 million gallons 
 M/T Haven Tanker Oil Spill (1991)  45 million gallons 
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Deep Horizon Oil Spill  (2010)  200 million gallons 
 Interestingly enough, the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska, while so widely publicized and 
subsequently litigated, does not even rank among the worst thirty-five oil spills of all time. It was a spill 
of 11 million gallons, which could have been far worse given the fact that the Exxon Valdez was carrying 
55 million gallons of oil. 
Probably the largest oil spill catastrophe of all time was the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling 
platform, which was owned by British Petroleum (BP) and which on April 20, 2010, exploded and sank 
off the coast of Louisiana. By the time the oil spill was contained, an estimated 200 million gallons of 
crude oil were discharged into the Gulf of Mexico, thereby creating an ecological catastrophe. The extent 
of the disaster was manifested in a press release by BP on July 27, 2010, in which BP announced that it 
had taken a charge of $32.7 billion dollars, including direct costs of $2.9 billion, as well as an escrow of 
$29.3 billion for future costs.  
79 On the impact of the Torrey Canyon, see Brown, “The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon,” Current Legal 
Problems 21, no. 1 (1968): 113; Albert E. Utton, “Protective Measures and the Torrey Canyon, Boston 
College Law Review 9, no. 3 (1968): 613. 
80 New York Times, March 25, 28, and 29, 1967. 
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of 1990: A Review of the Second Decade,” Tulane Maritime Law Journal 36, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 8-9. 
83 This information on the Torrey Canyon was adapted from Crispin Gill, Tony Soper, and Frank Booker, 
The Wreck of the Torrey Canyon (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1967), 16-17.  
The Barracuda Tanker Corporation was what might be termed a “shell” aka “dummy” corporation, and 
consisted of a Bermuda mail drop. The Torrey Canyon (which was named after one of the Union Oil’s 
first fields) was in reality associated with the Union Oil Co. Photographs of the vessel show the 
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long-term charter to the Union Oil Company. 
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Environmental Law Review 29, no. 1 (Fall 2011): 4-27. 
86 Richard Petrow, In the Wake of the Torrey Canyon (New York: David McKay Co., 1968), 186. 
87 Ibid., 105.  
88 Gill, Booker, Soper, op. cit., page 45. 
89 Petrow, op. cit., page 189. 
90 9 Stat. 65 
91 The American courts also ruled that if the owner of the vessel received an insurance indemnification, 
this money would not have to be added to the post-disaster value of the ship. 
92 In re. Barracuda Tanker Corp, 281 F. Supp 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
93 Petrow, op. cit., 189, 230. 
94 The concept of imminent danger was articulated in the Caroline Case which occurred in 1837. Briefly, 
during an insurrection in Canada, British forces crossed into the territory of the States and destroyed a 
vessel "The Caroline," which was being used by the Canadian rebels. There were American casualties in 
the British assault into American territory. This, in turn, led to an exchange of diplomatic notes between 
American Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and Lord Ashburton, a member of the British Parliament, 
who had negotiated with Webster to conclude the Webster-Ashburn Treaty, which resolved outstanding 
border issues between the United States and Canada. 
The Note dated April 24, 1841, sent by Webster to Ashburn articulated the doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense. Specifically, Webster wrote to Ashburn: 
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…and it will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show up what state of fact, and what rules of 
national law, the destruction of-the "Caroline" is to be defended. It will be for that Government to 
show a necessity for self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice, no moment for 
deliberation.  
The Caroline Case and the Webster - Ashburton exchange of notes is found in "British American 
Diplomacy, The Caroline Case" New Haven: Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library. 
This right of self-defense is incorporated in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, but this 
portion of the Charter deals only with armed attacked, not an impending environmental crisis. 
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 Chapter 3: Issues of Methodology 
 
 
I. Previous Studies of the Brussels Conference 
 
 While the literature on the Torrey Canyon shipwreck itself is generally either journalistic 
or descriptive,1 much of the existing literature on the Brussels Conference and the treaties it 
produced consists of legal analysis of their provisions – i.e. what each treaty article provides and 
how the treaties mark advances in Public International Law. 
 Therefore, not surprisingly, much of the initial analysis of the issues of oil spills on the 
seas and of the Brussels Conference, especially in the years immediately after 1969, appeared in 
law reviews and similar publications. Among the representative examples of this approach are 
scholarly law review articles by Dennis M. O’Connell,2 Nicholas J. Healey,3 and Allan I. 
Mendelsohn,4 as well as a lengthy unattributed forty-four-page long Comment in the Harvard 
International Law Journal.5 
 All were written by attorneys (with the possible exception of the Comment in the 
Harvard International Law Journal, which was probably written by law students) and, not 
surprisingly, primarily addressed the legal ramifications of the private law treaty. Conversely, 
there is very little in these pieces about interactions of Non-State Actors with IMCO and State 
participants at Brussels. By way of example, in Healy’s articles about Brussels, there is mention 
of the conference, the key participants who chaired the proceedings (Dr. Albert Lilar and Dr. 
Walter Muller), but there is no connection made to their professional affiliations as international 
lawyers representing shipping interests.6 These different roles raise issues of regulatory capture 
 58 
as well as regime complexes, and likewise will be examined in this dissertation. 
 Even in more recent years, much of the literature on the private law treaty tends to be 
legalistic in orientation and not framed in broader theoretical context.7  
 A partial exception to the legalistic approach in the analysis of the private law treaty is 
the literature about the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability in Oil 
Pollution (TOVALOP) and the contract regarding a supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil 
Pollution (“CRISTAL”), which were organizations established by shipowners and petroleum 
companies respectively, to provide compensation beyond that provided by the private law treaty 
to victims of oil spill damage.8 In the later years of TOVALOP’s and CRISTAL’s existences, 
numerous articles appeared that described not only the legal impact of these institutions, but also 
discussed in broad terms the interplay between shipping interests and international petroleum 
companies in the establishment and maintenance of the compensation scheme established by the 
private law treaty. 
 The question therefore arises as to what is missing in these previous studies of the private 
law treaty? And further, what can this dissertation add to the existing body of scholarly 
literature? 
 It is therefore argued that to date, there has been no study of the private law treaty and its 
effects in the broader methodological framework of international regimes. This inquiry will 
examine the results of Brussels in terms of regime formation. Further, the multiplicity of actors 
and their interactions in the Brussels process – States, IMCO, and Non-State Actors (shipping, 
oil, and insurance), will be analyzed through the paradigm of regime complexes.9 Moreover, the 
American refusal to participate in international regimes established by the private law treaty, and 
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the subsequent American election to proceed unilaterally by the enactment of the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 raise questions about the impact of exogenous events and their impact upon regime 
resilience and robustness.10 
 Finally, this dissertation contains materials, based on interviews with governmental 
officials who had both firsthand and secondhand knowledge as to what actually transpired at 
Brussels. To date, there apparently has been no study of Brussels based on the use of such 
interview data. 
 Accordingly, this dissertation, while incorporating a legal approach to understanding the 
content of the treaties under examination, seeks to move beyond a law review type analysis and 
instead place them in the realm of regime formation and regime complexes. In order to move in 
that direction, a brief review of the intellectual underpinnings of the study of international 
relations of the past seventy years follows. 
 
II. Paradigms in the Study of International Relations 
 
A. The State-Centric Model  
 
 Traditionally, the study of international relations has been oriented towards the nation 
state (“the State” or “State”), which has been the dominant entity in the international system 
since the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.11 
In a very real sense, the study of international relations, as was undertaken in the middle 
and later years of the twentieth century, developed almost exclusively around the nation state, to 
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the almost total exclusion of all other actors in the international arena. 
The state centric model was incorporated and expanded upon by many theorists of 
international relations in the mid- to late-twentieth century, and it formed the basis of the realist 
world view of the international system. Hans Morgenthau, in his classic work, Politics Among 
Nations, stressed the role of the nation state and the national interest in the international system 
with virtually no mention, let alone analysis, of the role of Non-State Actors except for Public 
International Organizations.12 
Similarly, Raymond Aron,13 Stanley Hoffman,14 and Henry Kissinger (at least in his 
earlier writings) wrote about a system of world order which relied, “on a system of independent 
states refraining from interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and checking each other’s 
ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.”15 
Nonetheless, there is virtually no rule in the realm of social science that is absolute 
without any exceptions whatsoever. Thus, even the most traditionalist theorist of international 
relations always allowed that there exist entities in international relations other than States. 
Among the obvious examples are Public International Organizations, as well as religious 
movements, the Vatican, international terrorism, state-run corporations, and the International 
Red Cross. 
Further, while Public International Organizations have been accorded the standing of an 
international person,16 most realist studies of these entities during this time period were 
predicated upon an instrumental interpretation of any particular situation, and the Public 
International Organization being studied, was viewed as being composed of sovereign States that 
utilized the Public International Organization as an instrument to attain the State’s specific goals. 
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Thus, the prevalent view of Public International Organization reduced it to an arena in which the 
clashing agendas of States were carried out.17 As two critics to this realist approach noted: 
Realists believe states would never cede to supranational institutions the strong 
enforcement capabilities necessary to overcome international anarchy. Consequently IOs 
(International Organizations) and similar institutions are of little interest; they merely 
reflect national interests and power and do not constrain the powerful states.18  
 
B. The Transnational Model of the International System 
 
 An alternative to the State-Centric model, which, as described herein, largely ignores the 
presence and roles of Non-State Actors, is the pluralist or the transnational model. The origin of 
the word transnational, as used in this context, is attributed to Phillip C. Jessup, who wrote his 
influential treatise, Transnational Law, in 1956,19 which was based on his belief that the State-
Centric model was inadequate to define the international order. Similarly, in 1964, Professor 
Wolfgang Friedmann of Columbia University wrote and lectured extensively about the diversity 
of the actors in the international system.20 This pluralist view was further developed by, among 
others, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye.21 Fundamental to their analysis is their view that 
the actors in the international system are not limited to States. Rather, they all argued that Non-
State Actors such as for-profit corporations and religious organizations, to name but two, are an 
integral part of the international system.22 They termed the pluralist system a “transnational” 
system. Keohane and Nye maintained that Non-State Actors’ roles are not confined to operating 
through their State of domicile, or the location from where they transact their business, or 
 62 
maintain their activities. Rather, they can and do act independently of their host States, and 
interact directly with Public International Organization, or other States, or other Non-
Governmental Actors.23  
This model stands in sharp contrast to the State-Centric model. It should be noted, for the 
sake of clarity, that the Keohane-Nye model uses a specific terminology that identifies and 
describes the interaction of the components of the transnational system. Thus, the term 
Intergovernmental Organization refers to a Public International Organization while Society refers 
to a privately (Non-State) organized interest group. Of course, it goes without saying that the 
Non-State Actors have their own policy agendas, which may or may not be congruent with the 
abstract notions of “the people” or “the public interest.” (For a diagram illustrating the 
components and interactions in the Keohane-Nye model, refer to Figure III-1 on the next page.) 
Probably the greatest deficiency in the Keohane transnational model is the underlying 
assumption of a sharply defined compartmentalization of its components. Even a cursory glance 
at their transnational model shows that on its face, its components are distinct: States, 
International Organizations, and Societies. Further, this assumption of compartmentalization is 
implicit in the writings of other political scientists.24  
This compartmentalization assumption apparently precludes the possibility that 
representatives of Non-State Actors may actually be embedded in the ranks of the ostensibly 
neutral state delegations and Public International Organizations. The validity of this assumption 
shall be tested in the analysis of the Brussels Conference. 
A second flaw in the Nye-Keohane model results from the fact that its major actors (S1, 
G1, S2, G2) are not differentiated or ranked. Thus, from their model alone, one cannot ascertain 
 63 
whether or not Keohane and Nye believe that Non-State Actors and International Organizations 
are inferior to, exceed, or are equal to States in power. Specific indicia of what constitutes power 
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A third flaw in the Keohane-Nye model was pointed out by Din Eshanov, who observed, 
“…The authors did not provide a clear cut analytic framework which would explain exactly how 
Non-State Actors interact with states and other subjects of IL (International Law).”26 Further, 
Eshanov continued, “it is not clear from their propositions what concrete mechanisms are 
available to Non-State Actors through which they could exert influence on the dynamics of 
global affairs.”27 
 
C. International Regimes 
 
 The simple transnational approach evolved into regime theory, which attempts to 
establish a theoretical, as well as a pragmatic, understanding of the cooperative interactions 
among States, International Organizations, and Non-State Actors. Keohane and Nye defined a 
regime as “sets of governing arrangements” whose components include “networks of rules, 
norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects.”28 
In 1983, Stephen D. Krasner edited a volume on international regimes29 which he later 
described as, “…A term that was just coming into wider usage in the field of international 
relations, and which has some currency in international law.”30 
In his seminal 1982 essay, Professor Krasner amplified this concept and defined an 
international regime as, “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Decision making procedures are prevailing for making and implementing collective choice.”31 
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This definition of a regime was refined as follows: 
Regimes are deliberately constructed, partial international orders on either a regional or 
global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue areas of international politics 
from the sphere of self-help behaviour. By creating shared expectations about appropriate 
behaviour and upgrading the level of transparency in the issue area, regimes help states 
(and other actors) to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional 
welfare or security.32 
Interestingly, in a fascinating self-reflective essay written eighteen years after his original 
theory was propounded, Professor Krasner modified significantly (if not actually walked back) 
his original definition and its underlying assumptions. Referring to his celebrated 1982 essay, he 
wrote, about his original definition of an international regime, (“principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”),  
In fact this definition reflected what would now be termed a constructivist perspective 
which emphasizes the importance of intersubjective shared ideas or identities. Most of 
the writers in the volume would not have accepted the definition had they fully 
appreciated its implications. Realists, for instance, would have defined regimes as 
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures that reflect the preferences of 
the most powerful states in the international system, and liberals would have been happier 
with a definition that read something like principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures that contribute to the solution of market failure problems. But these 
distinctions were not as clear in 1981 as they are now.33 
 Moreover, in a candid evaluation of the shortcomings of social scientists, Krasner 
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conceded that he had participated in a 1980s conference on regimes, and it was the lawyers, 
rather than the political scientists and the economists, who had clarity about the specific 
character and nature of international regimes.34 
 
1. Regime Formation 
 Regime formation “is the process by which a regime comes about in an issue area where 
hitherto none has existed. It includes both the initiation of the regime, for example, through 
international negotiations ending up in an international agreement, and its implementation 
through norm- and rule guided action by the participating states.”35 
 The process of regime formation has been the subject of considerable discussion among 
international relations theorists for over three decades. Relevant issues include (but are not 
limited to) typologies of regime formation, the role of bargaining in regime formation, the actors 
who participate in regime formation, and regime complexes, which often are a product of regime 
formation. A brief discussion of regime formation issues relevant to this dissertation now 
follows. 
 According to Oran Young, there are three tracks or channels through which regimes 
form.36 
 a. The contractian track in which actors interested in some sort of activity meet “for the 
explicit purpose of negotiating a ‘constitutional’ contract laying out a regime to govern the 
activities in question;” 
 b. The evolutionary track, which is the result of social institutions “arising either from 
widespread practice over time, or as a consequence of dramatic unilateral actions that are 
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subsequently accepted by others on a de facto basis;” 
 c. The piecemeal track in which actors, “can reach agreements on one or more 
components of a regime without entering into a comprehensive social contract regarding the 
activity.” 
 Another approach to regime formation is the analysis of a phenomenon through the 
paradigm of “the assumptions that are made” about the underlying motivations of actors.37 
 Accordingly, there exist three general schools of thought about the actors and their 
motivations in the establishment of international regimes. 
 The first is an outgrowth of realism. This approach is the logical outcome of the State-
Centric theorists, previously described in this chapter, who view international regimes through 
the prism of power. 
 As such, according to this school of thought, international cooperation is most likely to 
occur when it is imposed by a dominant State or hegemon that has a dominant position over 
economic resources and the ability to impose its will over competing States.38 
 In sharp contrast, the neoliberal approach emphasizes interests as opposed to power, and 
centers on a bargaining situation where each party seeks absolute gains but does not have the 
ability to impose its will on other members of an international regime. It is suggested at this point 
that the neoliberal approach is an appropriate model to analyze the dynamics of regime formation 
and will serve as part of the methodological framework of this study. 
 Cognitivism, the third school of thought, emphasizes the role of knowledge in the 
establishment of stable regimes. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger maintain that state identities 
and the objects that they pursue in foreign relations, “are shaped by normative and causal beliefs 
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that decision makers hold and that, consequently, changes in belief systems can trigger changes 
in policies.” Therefore, focus must be placed on “the distribution of knowledge.”39 Implicit in 
cognitivism is the assumption that decision-makers arrive at a consensus based on their shared 
values, which in the instant case would be a belief that oceans must be preserved from 
environmental degradation. The case study of the Brussels Conference analyzes the validity of 
these assumptions. 
 Another approach to a broad view of regime formation is to differentiate between 
reactionary regimes and anticipatory regimes. The former addresses an existing problem (e.g. 
marine oil spills), and each actor participates in attempts to negotiate a solution based on its 
perceived interest.40 
 Accordingly, in a reactionary regime, any individual actor is satisfied if its needs are met. 
The downside of this regime is that, “the resulting institutions will be limited in its ability to 
address changing environmental conditions…”41 It can therefore be argued that reactionary 
regimes are by definition weak because decision-making will always remain with the individual 
state components who seek to maximize their own advantage at the expense of the regime’s 
interest. 
 In contrast, an anticipatory regime can be forward looking and flexible enough to meet 
changing conditions. “It prescribes the processes for resolving problems that have not been 
identified yet. Decision-making in such a regime focuses on achieving a common long-term goal 
for all the members, not on maximizing the benefits of individual members.”42 
 To sum up, the international regime established at Brussels will be analyzed as a 
contractian regime (per Oran Young) in that the relevant actors gathered for the explicit purpose 
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of addressing a particular problem and establishing rules to deal with it. Further, the regime was 
reactionary (per Hagen) as opposed to anticipatory, resulting in a regime that might not be 
resilient to the challenges of exogenous events. Finally, the neoliberal approach (based on the 
dynamics of bargaining) will be the relevant paradigm. Conversely, the realist approach (based 
on a dominant power dictating to the wealth power) and cognitivist approach (shared values 
based on knowledge) will be tested to determine their relevance to the outcome of the Brussels 
Conference.  
 
2. Regime Complexes 
 The introduction of the concept of regime complexes marked an advance in the analyses 
of regimes. Regime complexes result from, “the rising density of international institutions – 
making it increasingly difficult to isolate and ‘decompose’ individual organizations for study.”43 
 Further, a regime complex is characterized as, “loosely coupled sets of specific 
arrangements.”44 An outgrowth of regime complexes is what has been termed “forum shopping” 
since there are multiple, overlapping institutions in any regime complex, actors can choose the 
venue where they hope to obtain the most favorable outcome.45 This allows States to, “bypass 
legal commitments which tend to undermine the goals of cooperation.”46 
 The essence of a regime complex approach is that it broadens the analysis of regime 
formation from a relatively simple paradigm of interaction among States to a more detailed 
examination of all of the participants in the regime’s formation and ongoing activities. Thus, by 
way of example only, there are twelve different sets of components identified in Keohane and 
Victor’s model for the regime complex for climate change.47 They range from United Nations 
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legal regimes (UNFCCC), to bilateral initiatives, to financial market regulating agencies. 
 
3. Role of Non-State Actors in Regime Complexes 
 If regime complexes consist of a variety of actors, both State as well as Non-State, the 
question arises as to the nature of the configuration in which these interactions occur. 
 First, as a general proposition, the role of ideas cannot be underestimated. As Thomas 
Risse-Kappen observed, the end of the Cold War cannot be analyzed separate and apart from the 
role of ideas, knowledge, values, and strategic concepts. He argued that the transmission of ideas 
from natural scientists, think tanks, scholars at academic institutions and public interest groups to 
their counterparts in the Soviet Union led to a mentality that was instrumental in ending the cold 
war.48 
 Second, the institutional presence, identity, and roles of Non-State Actors in a regime are 
crucial. In this dissertation, the core issue is to identify the Non-State Actors at Brussels, and the 
methods used by them to shape the contours of the regime. Chapter IV details six of the major 
Non-State Actors in the regime complex, as well as issues of overlapping identities among the 
State and Non-State Actors. 
 In recent years, the role of Non-State Actors in regime formation has been analyzed 
extensively. In Sell and Prakash’s study centering on a 1994 agreement on intellectual property 
(Trade-Related Intellectual Property or TRIPS) and the subsequent distribution of certain 
HIV/AIDS medications, they note the role of ideas in the bargaining process but ask the obvious 
question of whose ideas matter. Moreover, they observed that business interests and non-
governmental organizations, despite obvious differences are, nonetheless, similar enough in that 
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they have instrumental goals and principled beliefs, and thus they can be studied together. 
Further, they observed that both business interests and nongovernmental organizations use 
interest group tactics such as agenda-setting and mobilization of public opinion.49 
 Similarly, Raustiala, and Victor’s study of plant genetic resources revealed a 
sophisticated system of actors, institutions, and other components interacting with each other.50 
 This approach was taken a step further by Elizabeth A. Bloodgood who actually 
advocated the use of domestic interest group activity to analyze Non-State Actors.51 Specifically, 
she observed that American interest groups have three mechanisms for influence: campaign 
contributions and electoral pressure; strategic information transmission or expertise; and 
grassroots representation and mobilization.52 Bloodgood found that these mechanisms were 
useful in constructing a State-Centric theory of the international system, while simultaneously 
not underestimating the importance of advocacy INGOs or overestimating the decline of the 
State.53 
 In short, the study of international regimes based on an approach that the networks of 
arrangements among different types of actors, in which there exist significant overlaps among 
the State and Non-State components, all operating in a market economy, is a relevant paradigm 
for analysis of these regimes. 
 
4. The American Interest Group Analogy 
 If a regime complex incorporates a multiplicity of groups, both State and Non-State, and 
if business interests do in fact exhibit behavior substantially similar to that of non-governmental 
organizations per Sell and Prakash, and if domestic interest activity might provide a useful 
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paradigm per Bloodgood, then a brief discussion of some of the other observations about 
domestic interest group activity can be useful in analyzing the results of the Brussels Conference. 
 Specifically, students of American interest groups understood decades ago that the role of 
interest groups in the United States went far beyond the three mechanisms for influence 
suggested by Bloodgood. Among the most crucial mechanisms are strategies used by domestic 
interest groups that allow for participation in the decision-making process through the use of 
organs of administrative pluralism, clientism leading to regulatory capture, and self-regulation. A 
brief discussion of each of the strategies reveals the following. 
 
i.  The Existence and Roles of Organs of Administrative Pluralism  
The term “organs of administrative pluralism” refers to entities established by a particular 
government to bring specific private (non-governmental) entities into the decision-making 
process. The importance of these entities is that they provide a platform by which interest groups 
are embedded into an official governmental institution. At the very least, this results in an 
interest group having an officially sanctioned link to governmental decision-makers. 
A student of the administrative process noted the diversity of interest group/bureaucratic 
relationships in the following terms: 
The influence exercised by groups on the administrative process can probably be 
considered on a continuum. On the one hand, there exist in many countries officially 
sanctioned institutions described sometimes as organs of administrative pluralism i.e. 
boards and committees which are merely supposed to provide expert advice to the 
administration especially in economic and social matters. On the other hand we find 
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situations where public and private ‘managers’, the civil servants, and the staff of interest 
groups are working so closely together that to speak of ‘pressures from the outside’ is no 
longer an adequate description. Here the administrative process may have been 
‘colonized’ by the representatives of interest groups to an extent that the dividing line 
between state and society has all but disappeared.54 
The establishment of “organs of administrative pluralism” has been a fairly common 
phenomenon in industrialized nations. In the mid-nineteen-fifties, for example, over five 
thousand advisory committees, many of them having corporate representation, existed within the 
framework of the federal executive departments in the United States. During the Korean War, 
five hundred and fifty industry advisory committees were attached to the National Production 
Authority, an agency of the Department of Commerce.55 
In 1972, the United States Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act,56 
whose purpose was to reduce significantly the number of these entities, as well as to diversify the 
nongovernmental participants, in order to achieve a balance of opinions. Accordingly, their role 
in the policy-making process has probably diminished since that time. This statutory change, 
however, occurred three years after the Brussels Conference in 1969. As will be discussed below 
(Chapter IV), the Shipping Coordinating Committee, an organ of administrative pluralism 
attached to the United States Department of State, was particularly influential in formulating a 
policy position for the American delegation at the Brussels Conference. 
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ii. Clientism Leading to Regulatory Capture 
The clientele of an agency are, “...those groups whose interests are strongly affected by 
an agency’s activities, and provided the principal sources of political support and opposition.”57 
Clientism has been studied for decades as a phenomenon in domestic politics, but far less at the 
level of the international system. Among the conclusions drawn by political scientists studying 
domestic politics are that agencies often become dominated and are, in fact, captured by the 
groups that they are supposed to regulate. This phenomenon is known as regulatory capture. In 
the realm of international environmental regimes, there is some discussion of regulatory capture 
because of the existence of domestic entities, as well as multinational corporations, acting as 
stakeholders in the regime formation and ongoing regulation processes.58 
David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala and Eugene B. Skolnikoff however, conclude:  
We expected to find that policy systems open to participation by target groups would be 
prone to regulatory capture leading to public policy decisions that mirror the interests of 
regulated target groups, not the public good. The studies confirm that while regulatory 
capture is a risk, the capturing influence of target groups has been offset through 
informed participation by countervailing groups.59 
Other studies of international regimes established to deal with environmental issues 
have failed to incorporate even the possibility of regulatory capture in their research or 
conclusions. Thus, in their collection of research studies titled The International Politics of 
the Environment, Actors, Interests, and Institutions, Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury 
et. al discuss environmental issues such as deforestation, marine dumping, ozone depletion, 
and climate change, to name but a few, and limit their analysis of the role of Non-State 
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Actors to international environmental groups.60  
Conversely, despite the word “actors” in the subtitle, there is no mention of the role 
played by multinational corporations in formulating the terms of any particular 
environmental agreement, which certainly represents a failure to view the formulation of an 
international regime through the prism of regulatory capture of veto groups.61 As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter IV, the key to understanding the private law treaty was the 
regulatory capture of IMCO by Non-State Actors. 
Further, administrative agencies often actively seek support from interest groups, and the 
sources from which agency personnel are recruited have a direct bearing on policy outcomes.62 
Perhaps the ultimate manifestation of clientism is the veto group: it, by definition, has the power 
to oppose successfully any change in the status quo that the group perceives to be a threat to its 
position.63 This definition differs from the approach of George Tsebelis, who writes extensively 
about “veto players,” which he defines as follows, “in order to change policies – or, as we will 
say henceforth, to change the (legislative) status quo – a certain number of collective actors have 
to agree to the proposed change. I call such actors veto players.” Tsebelis, however, limits his 
definition of veto players to constitutionally-mandated players (e.g. Congress or the President), 
or those created by the political system (e.g. political parties).64 As previously stated, however, 
the term veto group as used in this study is a nongovernmental entity (Non-State Actor), which 
has the ability to block change unless its demands are accepted by all players. The concept of 
clientism will be utilized to examine the relationship between the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization and the Comite’ Maritime Internationale, a Belgian-based 
organization of maritime lawyers, which historically has actually drafted treaties in the area of 
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international shipping. 
The concept of clientism will also be used to analyze the composition of the American 
delegation to the Brussels conference. Clientism explains the presence of shipping, oil and 
insurance interests, and the absence of environmentalists; it also sheds light on the political clout 
of the fishing and coastal interests who would be directly involved in any lawsuit for damages 
arising from an oil spill. In addition, the role of the British marine insurers at the Brussels 
conference will be examined by the use of the veto group concept. 
 
iii.  Self-Regulation as a Manifestation of Non-Decisions 
Another concept developed in the study of domestic groups is that of the non-decision. In 
Power and Poverty, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz discuss the decision-making process. 
Among their key theoretical concepts is what they termed the non-decision. They note: 
A non-decision, as we define it, is a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a 
latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker. To be more 
explicit, non-decision making is a means by which demands for change in the existing 
allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are 
even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-
making arena; or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-
implementing stage of the policy process.65 
 
Essentially, the term non-decision-making encompasses a variety of strategies that seek 
to prevent a certain set of options from reaching the public agenda. 
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Among the strategies of non-decision employed by business interests is self-regulation. 
As Grant McConnell noted: 
The claim to autonomy is the typical demand in business. In its most traditional form – 
that government not interfere in business affairs that a policy of laissez faire should be 
followed – it is usually not seen as a business demand at all. Indeed, differing policies are 
often very simply condemned as “political”, although it should be fairly obvious that a 
policy of non-intervention is as political as any other.66 
This has been a common tactic in the context of the American political system. It has 
been noted that:  
Much of this self-policing and self-regulation is backed by state and federal law...and its 
voice carries tremendous influence regarding any changes to laws regarding the 
profession under its jurisdiction. Associations usually do this to head off governmental 
regulation and protect their profession’s independence. For example, physicians formed 
the American Medical Association in 1846 to prove that they were more than just blood-
letters, but also to stay independent of both hospitals and government.67 
Non-decision and autonomy serve as a conceptual framework to understand the strategy 
of oil tanker owners and petroleum companies in 1967 and 1968. Essentially, these two groups 
realized that with the growing consciousness of environmental degradation (which was partially 
sparked by Torrey Canyon – see Chapter IV below), some sort of international action was 
inevitable. Consequently, they reasoned that if they devised their own self-policing entities to 
deal with the oil spill problem, certain obvious benefits would accrue. Specifically, they correctly 
believed that the international community might either be deterred from undertaking any liability 
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compensation scheme in the first place, or procrastinate the implementation of any plan of 
action, or, at the very least, adopt a plan that would incorporate their own proposals as a basis of 
action. Therefore, beginning in 1967, the shipping and oil industries proposed the voluntary 
liability plans, TOVALOP and CRISTAL, either to head off or dilute proposed regulation of oil 
spills on the high seas by the international community.68 
By undertaking this course of action, the maritime and petroleum interests would, in 
effect, make these entities (TOVALP and CRISTAL) the arbiters of their own liability, and 
would have the further benefit of making themselves judge and jury vis-a-vis any potential 
liability for harm caused by them. 
 
D. The Use of a Case Study 
 
 
1. Critical Case Study 
 
 The basis of this dissertation is a single case study on the Brussels Conference. Needless 
to say, the utility of a single case (“critical case,” “single case,” or “crucial case”) as opposed to 
multiple cases, is subject to a significant debate among methodologists.  
 As indicated in Chapter I, Gary King, Robert D. Keohane, and Sidney Verba in 
Designing Social Inquiry are highly skeptical about crucial case studies. “In general, we 
conclude, the single observation is not a useful technique for testing hypotheses or theories.”69 
Moreover, they vehemently disagree with Harry Eckstein, who in the 1970s had argued that a 
crucial case not only can be used for explanatory purposes, but can also score a clean knockout 
over a theory.”70 
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  In sharp contrast to the Designing Social Inquiry argument, George and Bennett have a 
point-by-point critical analysis and rebuttal of Designing Social Inquiry, and come to very 
different conclusions on social research in general and case studies in particular. They maintain 
that, “Cases usually fall somewhere in between being most likely and least likely for particular 
theories and so pose tests for intermediate degrees of difficulty.”71 
 The most articulate defense of the single case study was made by Bent Flyvbjerg who 
explicitly rejected the idea that, “One cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; 
therefore the case study cannot contribute to scientific development.”72 After relating his own 
experience in finding “black swans” in a research project, he concluded that, “one can often 
generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific 
development via generalization as a supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal 
generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas, the ‘force of 
example, is underestimated.”73 This dissertation proceeds on the assumption that in general, 
critical case studies can be very useful in the development of theories in political science 
research. 
 
2. Process Tracing and Case Studies 
 Process tracing is defined as, “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected 
and analyzed in light of research questions and hypothesis posed by the investigator.74 It is “an 
analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidences 
often misunderstood as part of temporal sequence of events or phenomena.”75 Process tracing is 
a method to identify cause and effect by attempting, “to identify the intervening causal process – 
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the causal chain and the causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and 
the outcome of the dependent variable.76 
 Alternatively, causal process tracing is described as a way of, “formulating and testing 
explanations with case studies” Specifically, “if we are able to trace the processes, we will be 
able to identify the causal mechanism as it is operating in a particular.”77 
 A body of political science literature has developed on the theoretical aspects of process 
tracing. Moreover, there is scholarship that incorporates process tracing into actual case studies 
on international relations. Thus, by way of example, Nina Tannenwald used process tracing to 
determine why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945.78 She posited the existence of a 
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons and deterrence theory as two possible causes of the 
non-use of nuclear weapons, and by the use of process tracing, eliminated deterrence and thereby 
confirmed that it was the nuclear taboo that was the better explanation. 
 Similarly, Kenneth Schultz in Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy79 uses process tracing 
to analyze the 1898 Fashooda Incident between Great Britain and France which resulted in the 
ascendancy of British interests and the concomitant decline of French interests in East Africa. It 
further represented the last time (except for the extraordinary situation in 1940 after the Nazi 
conquest of France) in which Great Britain and France actually threatened war against each 
other. 
 Schultz uses process tracing to determine which factors were relevant to the crisis’ 
outcome. Among the factors considered were domestic considerations, economic issues, and 
military strength to come to a conclusion on how the crisis between Great Britain and France was 
resolved. 
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 In Chapter I, several factors were suggested, such as the development of norms of 
international law based on the “polluter pays” principle, the emergence of environmentalism as 
an issue on the public agenda, and the inadequate remedies for victim compensation, among 
others, as explaining the results of the Brussels Conference. Through process tracing, this 
dissertation attempts to determine which variables can be used to explain the outcome of the 
conference. 
 
E. Methodological Issues as Applicable to the Case Study of the Brussels Conference 
 Based on the foregoing, this dissertation attempts to analyze the Brussels Conference and 
the regime it established as follows. First, it is not at its core a legal analysis of the treaties signed 
at Brussels, although it is probable that an understanding of the legal concepts incorporated in the 
private law treaty’s provisions, such as strict liability versus negligence, and limits of liability 
versus unlimited liability, are a sine qua non to understanding what was accomplished at 
Brussels. 
 Nonetheless, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, law review articles have done a 
more than adequate job in detailing who is liable for marine oil spills and the extent of their 
liability under the treaties signed at Brussels. 
 Instead, this dissertation is a critical case study of the events from the Torrey Canyon 
disaster in March 1967, through the signing of the two treaties at Brussels on November 29, 
1969. 
 More specifically, it is a crucial case study of the establishment of a reactionary 
international regime (as the term is used by Hugen – see endnote 40 to this chapter), and the 
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roles of diverse actors in its establishment. These actors include States, a Public International 
Organization (IMCO), and Non-State Actors, particularly shipping, oil and insurance interests. 
Further, the neoliberal approach, which emphasizes bargaining in contradistinction to realism or 
cognitivism, will be the paradigm by which the results will be evaluated. The uneven results of 
the bargaining process, by which certain actors achieved their goals and other did not, will be 
analyzed through the paradigm of interest group theory, where concepts such as clientism will be 
incorporated not only to describe the results of Brussels, but also to understand the broader 
implications for the study of international relations. 
 Accordingly, this dissertation proceeds on the assumption that, in general, crucial case 
studies can be very useful in the development of theories in political science, and in the case of 
the 1969 Brussels Conference in particular, it is an indispensable tool of analysis because of its 
unique feature in its imposition of significant sanctions for violations of the terms of the private 
law treaty. 
 Additionally, the United States’ refusal to participate in the regime established at 
Brussels and choice to opt instead for unilateral action through the passage of the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 will be analyzed as an example of the establishment of a regime complex with 
competing institutions and centers of powers. 
 Finally, the variables, such as the development of norms of Public International Law 
based on the “polluter pays” principle, the emergence of environmentalism, the inadequacy of 
compensation remedies for oil pollution damage, and the existence of market forces 
(compensation by insurance companies) to explain the formation of the international regime will 
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be analyzed by process tracing, in order to eliminate the causes that are irrelevant to what 
actually occurred at Brussels and afterwards. 
 I do not believe that this regime theory approach has been used to date in any other 
analysis of Brussels. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the validity of this methodological 
approach, the next step is to discover what actually occurred in the leadup to Brussels and at 
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Chapter 4: The Formation of a Regime – The Brussels Conference of November 1969 
 
 Chapter II concluded with a description of the Torrey Canyon episode and the resulting 
oil spill, which ultimately cost millions of dollars to clean up and further resulted in enormous 
financial damage to fishermen, boat owners, proprietors of resorts, and those whose livelihoods 
depended on the seas. Thereafter, preparations began for what ultimately evolved into the 
establishment of an international regime to deal with the problem of marine oil pollution, in 
particular the legal questions of intervention of the high seas against the ship leaking oil, and on 
the issue of compensation to be paid to the victims of oil spills for damages sustained by them. 
 At the outset, it is crucial to emphasize that the Brussels Conference was not 
contemplated as an academic discussion of environmental issues, nor was it likely that it would 
result in general technical guidelines on ship operation and safety. Rather, it would codify and 
effectuate a new body of international law that would mandate compensation in the millions of 
dollars to parties injured by marine oil spills.  
 Further, the regime would be based on the economics of the world oil trade, a highly 
profitable business, and accordingly, liability would accrue to shipowners and their insurers, 
cargo (oil) interests, or some combination thereof. The countervailing idea that since the benefits 
of the oil trade accrue to society as a whole (gasoline for transport, oil to fuel industry and 
thereby provide employment, and oil for heating purposes), and therefore society as a whole 
should bear some or all of the losses, did not seem likely to carry the day.1 
 In order to obtain the full picture of the nature of the international regime established at 







I. Preparations for the Brussels Conference – International Stakeholders Regarding Oil 
Pollution at Sea 
 
A. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization  
 
 The gaps in international law, which allowed neither for intervention against an offending 
ship, nor for realistic compensation for injured parties that were evinced after the Torrey Canyon 
episode, prompted the British government in April 1967, to request a special session of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which has been known as the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) since 1982. IMCO is a United Nations specialized 
agency that was established in 1948 at a conference convened at Geneva, Switzerland. Its 
purposes are defined in Article 1 (a) of the Convention:  
To provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental 
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping 
engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the 
highest practical standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency and 
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.2 
 Essentially a backwater among United Nations Specialized Agencies, it began to function 
on January 6, 1959, and by 1967, it had fifty-nine members (by contrast, in 2018 it has one 
hundred fifty-three members, and three associate members). Operating on a minuscule annual 
budget of only one million dollars, IMCO had dealt exclusively with various technical matters in 
the maritime field and had aroused little general interest outside of the maritime community. 
Within the maritime community, there was resistance to the very idea of an agency like IMCO as 





area perceived as technical.3 Matters such as navigation, radio communications, methods of 
tonnage measurement, and protection of ships against fire hazards were the types of activities 
generally undertaken by IMCO. Nonetheless, given its budgetary constraints, IMCO did not have 
a large staff, and it was questionable whether it was up to the task at hand after the Torrey 
Canyon disaster. Accordingly, Non-State Actors such as the Comité Maritime International 
(CMI—see below) were available to become highly involved in the inevitable adoption of rules 
and regulations to be promulgated regarding oil spills on the seas. At the time of the Torrey 
Canyon disaster, a number of Non-Governmental Organizations had been granted official 
consultative status, which tended to overrepresent international shipping interests.  
 Parenthetically, by 2016, sixty-eight Non-Governmental Organizations had been granted 
consultative status by the IMO. They constitute a diverse group whose interests range from 
environmentalism (Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace International) to industry 
groups (International Bulk Terminals Association, International Associations of Independent 
Tankers Owners). 
 It should be emphasized that IMCO, like other Public International Organizations, then as 
well as now, is an integral part of an ongoing political-economic process. It does not exist in a 
rarified world of ideas, where organizational, economic, political and even personal motives are 
irrelevant to its work and mission. As Susan Strange noted: 
But it should be enough at least to pose the in-whose-interest question, in the hope that 
subsequent research may pursue it further. Note that this is a fundamentally different 
question than the regime one that has dominated the literature of international 
organization – and its eponymous journal, IO – for almost a quarter of a century. The 
regime question has been about when, and how, governments could be got to cooperate; 





an afterthought, did the cui bono question crop up. A notable exception was an edited 
volume in the late 1960’s The Anatomy of Influence, comparing the decision making 
processes in a half-dozen UN specialized agencies (Cox and Jacobson, 1973). They did at 
least ask the questions when and if these processes were influenced by “private regarding 
motivated” – in less polite language, by the self-serving interests of international 
officials. Otherwise, it has generally been an implicit assumption of regime research that 
any increase in international organisation is a triumph of idealism over realism, that more 
is always better, and that cooperation is ipso facto better than conflict – no matter what 
the purpose of the cooperation, and whatever the outcome of that cooperation. And the 
outspoken assumption, of course, is that international officials are selfless dedicated 
missionaries, with only the best interests of the world community at heart.4 
 
 Similarly, John M. Bunzel’s observation about the international system in general, is 
likewise applicable to international organizations, “The present predominant set of shared values 
and worldviews – what we might call superstructure also remain a good deal less than global. 
Since we don’t yet think globally and systematically, it’s hardly surprising that we’re having 
trouble solving global problems.”5 At the time of the Brussels Conference, IMCO did have 
preferences and biases, it saw its mission as being consistent with the maritime industry’s goals, 
and was not inclined towards harming this industry to promote environmental interests. 
 
B. The Comité Maritime International 
 
 By definition, decisions undertaken by IMCO on the development of technical and legal 





were part of the maritime industry – shipping interests, marine insurers, and petroleum 
companies. The European shipping interests then as well as now are organized in a 
nongovernmental organization called the Comité Maritime International (CMI). The CMI has 
probably been far more important than IMCO in the drafting of international law on marine 
matters. Based in Antwerp, it has served as an important agency in the development of 
international maritime law.  
 The CMI’s Constitution defines its purpose:  
It is a non-governmental not-for-profit international organization established in Antwerp 
in 1897, the object of which is to contribute by all appropriate means and activities to the 
unification of maritime law in all its aspects. To this end it shall promote the 
establishment of national associations of maritime law and shall co-operate with other 
international organizations.6  
 Since the time of CMI’s founding, whenever the need for a new set of laws, treaties, or 
regulations affecting the shipping industry arose, the CMI provided expertise. The CMI 
convened and drafted an appropriate convention, which was then transmitted to the Belgian 
government. In turn, that government held an international conference for the purpose of 
obtaining approval from those states that chose to participate. Among the CMI conventions 
adopted by the international community have been those dealing with matters such as collisions 
at sea, maritime mortgages and liens, arrests of ships, and salvage and assistance.  
 The CMI historically has maintained close ties with governmental officials in various 
European shipping ministries. This is particularly true in Great Britain, Belgium, Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark. The pattern of interaction closely resembles a client-patron relationship 
that has been studied and observed in many bureaucracies where an agency and an interest group 





the CMI, both as an organization and also as some prominent individuals associated with it, 
provides information and occasional political support to governmental officials.8  
 In turn, the CMI is given crucial input in decision-making regarding marine affairs in the 
abovementioned States. As I was told in an interview with a high official of a major international 
petroleum company, “The CMI can virtually dictate to certain governments which rules and 
regulations it will and will not accept.”9  
 The American affiliate of the Comité Maritime International is the Maritime Law 
Association, which is composed of lawyers who represent the maritime industry. Like their 
American counterparts in the marine insurance field, the Maritime Law Association is relatively 
uninfluential in policy formulation in the international area. “CMI is dominated largely by 
British and Scandinavian interests with Belgium directly behind and everyone else, including the 
United States, a very poor third.”10  
 Further, as shall be described in the next section, the shipowners have a very close 
relationship with the insurance industry either through self insurance via the Prevention and 
Indemnity Clubs, or through the purchase of policies through marine insurers. Accordingly, high 
limits of liability, coupled with the strict liability standard from marine oil pollution damage, 
would prove financially disruptive to the shipping industry. 
 
C. Marine Insurance Interests 
 
In the event of a significant oil spill, the major costs of the disaster would ultimately be 
paid by the insurance industry through third party coverage. Susan Strange was perfectly on 
target when she wrote about the insurance industry:   





economy. Those who supply it are not seeking power over outcomes–but they exercise it 
nonetheless. And increasingly so. Yet it is hardly mentioned in texts on world politics; 
(emphasis by writer of this dissertation) and in economics the study of insurance is 
dominated by a few informed specialists, most of who are ideologically committed to the 
value judgments of economic liberalism, putting the pursuit of free trade and 
untrammeled competition above all other policy objectives.11 
 
Professor Strange expanded on this thought when she wrote: 
But it is still generally true that the most widely read academic journals in social science, 
whether in economics or politics, pay little or no attention to the political economy of the 
insurance business as it is conducted in the real world. This is surprising because 
structural forces in the market, in technology, in the authority of political regulators, in 
the nature and fortunes of the players, make this one of the most dynamic of the world 
system.12 
 
 Similarly, political economist Virginia Haufler wrote about reactions of political scientist 
colleagues when she discussed her proposed research dealing with insurance. The following 
excerpt is from the introduction to her book, Dangerous Commerce: Insurance and the 
Management of International Commerce, about risk management in the international system: 
When I started this project, the reaction among my colleagues could not be called 
universally enthusiastic. Their concerns centered on whether the insurance industry made 
a suitable project for a political scientist to explore; some declared insurance dreadfully 
dull. Certainly few had bothered to explore this area previously. When I began my 





in what they did. The challenge to me was to demonstrate to readers in both the scholarly 
and business communities that the historical development of insurance reveals something 
broader about political-economic development and the changing relationship between the 
public and private sectors.13 
 
 While maritime insurance underwriters are available in many parts of the world, the 
industry has historically been centered in Great Britain. Some historians trace modern marine 
insurance to the Lombards, who were thirteenth century Italian traders, but most agree that the 
modern concept of insurance originated after 1691 at Lloyd’s Coffee House (on Lombard Street) 
in London where shipowners used to distribute lists of cargos they needed insured. Any 
interested party would sign his name (from this practice came the term underwriter) under the 
item he would be willing to insure. Lloyds, despite its venerable age, is still a powerful insurer. 
The modern Lloyd’s, together with a number of specialist “London Market” insurance 
companies, still writes about 15% of all marine business, 27% of world aviation 
insurance, and nearly 58% of all offshore energy business (including oil rigs and similar 
marine structures). Lloyd’s is not an insurance company; rather, it is a society of 
underwriters and a marketplace where risks are insured by around eighty syndicates of 
Underwriting Members (“Names”) which are controlled in turn by managing agents or 
underwriting firms (51 at present)...Marine business (and nearly all other business) is 
brought to Lloyd’s by 180 or so accredited Lloyd’s brokers.14 
 The roots of the political-economic power of the insurance industry are described in the 
following terms: 
The development and evolution of an international risks insurance regime over the course 





participants. The insurance underwriters in London and elsewhere made crucial decisions 
about what would be insured, how it would be insured, and by whom. The public 
authorities, concerned with national security and economic well-being, looked on the 
management of political risks as an important factor facilitating foreign commerce, but 
proved reluctant to become participants themselves; they eventually joined the regime as 
junior partners. The commercial underwriters and government agencies carefully separate 
their business from each other, viewing their operations as complementary not 
competitive. Both adhered to standard industry norms in designing their insurance 
contract, and both believed that many international risks could not be insured.15 
 
 In modern times, two types of maritime insurance developed. The first form insures a 
quantifiable insurance risk such as the cost of the ship and is referred to as hull and machinery 
insurance. It is issued by large marine insurance companies, who cover risks. The second form of 
insurance covers, among other losses, damage caused by a ship or its cargo, which by definition 
is not a quantifiable number that can be determined in advance. This form of insurance is not 
issued by marine insurance companies. Rather, it is issued by the shipowners themselves, who 
band together in what are termed Prevention and Indemnity Associations (“P&I Clubs”). 
Accordingly, the costs of a disaster like the Torrey Canyon are ultimately paid for by the 
shipowners themselves. Therefore, the stakes for the shipowners are enormous in a situation of 
massive damage to third parties, including government cleanup costs caused by cargo carried on 
their vessels. In a very real sense, the P&I Clubs are the alter egos of the shipowners, and any 
compensation paid by them are ultimately borne by the shipowners themselves.  
 Lloyd’s, the London-based insurer, is composed of over six thousand separate 





a particular voyage, each of the brokers (through the syndicate) can purchase a portion of the 
insured value of the vessel and/or its cargo (but generally not for damage caused by the cargo). 
Often, these individual policies issued by insurance brokers represent a tiny portion of the ship’s 
value. In the case of the Torrey Canyon, over four thousand brokers had insured the hull, and the 
losses in many cases were as little as one thousand dollars. Although the Torrey Canyon’s hull 
was insured at sixteen and a half million dollars (the greatest loss in maritime history), the loss of 
the portion insured by the British underwriters was easily absorbed by the British insurers.16 
 In 1969, British underwriters insured the bulk of the world’s shipping tonnage. Their 
position was that high limits of liability, combined with a strict liability standard (as opposed to 
the traditional maritime concept of fault), would result in uninsurable liabilities, which implied 
that the system in place for the transoceanic transport of oil would simply break down.17 
 The United States marine insurance industry at that time was smaller and far less 
influential than its British counterpart. Nonetheless, the amount paid out by it for the Torrey 
Canyon loss amounted to almost twenty-five percent of its total annual premium intake.18 In 
1971, the American Hull Insurance syndicate reported that the percent of the income paid out to 
indemnify casualties was at a record high, and indicated that new policies were required to meet 
contemporary challenges to the industry.19 Therefore, it urged lower limits of liability and lower 
standards of liability, specifically, liability based on negligence, with carved out exceptions 
diluting that standard, as opposed to the higher standard of strict liability. In addition, shipowners 
were interested in the idea of an international fund that would obligate the cargo interests (i.e. 
oil) to participate in any compensation scheme. This would distribute the costs to the entire oil 
transport industry and lessen their own financial burden. Thus, their interests did not necessarily 






D.  The Petroleum Interests 
 
 The power and size of the major international oil firms have been well documented.20 
The relationship between the oil and shipping industries is complex. Petroleum companies 
operate their own tankers, yet independently owned tankers have always been an important 
factor in the transoceanic transport of oil.21 The American Merchant Marine Institute (AMMI), 
which was the major merchant marine lobby in the United States until 1968 when it merged into 
a new association known as the American Institute of Merchant Shipping, listed in 1972 among 
its forty three members, eight oil companies including Standard Oil Company of California, 
Atlantic Refining Company, and the Sun Oil Company.22 As previously noted, however, a 
divergence of interests was manifested between these two industries at the 1969 Brussels 
conference over liability for oil spills. The States where shipping interests were powerful argued 
that cargo interests, rather than vessel owners, should bear the responsibility for liability for 
damages. While oil interests were not averse to some forms of compensation, this could be 
accomplished only if the shipowners and the P&I Club agreed to participate in offering some of 
the compensation to damaged parties. Further, the terms of liability could neither be made 
unlimited, nor based on strict liability, rather than on fault.23 Of the three involved major 
industries (shipping, insurance, and oil), the oil companies offered the least resistance to a 
compensation plan. The reasons for this attitude were:  
a) Their financial resources were far greater than those of the shippers or the 
insurers. (It should be remembered that these events occurred in the late l960s, a time 
when the oil interests were far more independent and far less under the control of the 
States in which they drilled for oil than they are today.) 





criticism for oil spills (which is still true today). By participating in a compensatory 
scheme, a more positive public image might be developed. 
c) Finally, by participating in the establishment of any international fund, the oil 
industry would have an effective voice in its founding and in its ensuring policies.24 
 
E. Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution 
(TOVALOP) 
 
 As was discussed in Chapter III, self-regulation is a tactic used by Non-State Actors in 
domestic systems whereby a group threatened by government regulation takes a position that 
while regulation is needed in any particular situation, the regulation should come from within the 
industry rather than from within the government. One of the purposes of this tactic is to cause a 
non-decision from the government – i.e. not to proceed with governmental regulation and 
instead, let industry police itself. 
 This tactic was used by the tanker owners and the petroleum companies shortly after the 
Torrey Canyon episode in the establishment of two industry entities, The Tanker Owners 
Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) by the shipowners, 
and the Contract Regarding and Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution 
(CRISTAL) by the oil companies. 
 TOVALOP was an agreement reached by owners of oil tankers whose ostensible purpose 
was to reimburse governments for cleanup costs that ensued after an oil spill.25 It originated in 
London in June 1967, shortly after the Torrey Canyon episode, in a meeting of several corporate 
lawyers representing shipping entities affiliated with seven major oil companies (British 





assess what international action might occur in the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon episode. 
These seven oil companies were the leaders in world oil production and known informally as the 
“Seven Sisters.” Their specific intention was to avert entirely or delay any reaction, either 
unilateral or international, that these lawyers perceived would run counter to the interests of their 
clients in the shipping industry. Consequently, after a series of meetings, TOVALOP was 
formally registered as a Bermuda based self-insurance corporation in December l967.  
 The TOVALOP Agreement provided that the member Tanker Owners would undertake 
certain obligations in the event of an oil spill caused by one of its members. Specifically, if a 
Participating Owner’s oil tanker caused an oil spill through an error or omission, then, in such 
event, the Participating Owner would either remove the oil and/or reimburse the government 
which had cleaned up the spill for cost of removal up to certain limits – ten million dollars. This 
compensation would be made available only after all other means and avenues of compensation 
were exhausted.  
 In short, TOVALOP would provide payment if a Participating Owner acted negligently 
(as opposed to a strict liability standard), and only to reimburse governments for cleanup costs, 
(as opposed to third parties, e.g. property owners, fishermen, and persons similarly situated, for 
damage to person and property).  
 Moreover, as the name clearly states, it was a voluntary Non-State organization, and 
therefore was not subject to governmental oversight, review, appeal, or any of the procedural 
safeguards in place when a government is the decision-maker regarding the imposition of 
liability. Ultimately, it was sole judge and jury in the matter for governmental compensation for 








F. The Contract Regarding and Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution 
(CRISTAL)  
 
 CRISTAL was not financed by insurance companies. Rather, the participants, the major 
international oil companies, pledged to compensate affected parties on a pro rata basis. The 
upper limit of CRISTAL compensation was established at thirty million dollars.26 The same, 
notwithstanding, CRISTAL would become activated in any particular situation only after other 
criteria had been met. First, the shipowner’s maximum liability under TOVALOP would have to 
be established. Added to this figure would be the expenditures incurred by the shipowner to 
clean up the oil. Finally, two other computations would be necessary: the maximum liability of 
the owner with respect to such damage under applicable law, statutes, regulations, and 
conventions; and the maximum amount to which persons sustaining pollution damage were 
entitled from any other person or other ship under existing law, statutes, regulations, and 
conventions for compensation for the damage. CRISTAL would pay the difference between that 
final figure and a maximum of thirty million dollars.27 Thus, unless a monumental oil spill 
disaster occurred, and the total cleanup costs exceeded fourteen million dollars, CRISTAL would 
not be activated. The CRISTAL agreement among the oil companies was formally agreed to by 
its component members on January 14, 1971. 
 After the details of CRISTAL had been worked out, an entity called the Oil Companies 
Institute for Marine Compensation Ltd (“the Institute”) was established by the oil companies. 
Unlike TOVALOP, which imposed liability on the shipowner, CRISTAL’s method was to 






 Again, like TOVALOP, the Institute was not a governmental entity, and any payments by 
it were essentially voluntary in nature with the Institute establishing all procedural and 
substantive rules and regulations. 
 
II. The Regime Formation Process Begins – April 196728 
 
 
 As previously noted in this chapter, shortly after the Torrey Canyon episode, the British 
government in April 1967, sent an official communication to IMCO requesting an urgent 
meeting to discuss changes in international law regarding liability for pollution-caused oil spills 
and possibly other pollutants. 
 Almost simultaneously, the Bureau Permanent of the CMI voted to establish an 
International Torrey Canyon Subcommittee, which was charged with studying the disaster and 
making the appropriate recommendations as to any changes in international law regarding 
liability for marine oil pollution damage. The Chairman of the Subcommittee was Lord Devlin 
who was the President of the British Maritime Law Association, which like other Maritime Law 
Associations was the official national affiliate of the CMI (see official CMI website for listing of 
all national Maritime Law Associations). The Subcommittee selected from its membership a 
Working Group of nine, which included prominent members of the French, British, Italian, 
Dutch, Norwegian, and Swedish Maritime Law Associations, as well as the Manager of the 
German Shipowners’ Association. 
 The IMCO and CMI subcommittees worked separately in the formation of the emerging 
regime complex to deal with maritime oil pollution. IMCO consisted of an organization that had 
diverse international membership, although it was highly inclined to promote shipping interests 





clients were the shipowners and therefore clearly represented the shipping interests and their 
alter egos, the P&I Clubs.  
 IMCO through its Legal Committee studied both the Public International Law question of 
intervention on the seas against an offending vessel (Legal Working Group I), as well as the 
private law issue of financial liability of the shipowners (Legal Working Group II). The CMI 
dealt only with the private law issue and was not concerned with the issue of intervention on the 
seas. It is important to note, however, that IMCO and the CMI did have an official channel of 
communication through the IMCO Legal Working Group II. 
 It soon became clear that most important private law issue was the standard of liability, 
which would be incorporated in any private law treaty. Maritime law had traditionally used a 
negligence standard, which is far less rigorous than the strict liability standard. The latter 
standard, in practical terms, meant that liability would accrue to the shipowner, whether or not 
the crew of the ship had acted negligently. There were many in IMCO who wanted a strict 
liability standard, while the CMI, as an organization representing shipowners, was adamant that 
the traditional negligence standard would remain in effect. 
 The second issue was who would be liable for oil pollution damage. In the broadest 
sense, the question under consideration was one of economics – should liability be borne by the 
shipowners and their insurance companies, or should liability be borne by the petroleum 
companies who, at the end of the day, were profiting from a lucrative trade in oil, or some 
combination of shipowners, insurance companies, and oil companies? As will be seen below, this 
question was not resolved at the Brussels Conference, and in a very real sense still remains an 
open issue today. 
 The CMI spent the period between the establishment of its Working Group in 1967 and 





regime based on strict liability, as well as high limits of liability. 
 Accordingly, the CMI met in Rome in October 1967, and requested that its members 
respond to a membership poll on the issues in order to establish a unified position. 
 Eighteen members responded to the poll, and in September 1968, the CMI held a meeting 
in Brussels to establish its position. The meeting was chaired by Albert Lilar, President of the 
Belgian Maritime Law Association, who, as will be seen in the discussion of the Brussels 
Conference, served as an official chair on behalf of IMCO. The net result of this meeting at 
Brussels was (not unexpectedly), the drafting of a proposed treaty based on a consensus to 
minimize the liability of shipowners. 
 Several months later, in January 1969, IMCO met in London and considered the 
September 1968 CMI draft treaty, and while there was an agreement on certain relatively minor 
issues such as compulsory insurance for shipowners, the key issue of liability remained open. 
 Also in January 1969, the CMI met in Tokyo and in an effort to shift the terms of 
liability, the Irish and Swedish delegations proposed that the strict liability standard be applied 
to cargo owners rather than shipowners. This proposal was rejected, and further, no consensus 
was reached on all of the terms of a draft treaty. Following the Tokyo meeting, the CMI 
submitted its latest draft to IMCO, but the terms and limits of liability remained open issues to be 
resolved at Brussels. 
 
III.       The IMCO Meeting of May 1967 
 
 The special session of IMCO to discuss the problems raised by the Torrey Canyon 
episode convened in London on May 4 and 5, 1967. Because of the significant decisions made at 





broad consensus that if another Torrey Canyon disaster were to be avoided, certain corrective 
steps would have to be taken. Three categories of potential IMCO activities were considered. 
The first dealt with technical and preventive measures to avoid repetition of a Torrey Canyon 
disaster. Discussed were methods of training seamen, tanker construction technology, and 
establishment of sea lanes for tankers. Next on the agenda was a discussion of remedial 
measures, such as how to alleviate the physical problems caused by oil pollution. These 
functions were well within the usual scope of IMCO activities and could be best described by 
noting that, though desirable, they were nonetheless technical and generally non-controversial.  
 The third category of question, however, marked a notable departure from previous 
IMCO endeavors. For the first time at any IMCO meeting, proposals dealing with legal remedies 
were placed upon the agenda. Among the items under consideration were: the legal rights of a 
coastal state to intervene on the high seas in case of an oil tanker breakup that threatened its 
shores; the terms and extent of civil liability in accident situations; and the question of 
compulsory insurance for oil tankers.  
 The legal questions, which previously would have been discussed exclusively at a CMI 
session, were now being considered by IMCO. At least some of the motives for this new 
approach were suggested by a team of observers from the United States House of 
Representatives, who in their report to the House’s Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries noted that:  
First, the CMI, as a non-governmental body does not have the official status to make 
authoritative determinations on behalf of member nations. An intergovernmental panel 
such as a new subcommittee of IMCO would be able to give the prompt and official 
attention required for the pressing legal problems.  





coordinated within one organization.  
A further reason in the mind of the delegates, not discussed by the council but learned in 
private conversations, was that the CMI is not highly regarded for its efficiency or 
dispatch in handling problems. Many delegates felt that assigning urgent and complicated 
legal questions to the CMI would not bring prompt results.29  
 
 This last reason is problematical because the CMI over the past seventy years had dealt 
with precisely the type of situation, which it was now claimed the CMI did, “not have the official 
status to make authoritative determinations on behalf of member nations.”  
 Instead, one must examine the latter two reasons given by the report of the United States 
House of Representatives and the fact that IMCO was attempting to gain recognition (and 
possibly enhance its image and obtain a larger budget) by drafting a convention on a matter 
guaranteed to win some publicity for itself.30 Further, it is reasonable to assume that since CMI 
represented shipping interests, it was probably felt by many within IMCO (such as the non-
maritime States) that a more “neutral” agency should participate in the forthcoming conventions.  
 Thus, it appeared as if there occurred, a dichotomy between, on the one hand, IMCO, a 
Public International organization, and the CMI, a Non-State Actor that heretofore had drafted 
maritime treaties and conventions. This divorce, however, was not destined to be permanent or 
even contemplated to be permanent, for it was emphasized at the London Conference that, “The 
IMCO body could draw upon the experience and expertise of the CMI, on a consultative 
basis.”31 Thus no real separation between the shipping interests and IMCO was in the offing. As 
was demonstrated repeatedly at the 1969 Brussels Conference, the term “consultative basis” was 








IV.  The Competing CMI and IMCO Treaty Drafts – Post-London 1969 
 
 As previously indicated, as the Brussels Conference approached, the CMI and IMCO 
draft treaties still diverged in significant ways.  
 The CMI draft stipulated that liability be based on the traditional maritime standard of 
fault (negligence) and not on the principle of strict liability.32 Again, the CMI worked closely 
with the P&I Clubs and accordingly, since liability would be ultimately borne by the shipping 
companies (who self-insured through the P&I Clubs), their mutual interests dictated that liability 
be based on fault (i.e. negligence as opposed to strict liability) and, further, be limited rather than 
open-ended. The IMCO Working Committee split between those sympathetic to the CMI 
position and those opting for strict liability. The strict liability clause of the IMCO Working 
Committee made the vessel owner fully liable for damages, unless the oil spill was caused by “an 
act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character.” Because of the split in the IMCO Working Committee, the proposed IMCO draft 
treaty contained both versions (Alternative A and Alternative B), and it remained for the 
delegates to the Brussels Conference to make the final decision.  
 Besides the major issue of liability based on fault versus strict liability, there were other 
significant differences between the CMI and the IMCO draft treaties.  
 First, the CMI draft applied to seagoing vessels carrying bulk quantities of oil. The IMCO 
convention defined ship (except war ships and government vessels used for noncommercial 






 Second, the CMI draft defined damage as “contamination” – the damage actually caused 
by oil.34 The IMCO draft could be interpreted to include damage caused by fire and explosion, as 
well as by oil.35 
 Third, the CMI draft provided a limit of one thousand Franc Poincaré (sixty-seven 
dollars) per net ton if the owner was innocent of “actual fault or privity.” IMCO’s decision was 
to allow the matter of a ceiling for financial liability be decided at Brussels. Consequently, the 
treaty clause that stipulated the exact amount of liability was left blank.36  
 While there existed other discrepancies between the two drafts on other related matters, 
such as compulsory insurance and appropriate jurisdictions for adjudicating any claims,37 there 
also were wide differences of opinion within the IMCO Working Group. Several of these 
relevant issues could not be resolved in the pre-conference negotiations. (Table IV-I: Competing 
IMCO and CMI Draft Treaty Provisions outlines these issues on the next page.) Among the 
major points of contention were:  
a) Which pollutants should be encompassed within the scope of the treaty. The 
United States position was that all pollutants should be included. Others took the position 
that only pollution by oil should be regulated. 
b) The territorial scope of the proposed treaty. Some states wanted to include the 
territorial seas, as well as the high seas. Others opposed the inclusion of the territorial 
seas in the treaty, since the right of States to act within their territorial seas had been 
codified in international law and, “application (of the treaty) in the territorial sea might 
subject coastal states to liabilities by arbitral tribunals on the basis of law other than that 
of the coastal state.”38 
c) The matter of strict liability vs. liability based on fault. The United States favored 





structure of the shipping and marine insurance industries, which were located largely 
outside of the United States. 
d) The limit on liability. This was a subject of vigorous debate. The proposed figures 
ranged from sixty-seven dollars to four hundred and fifty dollars per ton per vessel per 
incident. The United States, “favored a limit which would be sufficient in most cases to 
compensate fully governments and coastal victims for pollution damage keeping in mind 
the amount of insurance available on the world market.”39 
e) Whether a vessel should be required to demonstrate through some form of 
insurance that it was able to compensate both government and victims. Again, the United 
States maintained that, “such a provision (was) essential to insure compensation.”40 41 
 
 
 TABLE IV-1: COMPETING IMCO and CMI DRAFT TREATY PROVISIONS 
 IMCO CMI 
STRICT LIABILITY Yes No 
LIMITS TO LIABILITY Yes (higher)  Yes (lower) 
CARGO CAUSING 
DAMAGE 
Only Bulk Oil  Other Cargoes 







V.        THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE  
 
A. The Organization of the Conference 
 The IMCO conference met in Brussels from November 10 to 29, 1969. The attendees 
included forty-eight nations as participants, six nations as observers, three specialized agencies 
of the United Nations, two intergovernmental organizations, and six non-governmental 
organizations.42 The majority of the participants were either shipping States or coastal States 
from the Western powers, or from the Communist bloc. Conversely, there was little 
representation from developing States, with the notable exception of Liberia, where so many 
seagoing ships were registered. (A full list of the participating nations and organizations, as well 
as the composition of the leadership, is presented in the following pages in Table IV-2 
Participants at the Brussels Conference.) 
 The first item on the agenda was the election of a President and Vice President for the 
Conference. Elected as President of the Conference was Dr. Albert Lilar, Chairman of the 
Belgian delegation. Dr. Lilar was also the President of the CMI and, as indicated, a member of 
the Belgian delegation. From the perspective of interest group theory, especially on the broad 
issue of regulatory capture, this overlapping of public and private roles by the President of the 
Conference was highly significant.43  
 The Conference was divided into three working committees. The Committee on the 
Whole I studied the draft articles on the public law treaty, which served as the basis of the 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case Of Oil Pollution 
Casualties. Chairman of this committee was Mr. George A. Maslov (USSR) with Mr. G. E. 
Nasamento de Silva (Brazil) and Mr. E. Lysgaard (Denmark) as vice chairmen. The Committee 





International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. Chairman of this 
committee was Dr. Walter Muller, a prominent Swiss attorney, member of the Swiss delegation 
and President of the Swiss Maritime Law Association. Vice chairmen were Mr. C. Borchsenius 
of Norway and Mr. S. Matysik of Poland.  
 Finally, a committee on the Whole or Final Clauses was established. The chairman was 
Mr. H. E. Shefer (Netherlands), and the Vice-Chairman was Mr. R. Economou (Romania). 
 Again, one cannot underestimate the significance of the appointments of Dr. Albert Lilar 
and Dr. Walter Muller to leadership roles at the Brussels Conference. These two appointments 
are illustrative of the role of interest groups in general, and the concept of regulatory capture in 
particular. This phenomenon could exist only in an international system that is transnational and 
characterized by overlapping relationships among its State, Non-State Actors, and Public 
International Organization components. What is somewhat surprising is that those who have 
previously written about Brussels have failed to identify these dual roles and their significance to 
both interest group and international relations theory.44 
 There were those at the Conference who opposed the approach of drafting two separate 
conventions. Canada articulated these sentiments when early in the Conference its delegate, Mr. 
Jamieson, noted that, “The Canadian government believed that there should be only a single 
convention – if necessary, in two parts: one part dealing with civil liability, the other with the 
right of intervention – so that the states would not be able to approve or reject one or other of the 
proposed conventions as it suited their interests.”45 In other words, the Canadian government 
took an approach requiring mutually acceptable cross-provisions for the private law and public 
law treaties.  
 To reinforce its position, Canada offered an amendment to the public law convention that 





vis-a-vis vessels of those States that did not accept the financial obligations in the private law 
convention. Canada’s position was that it was absurd to require a coastal State to pay for cleanup 
costs in relation to States that did not accept the corresponding financial obligation of the private 
law convention. The amendment, which reflected an emerging environmentalist approach to the 






     TABLE IV-2 
 PARTICIPANTS AT THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE (NOVEMBER, 1969) 
III. Participation 
 As previously indicated, fifty-three countries were represented at the Conference, forty-
seven by official delegations and six as observers. In addition, three Specialized Agencies of the 
United Nations, two intergovernmental organizations, and six non-governmental organizations 
were represented by observers at the invitation of the IMCO Assembly.  
 The following countries were represented by official delegations with the number of 





















Ivory Coast (2) 
Japan (13) 
Korea, Republic of (4) 
Liberia (9) 
Libya (1) 
Malagasy Republic (5) 
Monaco (1) 
Netherlands (7) 













Ukrainian S.S.R. (2) 
U.S.S.R. (6) 
United Arab Republic (2) 













Hong Kong (1) 




 The following Specialized Agencies of the United Nations were represented as observers 
with the number of representatives from each indicated:  
International Labour Organization (1)  
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2)  
International Atomic Energy Agency (2) 
  
 The following intergovernmental organizations attended as observers with the number of 
representatives from each indicated:  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1)  
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (2)  
 
 The following non-governmental organizations attended as observers with the number of 
representatives from each indicated:  
Comité Maritime International (2)  
International Chamber of Shipping (1)  
International Chamber of Commerce (3)  
Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (1)  
International Law Association (3)  
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (1) 
  
IV. United States Delegation 
The United States delegation consisted of:  
Representatives:  
Robert H. Neuman  
Assistant Legal Advisor  
Department of State  






Rear Admiral William L. Morrison United States Coast Guard  
Department of Transportation  
Alternate  
Charles I. Bevans  
Assistant Legal Adviser  
Department of State  
K. E. Biglane  
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration 
Department of Interior  
W.J. Ford  
Shipping Attache  
U.S. Embassy, London  
Louis P. Georgantas  
Office of the Legal Adviser  
Department of State  
Advisers:  
Ralph E. Casey, Vice President  
American Institute of Merchant Shipping  
James J. Higgins, President  
Maritime Law Association of the United States  
(Source: United State Department of State, Robert E. Neuman et. al., Report of the United States 













B. The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties (Public Law Treaty)  
 
 The public law treaty establishes the rights of a State to intervene on the high seas against 
a ship causing oil pollution by providing that: 
Parties to the convention may take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to 
prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related 
interests from pollution of the seas by oil, following upon a marine casualty or acts 
related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful 
consequences.46 
 Two further relevant points should be noted:  
a) The convention applies only to the high seas, not the territorial seas. 
b) Not only coastlines are protected, but related interests, which are defined as, 
“...fisheries activities...tourist attractions...the health of the coastal population...and living 
marine resources and wildlife.”47 
 This right to intervene against an offending vessel is tempered by the requirement that the 
intervening State must undertake consultations with other States affected by the casualty, 
particularly the flag State; consult with independent experts on the advisability of the impending 
action against the vessel; and notify any person (physical or corporate) in the coastal State whose 
interests could be affected by the decision.48 
 Nonetheless, if the situation allows no time for consultation or notification, the threatened 
coastal State was authorized to act unilaterally.49  
 Thus, a new right under Public International Law was created. Specifically, a State had 





interests. Accordingly, this provision resolved the uncertainty faced by the British government 
when confronted with a decision whether or not to destroy the Torrey Canyon.  
 The treaty further provided that each state should “...use its best endeavors to avoid any 
risk to human life, and to afford persons in distress any assistance of which they may stand in 
need, and in appropriate cases to facilitate the repatriation of ship’s crews, and to have no 
obstacles thereto.”50 On the last point, the Soviet Union had proposed an amendment which 
would have obligated the coastal State to repatriate the crew to the State of the ship’s registry or 
their home port without delay.51 The compromise term “to facilitate the repatriation” was 
ultimately incorporated into the treaty. 
 Further, the financial liability issues resulting from a State’s intervention against an 
offending vessel were also resolved as follows:  
 First, if any State takes measures in contravention of the provisions of the treaty and 
causes unnecessary damage, then compensation must be paid, “to the extent of the damage 
caused by measures which exceed those reasonably necessary to achieve the end mentioned in 
Article I.”52 
 Second, Article VIII provides that if there is a dispute between the involved parties 
whether or not the measures taken, “were in contravention of the provisions of the proposed 
convention,” (and compensation must therefore be paid under the provisions of Article VI), then 
the parties can submit the dispute to conciliation or arbitration as provided in the annex of the 
convention.  
 Third, the annex to the convention details the procedures for conciliation and arbitration. 
The Soviet Union, the Soviet Bloc, and some of the Third World States opposed the principle of 
compulsory arbitration. The United States and Western Europe favored the idea.  





practice that had been used previously (for example in the Torrey Canyon episode). The treaty, 
in a very real sense, only legitimized State action against privately-owned ships, which in any 
event was a course of action likely to have been undertaken by coastal States faced with an 
environmental catastrophe. 
 Second, it was perceived as a reasonable move to save the seas.  
 Third, the treaty was “conservative,” and rather limited in that:  
a) It only dealt with oil, not all contaminants. 
b) It provided for consultation with other powers and international experts. 
c) It provided for compensation in cases of overreaction. 
 In essence, the Caroline Case53 described in Chapter 2 serves as a relevant precedent or, 
at the very least, a rationale for this treaty. Action is sanctioned in situations where monumental 
disaster is inevitable. The State’s action can readily be justified on the grounds of defense; 
consequently, the treaty reiterates an accepted principle of customary international law.  
 Professor I. F. E. Goldie noted that there are those who suggested that the treaty be 
rejected because it reaffirms “creeping jurisdiction...that whenever a state enjoys exclusive 
offshore rights for some purposes, it tends to acquire further exclusive rights for other and 
perhaps all purposes, jeopardizing regional, international, and community interest in the freedom 
of the seas.”54 Goldie maintained that such fears are groundless and, “creeping jurisdiction can 
only occur by a failure of the international community’s will.”55 It is difficult to perceive how the 
public law convention could represent a threat to the international community.  
 Additionally, the protective theory is analogous to self-defense. The great principle of 
territorial integrity is vulnerable before the experience of such a fundamental right. Certainly, 
“the freedom of the seas” concept is of no greater dignity and must be temporarily abridged in 





 A second approach to rationalize the right of States to intervene on the high seas is based 
on the broad doctrine of “abuse of right” and its specific application in the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration.57 It should be pointed out that abuse of right is a doctrine of Public International 
Law, which may be applied by the International Court of Justice per Article 38 of the Statue of 
the Court. Both approaches have a common basis of affording an environmentally endangered 
State the opportunity of intervening against an offending vessel on the seas. 
 
C.  The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Private Law 
Treaty/Civil Law Treaty) 
 
 
 The private law treaty was far more complicated and controversial than was the public 
law treaty because of radically different views on the resolution of outstanding issues that were 
encompassed within the former draft text.58  
 The private law treaty, as signed, provides that the convention applies to oil pollution 
damage occurring on the territory or the territorial sea of a contracting State.59 At that time, there 
did not exist a universally accepted standard as to the width of the territorial sea. Accordingly, a 
State that recognized a width of six miles had a greater coverage under the treaty than a State that 
recognized a three-mile limit.  
 Article III discusses the scope of liability, which was probably the most controversial 
issue discussed and decided upon at the conference. The issue was simply who was liable for 
damages. The terms of the private law treaty provide that the owner of the vessel (as opposed to 
the cargo owner) was made liable for any damages.60 Clearly, this represented a victory for the 
international oil interests who had far deeper pockets than the shipping interests.  





provision to the treaty to establish a fund to compensate victims. The Canadian delegation, 
among others, had argued that since marine oil pollution was caused by the oil interests, as well 
as the shipping industry, both should share in the cleanup costs. Consequently, Canada offered 
an amendment that would have made the shipping interests liable up to a certain amount, with 
the cargo owner (oil interests) paying the remainder.61  
 Similarly, the Irish delegation offered another amendment, which was supported by 
States that had strong shipping interests, such as Belgium, Greece, Liberia, and the Scandinavian 
countries. This amendment placed primary responsibility on the cargo owner. Further, the 
liability would have been absolute, rather than capped at a specific dollar or franc amount. This 
was modified by a savings clause, which provided that if the oil discharge occurred because of 
the vessel’s negligence, then, in such event, the cargo owner (oil interests) would have had a 
right of recovery over the shipowner. 
 After lengthy discussion, an agreement was reached that provided that the shipowner 
would be held liable for oil pollution damage up to the amount of one hundred thirty-four dollars 
per net ton of the ship, or fourteen million dollars whichever was less. Further, strict liability, 
rather than negligence, was the standard used in the determination of the ship owner’s liability. 
 The effects of these seemingly onerous provisions were, however, diluted as follows: 
a. An international compensation fund would be established to relieve shipowners 
from the burden of liability. Specifically, Sweden and Denmark offered a resolution 
that called upon IMCO to convene a conference by 1971 to establish such a fund. The 
fund would be based on two principles: “that victims would be fully compensated 
under a system of strict liability (and) that the fund should relieve in principle the ship 
owner of the additional final burden imposed by the convention.” 





 “resulted from an act of war or hostilities;” 
“was wholly caused by an act of omission done with intent to cause damage by a 
third party;” 
“was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful acts of any government 
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational 
aides in the exercise of that function.”62 
 The ceiling for liability was global in that it incorporated all potential suits ranging from 
cleanup costs to damages to coastal installations. No priority was granted to government cleanup 
costs over any other person’s or other entity’s cleanup costs or damages. These limits of liability 
were enhanced by the commitment of TOVALOP and CRISTAL to provide additional coverage 
in the event that damages exceeded fourteen million dollars. Needless to say, any payments by 
TOVALOP or CRISTAL would be made at their sole discretion, rather than by the independent 
authority having the power to compel payment. 
 Other salient provisions of the treaty dealt with the physical location of damages to an 
injured party. Specifically, as previously noted, the treaty’s liability provisions apply solely to 
damage in territorial waters, or the actual territory of a contracting State. Also covered are costs 
resulting from preventive measures taken by a coastal State.63 Excluded, however, by 
implication, are damages that occur on the high seas, which would be highly relevant to coastal 
fishing interests, whose boats, equipment, and cargo were excluded from coverage by the terms 
of the treaty.  
 Further, the treaty provided that each ship carrying over two thousand tons of oil must, 
“maintain insurance or other financial security...in the sums fixed by applying the limits of 
liability...to cover his liability for pollution damage under the convention.”64 This certificate 





business of the owner; the type of security (e.g. surely bunds), name, and place of business of the 
insurer.65  
 Two significant exceptions, however, were incorporated into the article outlining the role 
of the insurer or financial guarantor.  
 In an instance where an insurer is being sued for damage, the defendant (insurer), “may, 
irrespective of the actual fault or privity of the owner, avail himself of the limits of liability, 
prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1.66 The owner, however, cannot limit his liability in cases of 
“actual fault or privity.”67 
 In addition, the insurer was given the right to plead a defense, “that the pollution damage 
resulted for the willful misconduct of the owner himself,” and thereby not be liable for the 
damage.68 
 These limitations on liability provided to the insurer are highly significant. As will be 
demonstrated further, they are indicative of the role played by the insurers at the Brussels 
conference. 
 Further, on the matter of jurisdiction for litigation, the convention provides that if 
pollution damage has occurred in the territorial seas of two or more of the contracting States, or 
preventive measures have been taken in these areas, “...actions for compensation may only be 
brought in the courts of any such contracting state or states.”69 Thus the venue for litigation is in 
the court system of the State(s) damaged, irrespective of the State of origin of the ship’s owner or 
charterer.  
 Finally, other articles dealt with “boiler plate” issues of ratification and signature,70 
denunciation,71 and the amendment process.72  
 While the private law treaty established an orderly process for compensation of pollution 





would provide substantial compensation for those entities and persons who were damaged by oil 
spills and their aftermath. Even Robert H. Neuman, the Chairman of the American delegation to 
the Brussels meeting wrote, “...the fact remains that the 1969 conventions are likely neither to 
reduce substantially the number of accidental oil spills or dramatically mitigate the damage 
resulting from them, nor will they fully compensate in all cases the coastal victims of such 
incidents.”73 
 While the first two goals mentioned by Neuman (the reduction on the number of oil spills 
and the mitigation of oil spill damage) were not directly under discussion at Brussels, 
compensation of victims was a primary topic of concern. Consequently, the question must be 
raised as to why a seemingly inadequate system of compensation was established at Brussels. 
The answer lies in the interests of Non-State Actors, both national and transnational, who 
perceived an economic threat if certain terms and limits on liability were established at the 
Brussels Conference. The next step then in this analysis is to examine the methods by which 
Non-State Actors were able to influence the terms of the Convention on Civil Liability (the 
private law treaty).  
 
VI. Decision-Making at Brussels Using the Paradigm of Regime Formation 
 
A.  The Regime Formation Process 
 
 As demonstrated in this chapter, the regime formation process during the period 
beginning in April 1967 through November 1969 occurred in the context of a transnational 
system characterized by interactions among State- and Non-State Actors and a public 





as competing power centers, as well as powerful insurance and oil interests. All interacted in a 
bargaining process that culminated in the private law treaty, as well as the far less controversial 
public law treaty. A closer examination of the institutional framework in which Non-State Actors 
operated clarifies their specific roles in the competitive regime formation process. It has been 
observed that, “competition among the elemental institutions constitutes a core characteristic of 
regime complex.”74 A closer examination of the institutional framework in which Non-State 
Actors operated clarifies their role in the competitive regime formation process in Brussels. 
 
1. The Institutional Presence of the CMI and Other Non-State Actors at the Brussels 
Conference  
 
 The pivotal role of Non-State Actors at the Brussels conference can be observed by a 
reading of the records and the rules of the conference.75 Most of the States who sent 
representatives to the meeting divided their delegations into three levels: the delegates; 
alternates; and advisors. While the delegates and alternates were, in virtually all cases, 
individuals who held official governmental positions, the advisors represented, to a certain 
extent, various segments of the industries that would be most affected by any resulting new 
treaties. Thus, sprinkled throughout the ranks of certain delegations were representatives of 
shipowner associations, maritime law associations, and the insurance industry.76 The Provisional 
Rules of the meeting provided that alternates or advisors could act as a representative if they 
were so designated by the head of the delegation.77 An examination of the records of the 
Committee of the Whole II (which drafted the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution) 
indicates that the Non-State Actors often availed themselves of the opportunity to inform 





of which was the controversy over whether or not to incorporate strict liability provisions into 
the private law treaty.  
 Allan I. Mendelsohn, a former United States Department of State negotiator who 
participated in several IMCO conferences, has been highly critical of the mingling of private 
interests in national delegations at IMCO meetings. Mendelsohn has stated:  
The individual participants who appear at conferences on behalf of states are mostly 
drawn from ship owning and marine insurance interests. Though highly competent in 
their respective fields, these individuals are usually more prone to protect, and 
experienced in protecting, their own parochial interests rather than the interests of the 
environment.78 
 While Canada, and to a lesser extent, the United States represented “the interests of the 
environment” at Brussels, the shipping, petroleum, and insurance interests were probably far 
more effectively represented by delegates such as Dr. Walter Muller and Dr. Albert Lilar, who as 
previously indicated represented shipping interests on a professional level, but served as 
members of their national delegations (Switzerland and Belgium respectively), and were part of 
the formal IMCO leadership that ran the Brussels Conference. 
 The bias of certain key Brussels Conference delegations, such as Belgian, Swiss, and 
Irish, towards the shipping and insurance industries and not to the potential victims of an oil spill 
again underlines a major premise of this study: that in the bargaining process to create a 
transnational regime, there is competition but not all actors are created equal. 
 Instead, the critical role of Non-State Actors (especially in the crucial area of terms of 
liability), and their methods of cooption can undermine the efficacy of the institutional 





2.          The American Delegation at Brussels: The Politics of Access 
 
 As previously noted, Non-State Actors such as the CMI were crucial in drafting the terms 
of the private law treaty. In addition, certain Non-State Actors were able to influence their host 
country’s votes and position at Brussels (also referred to as advisory committees). The American 
delegation to the Brussels conference provides a prototype of the latter type of influence.  
 Writing on the roles played by interest groups, Harmon Zeigler noted on domestic 
systems:  
In those cases of almost total harmony of interest between the government organization 
and the interest group, the regulated clientele actually acquires a beachhead within the 
institutions of government. Groups enjoying this relationship have a distinct advantage 
over groups which face the obstacle of lack of access.79 
 
 As previously observed in Chapter III, among the methods that an interest group can 
utilize to obtain access to bureaucratic decision-makers is by the use of what are termed organs 
of administrative pluralism (also referred to as advisory committees). The Shipping Coordinating 
Committee, an organ of administrative pluralism, played an outside role in the American 
delegation at Brussels.  
 At the time of the Brussels Conference, the Shipping Coordinating Committee had thirty 
members. The committee’s members were drawn from the Departments of State and 
Transportation, and from the shipping, oil, and insurance industries. The Committee’s purpose 
was to provide an input for the private interests who would be affected by a State Department 
decision on shipping matters. A second purpose of the Shipping Coordinating Committee was to 





agencies, such as the United States Coast Guard.80  
 An examination of the Shipping Coordinating Committee’s membership at the time of the 
1969 Brussels Conference makes it clear that access was provided only to representatives of the 
maritime, insurance, and petroleum industries. Conversely, there was no access to the Shipping 
Coordinating Committee by representatives of environmental interests.81 (For a detailed list of 
the committee’s membership, see Table IV-3 Shipping Coordinating Committee on p. 138.)   
 At a hearing held before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 
April 1973, Richard Frank, a spokesman for the Center for Law as Social Policy, a group 
representing environmental interest, charged that the lack of environmentalist membership on the 
Shipping Coordinating Committee resulted from a deliberate State Department policy, “to inhibit 
the participation of certain elements of the public in the decision-making process.82 Frank added 
that the economic bureaus of the State Department, which formulated international 
environmental policy, “have a constituency which is more oriented toward economic (sic) than 
the environment.”83  
 Democratic Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell, who had a strong environmentalist 
orientation, agreed with Frank’s evaluation of the State Department’s pro-industry orientation, 
and indicated that he would attempt to ensure that organized environmentalists would be granted 
access to the deliberations of the Shipping Coordinating Committee.84  
 In my research, I conducted interviews in Washington, D.C., in March and June of 
1972.The late Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island provided background information, but this 
information was somewhat general in that he was an active member of the United States Senate, 
and obviously was not in a position to reveal matters that might be detrimental to his career. 
Another interviewee was Allan I. Mendelsohn, a former State Department negotiator currently in 





Center. He was the individual deploring the lack of public participation in the decision-making 
process. The other former negotiator wished to remain unidentified. It should be noted, however, 
that there was a feeling in certain business circles at the time of the Brussels meeting that the 
United States had adopted a position that was inconsistent with the best interest of the shipping 
and insurance industry and was over-concerned with ecology.85  
 Thus, decision-making in the State Department on the American stance at the Brussels 
Conference was not based on an amorphous concept known as “the public interest,” but on the 
fact that representatives of key industry groups had direct access to members of the bureaucracy. 
This again illustrates a major point of this study: that in the making of policy to formulate a 
regime to regulate pollution, the role of Non-State Actors with a vested financial interest in the 
outcome can be crucial, and their resistance to the development of an effective international legal 
regime to regulate oil spills can override or countervail the desire of some States or 
environmental interests to establish such a regime.  
 When discussing the policy formulation process, it is, of course, difficult to define 
precisely which course of action is congruent with the public interest.86 It is not, of course, being 
suggested that the policy demands of the oil, marine, or insurance interests cannot coincide with 
“the public interest,” nor that the demands of environmentalists, such as the Sierra Club, always 
represent ‘‘the public interest.” Rather what is being suggested is that a policy formulation 
process that does not give a multiplicity of competing interests access to the decision-makers 
cannot, by definition, be considered to be representative of the “public interest.” Accordingly, it 
is suggested that if either IMCO or the State Department had given access only to organized 
environmental groups, and not to the shipping interests, the resultant policy would likewise not 






    TABLE IV-3  
 SHIPPING COORDINATING COMMITTEE 
 August 8, 1969  
NAME _ ORGANIZATION 
Mr. Philip H. Trezise Department of State - E 
Mr. John Rhinelander  Department of State - L  
Mr. John F. Buckle  Department of State - E/MA  
Mr. Richard A. Frank  Department of State - L/E  
Mr. M. C. Pfutz  American Petroleum Institute  
Mr. A. H. McComb, Jr.  American Petroleum Institute  
Mr. James J. Higgins  President, Maritime Law Association  
Mr. Gordon W. Paulsen  Maritime Law Association  
Mr. John Prokes  America Inst. of Merchant Shipping  
Mr. Nicholas J. Healy  American Inst. of Merchant Shipping  
Mr. James J. Reynolds  American Inst. of Merchant Shipping  
Mr. Richard W. Palmer  Maritime Law Association 
Mr. Robert P. Nash  Spec. Counsel – American Inst. of Merchant 
       Shipping 
Mr. Ralph E. Casey  Exec. Vice Pres. – American Inst. of 
Merchant Shipping  
Mr. Carl J. Green  Department of Transportation TGC-10  
Mr. Bernard H. Hyllestad  Department of Transportation TPI-50  
Mr. Robert Henri Binder  Department of Transportation TPI-50  
Mr. Edward S. Johnson  Federal Maritime Commission  
Mr. F. D. Heyward  United States Coast Guard  
Commander H. G. Lyons  United States Coast Guard  
Mr. R. Y. Edwards  United States Coast Guard  
Mr. C. G. Patrick Bursley  United States Coast Guard  
Mr. C. J. Maguire  United States Coast Guard  
Mr. C. E. Mc Dowell  American Institute of Merchant 
Underwriters  
Adm. H. G. Shepherd  National Cargo Bureau  
Mr. A S. Miller  F.C.F.N. 
Mr. Earl W. Clark  Labor Management Maritime Committee 
Mr. Paul J. McElligott  Regan and Mason 
Mr. G. Marshall Bates  Captain, US Navy (Admiralty Navy JAC)  









 In my interview research in 1972, when two former State Department negotiators were 
asked about the role of the Shipping Coordinating Committee, both replied that before the United 
States participates in any international conference relating to maritime affairs, the members of 
the Shipping Coordinating Committee assemble to inform the Department of State of their 
positions. When I observed that there were no groups representing the public interest on the 
Shipping Coordinating Committee, two different answers were offered. One former negotiator 
replied, “We (the State Department) and other governmental units represent the public interest.” 
The other conceded that, in fact, the public interest was not represented at all, and the Shipping 
Coordinating Committee excluded public interest-oriented groups such as environmentalists or 
those who are involved in what might be referred to as consumerism and thus are opposed, for 
example, to oil or insurance industry policies.87 
 Another relevant aspect of the Shipping Coordinating Committee is the interchange of 
personnel (a so called “revolving door.”) between its Non-State Actor members and the United 
States government. This clearly enhances their role in the decision-making process. Three cases 
serve to illustrate this concept:  
a) James J. Reynolds: President of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping 
since 1969. From 1946 to 1951, he served on the National Labor Relations Board. In 
1961, President Kennedy named him Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management 
Relations. In that position, he served the government as the governmental official most 
directly concerned with maritime labor disputes. After the Nixon administration came to 
power, he became the congressional lobbyist for the American Institute of Merchant 
Shipping.  
b) Ralph E. Casey: From 1939 to 1955 he served with the General Accounting 





activities (1948 to 1955). From 1955 to 56, he was chief counsel to the House Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries Committee. Resigning that post in 1956, he became president of the 
American Merchant Marine Institute from 1956 to 1968. When the American Institute of 
Merchant Shipping succeeded the AMMI in 1969, he became that group’s Executive 
Vice-President. In 1971, he became chief counsel to the House Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee. 
c) Earl W. Clark: In 1969, he was involved in the Maritime industry’s Labor-
Management Maritime Committee. From 1951 to 1954, he was a former United States 
government deputy maritime administrator.88 
 Beyond the fact that the Shipping Coordinating Committee’s membership was limited to 
government and maritime industry representatives, formal access was not granted to interests 
affected by any potential oil spill disaster. Thus, those whose livelihoods depend on the sea, such 
as fishermen, and resort and hotel operators, and those who would be adversely affected by a 
marine oil spill were not present when questions of the amount and extent of liability were 
raised. It is fairly certain that lobster fishermen in Maine or hotel owners in Florida would have 
demanded greater amounts of compensation to be included in the treaty, as opposed to a 
representative of the American Petroleum Institute or the American Institute of Merchant 
Shipping.  
 
3.         The Regime is Formed: The Brussels Conference’s Decision on the Issue of Liability 
 
 The most significant decision made at the 1969 Brussels Conference was related to the 
terms of liability. As previously observed, the delegates from Canada, Ireland, and Belgium (as 





or cargo owners would be financially responsible for oil pollution damage, and on the terms of 
liability.  
 The final decision on the terms and extent of liability resulted from rounds of 
negotiations involving the P&I Clubs, who were the major insurers of European and American 
owned tankers, and the Belgian, British, Irish, and Scandinavian delegations.89 The P&I Clubs 
interacted directly with the British delegation, and insisted that liability be based on the 
traditional maritime standard of negligence (in contradistinction to strict liability) and that a low 
ceiling be imposed on the maximum amount of compensation that a shipowner be required to 
pay for any single oil spill incident.90 At various stages of the conference, different maximum 
liability figures were suggested by the P&I Clubs, but they never exceeded ten million dollars 
per incident. The P&I Clubs argued that the adoption of strict liability and unlimited liability 
standards would make it economically unfeasible to provide insurance for oil tankers.  
 In sharp contrast, the Canadian delegation, which represented a state with a coastal and 
environmentalist orientation, argued that the economic loss resulting from an oil spill should be 
borne entirely from those who profited from the carriage of oil.91 The Canadians maintained that 
to establish negligence rather than strict liability as the criteria for recovery of damages, or to 
impose a ceiling on the compensation that a victim of an oil spill could receive, would inevitably 
shift part of the cleanup and reconstruction burdens from the polluter to its victim.92  
 At Brussels, a compromise was reached on the problem of the terms of liability. It was 
agreed that the draft convention would be based on the principle of strict liability, and a one 
hundred thirty-four dollars per ton or fourteen million dollar limit (whichever figure was less) 
would be imposed on the shipowner for an oil spill disaster. It was also agreed in principle that 
the cargo owners (petroleum companies) would be responsible financially for claims in excess of 





incorporated into the terms of the treaty, were to be defined in a supplemental IMCO 
convention.93  
 After the terms of the compromise had been offered, the following occurred:  
Lord Devlin, (a member of the British delegation, but also professionally involved with 
the shipping interests, as well as being the person selected by IMCO to head the Brussels 
Conference, after checking with the insurance people in London, stated that those limits 
could be insured (on the London market) so long as the provisions on direct action 
against the person providing financial responsibility contained an exception allowing the 
insurer a defense on the ground of willful misconduct of the vessel owner.94 
 In my interview with a member of the American delegation at the Brussels conference, I 
asked whether a treaty could have been concluded without the express agreement of the London 
insurers. The delegate replied that in the absence of concurrence by the insurers, a treaty would 
not have been possible. He added that the P&I Clubs would not have agreed to a draft treaty that 
they considered incompatible with their economic interests.95 I then asked whether this method 
of drafting a treaty represented a dilution of a basic principle of tort law. Should compensation 
not be based on the victim’s loss rather than on the tortfeasor’s ability to pay?  
 The diplomat replied that ideally the needs of the victim should be given a priority over 
the polluter’s financial condition. However, the realities of the situation dictated that the insurers 
had to remain economically viable in order to continue their insurance activities, and one could 
not expect them to bear too heavy of a burden of the losses resulting from oil spills.  
 The diplomat then added that since its creation, IMCO had maintained a close 
relationship with groups such as the P&I Clubs and the CMI. He indicated that the Secretariat of 
IMCO included several officials who had formerly served in their national maritime industry and 





 When asked whether or not IMCO would act upon an environmental program that would 
run counter to the direct interests of the CMI and the P&I Clubs, the diplomat responded, 
“Probably not.”97  
 In my research, I also interviewed maritime counsel of an international petroleum 
company, an American marine insurer, and a staff member of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the United States Senate. All agreed with the diplomat’s assessment of the CMI 
relationship with IMCO.98 
 This finding that the process of regime formation at Brussels was finalized when the 
London insurance confirmed that the conference’s negotiated and agreed upon monetary amount 
was acceptable to them raises significant issues about the regime formation process. At the 
outset, it is important to reiterate the obvious. The entire regime formation process commencing 
in April 1967, was based on the fact that the shipowners’ insurance companies would 
compensate third-parties for damages sustained by them. The salient question was what level of 
losses could be insured by the insurance companies? No one had realistic expectations that 
insurance companies would insure unrealistic levels of loss.  
 On the other hand, from a regime formation perspective, it is startling that this crucial 
decision was, in effect, made by Non-State Actors rather than by the States themselves. This 
raises significant issues regarding the general role of Non-State Actors in international regimes, 
whether the realist and cognitivist schools of thought provide an accurate description of what 
occurred at Brussels, the nature of regime complexes that incorporate both State and Non-State 
Actors, and whether the American interest group analogy provides an adequate description of 
decision-making at Brussels. 
 Further, the establishment of TOVALOP and CRISTAL adds another dimension to the 





and CRISTAL can be analyzed by means of the concept of non-decision. As stated previously in 
Chapter III, a non-decision:  
…is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and 
privileges in the community can be killed before they gain access to the relevant 
decision-making arena.99 
 Somewhat similarly, TOVALOP and CRISTAL were indicative of the role played by 
Non-State Actors in the international environmental movement, which was described by Kyla 
Tienhaara, Amandine Orsini, and Robert Falkner as follows:  
A final role that global corporations have recently assumed is that of regulator. Instead of 
simply passively accepting or trying to influence regulations by governments, global 
corporations are actively developing standards for themselves or cooperating with other 
private actors (e.g., NGOs) to do so...These private initiatives are not only relevant of 
how they affect corporate behavior with respect to the environment, but in terms of how 
they influence the way in which environmental issues are dealt with in more traditional 
state-led forms.100 
 Needless to say, a Non-State Actor acting as a regulator is not one and the same as an 
entity which assesses damages, and then, through a self-insurance scheme, pays damages to 
certain impacted parties. 
 In the cases of TOVALOP and CRISTAL, the Non-State Actors (in this instance, the 
shipowners and oil companies) attempted to deflect a demand for the creation of international 
machinery to deal with the oil spill problem. Specifically, these two interests hoped that their 
compensation schemes would deter and/or delay IMCO or any State from drafting or enacting a 
treaty and/or a statute regulating the liability of one responsible for an accidental oil spill.  





CRISTAL did not forestall international action on an oil spill program, these two plans might 
form the framework upon which any alternative state-sponsored draft treaty would be based.101 
 TOVALOP and CRISTAL were ultimately based upon the principle of self-regulation, a 
perspective that is predicated upon an assumption that business should be free of governmental 
restraint and police its own actions.102 Accordingly, in the case of CRISTAL, a victim of oil 
pollution damage would seek to recover compensation by applying to an entity that provided 
payment for damage based on rules formulated, adjudicated, and enforced by the very industry 
causing the problem in the first place, rather than by a regime established by governments. A 
similar situation would prevail when a government would attempt to recover its cleanup costs 
from TOVALOP. In either case, recovery would depend upon the shipper’s or petroleum 
company’s interpretation of its own contract. Clearly, in so far as the oil companies and tanker 
owners were concerned, a self-regulation scheme was far more satisfactory than one imposed by 
governments acting alone or in concert. 
 Accordingly, while the Conclusions chapter will address the issues raised herein, it seems 
clear that any analysis of regime formation must incorporate the possibility of the existence of 
regime complexes that include Non-State Actors who have a close relationship with States and 
Public International Organizations based on clientism, including regulatory capture and their 
roles as a veto group. Further, the bargaining among State and Non-State Actors provides 
evidence of the validity of the neoliberal approach, which emphasizes the element of bargaining 
among the constituent members of an international regime. Conversely, there is absolutely no 
evidence that a single State acted as a hegemon exerting undue influence over the outcome of the 
Brussels Conference. Moreover, what is perhaps even more striking is that there is no evidence 
that the cognitive school of thought guided decision-making at Brussels, but to the contrary, it 





growth of a body of international environmental law that incorporated the “polluter pays” 
principle, there is no real evidence that this principle was a relevant factor in the drafting of the 
private law treaty. To the contrary, there is no mention of it in the records of the proceedings, nor 
did it ever come up in the interviews that I conducted with the participants in the Brussels 
process. 
 Specifically, while the conference ostensibly dealt with environmentalism, the essence of 
the deliberations was to arrive at the lowest possible figure of compensation to injured parties. 
 Finally, in the broadest sense, the observation of Raustiala and Victor about regime 
complexes describes what occurred at Brussels: “In regime complexes by contrast, the array [of] 
rules already in force channel and constrain the content of the new elemental regimes…The 
institutional slate is not clean. Ideas, interests, and expectations frequently are already aligned 
around some set of existing rules and concepts…”103 In the case of the Brussels Conference, the 
existing rules and concepts reflected the power of insurance, shipping, and oil interests, as well 
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 Chapter 5: The Private Law Treaty – The Expansion of the International Regime  
and the Impact of Exogenous Events on its Resilience (1971 to 2011) 
 
 After the Brussels Conference concluded on November 29, 1969, each participating 
State, with the exception of Canada, began the ratification process based on its own 
constitutional procedure. Canada, which as noted in Chapter IV, had voiced opposition to certain 
portions of the treaties and was the only State present at Brussels that voted against the private 
law treaty. 
 
I. The Canadian Refusal to Participate in the Brussels Regime 
 
 In April 1970, four months after the Brussels Conference, the Canadian government 
introduced bills in the House of Commons that sharply deviated from the principles that were 
incorporated into the civil law treaty.1 Briefly, the bills established pollution-free zones in Arctic 
waters from every point of coastal outreach one hundred miles from the Canadian coast above 
the sixtieth parallel. Within this zone, Canada asserted the right to control pollution, to regulate 
ship construction, to regulate navigation, to prohibit passage of shipping, and to impose financial 
penalties for failure to comply. Additionally, the law also established exclusive Canadian fishing 
rights beyond a twelve-mile limit in specific areas like the Bay of Fundy, and also designated a 
twelve-mile territorial sea. The United States State Department issued a sharply worded 
statement contending that, “International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral 





nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction.”2 Many observers commended the Canadian 
legislation and deplored the American response. To them, Canada was acting affirmatively to 
protect the Arctic from maritime pollution, while America was attempting to impede this effort 
because of “legal technicalities.”3  
 The Canadian move was motivated by criteria that went beyond a mere concern for 
preservation of the Arctic environment. Canada was reacting to the fact that the law of the sea 
has generally been formulated to favor shipping interests, not coastal interests. As Columbia 
University School of Law Professor Louis Henkin noted: 
The law of freedom of the seas has been a law of laissez faire favoring the shippers of the 
world. Shipping states are potential perpetrators of serious pollution threatening coastal 
states, but they have the votes to resist comprehensive regulation. Recent flurries of 
activity have produced neither cure nor effective control, and Canada, in particular, has 
been outvoted at several anti-pollution conferences.4  
 In a sense, the Canadian move can be interpreted as a rebuff to the IMCO conference in 
which many of the key decision were shaped by the CMI, the P&I Clubs, other maritime 
(noncoastal) interests, and the shipping states to the detriment of the needs of coastal states who 
wanted to incorporate into the draft treaty provisions establishing absolute liability. In terms of 
the impact on the international law process by the Canadian action, Professor Henkin stated that, 
“surely today, the answer to inadequate law or inadequate process is not unilateral assertions 
enhancing national authority and national judging for oneself and others. Canada has struck a 
blow against pollution and for today’s crusade for the environment, but it is a blow also at 





II. The American Refusal to Participate in the Brussels Regime 
 
 The American reaction was somewhat more muted than that of Canada, but it too reflects 
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Brussels Conference. On April 3, 1970, the United States 
Congress, after a three-year effort, adopted the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 
(WQIA).6 The legislation embodied features that either paralleled or surpassed some of the 
features of the private law treaty. Particularly significant was the law's section providing that in 
the event of an oil spill (unless a shipowner could successfully claim that the discharge occurred 
solely because of an act of God, an act of war, negligence on the part of the American 
government, or an act of omission of a third party), the owner's liability for the cost of the 
removal of the oil of the government would be the lesser of either one hundred dollars per gross 
ton or the sum of fourteen million dollars.7 While ostensibly this provision deviates only slightly 
from the private law treaty's provision on the amount of liability (one hundred thirty-four dollars 
per gross ton or fourteen million dollars), the WQIA's limits applied only to governmental 
cleanup costs, while the private law treaty's limits encompassed both governmental costs and 
private claims. Under WQIA, private entities, individuals, and individual American states were 
free to pursue their own damage claims. 
 In contrast to the provisions of the WQIA, the private law treaty did not grant any priority 
to the government-incurred cleanup costs over those of private interests. Therefore, in any single 
instance where the amount available under the cleanup costs would be less than the total damage, 
a pro rata distribution would be necessary. Accordingly, in the event of a massive oil spill from a 





States government could recover would be far greater under the WQIA than under the private 
law treaty.8  
 Conversely, since Non-State interests would share with the government in the settlement 
based on the private law treaty’s provisions, these interests would forfeit any further claims (if 
the damage exceeded the amount allocated to them) based on existing common, statutory, or 
admiralty law. Robert Neuman, the American negotiator, when queried on this point, replied, 
“That is the price they have to pay for receiving a remedy.”9 
 Another difference between the private law treaty and WQIA deals with the issue of 
jurisdictional coverage. The WQIA provides for liability for damages sustained within the 
American contiguous zone, as well as the territory of a particular State or on the territorial sea 
adjacent to a State, while the private law treaty omitted the contiguous zone. Instead it refers 
only to damages occurring on the territory of a particular State, thereby making the private law 
treaty less comprehensive in coverage than the WQIA.  
 In only one situation, however, would the provisions of the private law treaty be stricter 
than those of the WQIA. In the event that an oil spill occurred solely because of the actions of a 
third party (a small fishing boat collides with a tanker in a fog, and the fault lies solely with the 
smaller vessel), the tanker would not be liable under the WQIA, but would be liable under the 
private law treaty.10 
 Hearings were held before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate's 
Public Works Committee in July of 1970, and before the Subcommittee on Oceans and 
Environment of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee in May of 1971, to examine the 





States Constitution as the operative principle,11 the Senators were reminded by the Deputy 
Attorney General that the private law treaty, “would therefore supersede all state and all 
preexisting federal laws which are inconsistent with it.”12 
 The hearings disclosed that American oil and maritime interests preferred the terms of the 
private law treaty over the terms of the WQIA. Among those who testified in favor of the private 
law treaty's ratification were James J. Reynolds, President of the American Institute of Merchant 
Shipping, and Herbert A. Steyn, Jr. of the American Petroleum Institute.13 Each was 
accompanied to the hearings by a representative of a major international petroleum producer. 
Their arguments did not center on the private law treaty's generally less onerous liability 
provisions. Instead, emphasis was placed on the uniformity of procedure that would arise upon 
the private law treaty's ratification. This was deemed far more acceptable than each individual 
State adopting unilateral measures to deal with the problem. 
 The strategy of these interests was, in the words of Herbert Simon, Donald Smithburg, 
and Victor Thompson to:  
...accept regulation, even though somewhat adverse to its short run interests as a means of 
anticipating and heading off potential political forces that would otherwise impose more 
severe and less palatable regulations upon the group.14 
 In sharp contrast, the representatives of environmental organizations, such as the National 
Audubon Society and the Sierra Club, advocated rejection of the private law treaty. Noting some 
of the inadequate aspects of the treaty such as the cap on liability, the priority of payment of 
claims, the scope of liability provisions, and the fact that both federal and state laws were more 





be linked with a supplementary fund treaty.15 
 The most vehement arguments against the treaty were presented by Allan I. Mendelsohn, 
a former State Department negotiator in the area of marine and air law.16 Noting all the 
previously described weaknesses of the treaty, and contrasting these inadequacies with both 
international treaties on aviation (which are based on strict liability provisions) and the WQIA, 
he insisted that the treaty be ratified only upon negotiation of the thirty million dollar 
supplementary treaty.17 He maintained that if the Senate were to reject the liability treaty, “it 
would give us the bargaining power to go into that conference and to use the strength of our 
government to effect a treaty with a limit that adequately protects the American public.”18  
 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted the arguments of the 
environmentalists and Mendelsohn. On August 5, 1971, the committee reported the Liability 
Convention to the Senate floor and recommended that advice and consent to ratification be given 
only after the Senate could act on the supplementary fund treaty.19 
 
III.       The Establishment of the IMCO International Compensation Fund in 1971  
 
 As part of the regime strengthening process, the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (IMO Fund) 
was established in 1971. As noted in Chapter IV, the establishment of a fund to provide for 
additional compensation above the limits agreed to at Brussels was a prerequisite by certain 
States to approve the private law treaty. Further, it has even been suggested that in the absence of 





the private law treaty would not have been approved at Brussels.20 
 Accordingly, IMCO held a conference in Brussels in 1971 to establish a source of 
compensation for oil spill damages above and beyond that provided by the private law treaty. 
Canada again acted as the self-appointed guardian of environmental interests and demanded 
unlimited liability for pollution damage caused by oil spills. The other States involved at 
Brussels 1971 essentially split on which domestic interests were paramount – their shipping 
industries or the role of petroleum in the domestic society.21 
 Therefore Japan, Greece, Denmark, Liberia, and Norway, together with the USSR and 
France, sought to protect their domestic shipping companies from liability. Conversely those 
States heavily dependent on foreign oil with a relatively weak shipping component, like 
Germany and the Netherlands, sought to shield the oil industry from any extreme compensation 
positions.22 
 Ultimately agreement was reached on the terms of a compensation fund which provided 
that a sum of up to thirty-five million dollars would be made available from oil companies for 
payment of damages for an incident resulting in oil pollution damage. Nonetheless, the thirty-
five-million-dollar figure would be reduced by any amounts paid under the terms of the private 
law treaty. Therefore, the compensation scheme agreed to in 1971 provided that the P&I Clubs 
and/or other insurers would pay up to fourteen million dollars while any excess (up to an 
additional payment of up to twenty-one million dollars) would be paid by the oil companies. 
Since the International Compensation Fund would not go into effect until the ratification process 
was completed, TOVALOP and CRISTAL would in the interim pay the excess damages based 





June 19, 1975, with the Supplemental Fund Convention entered into force on October 16, 1978.  
 
IV.       The 1992 Conventions 
 
 The ten-year period after the Supplemental Fund Convention went into effect was 
relatively quiet in terms of the issue of oil spills on the seas, and the legal regime established at 
Brussels (including the Supplemental Fund Convention, TOVALOP and CRISTAL) and the 
WQIA, passed by the United States Congress, seemed adequate to handle the problem. 
 In 1989, however, after the Exxon Valdez catastrophe (see V. below), it became clear that 
the limits of liability contained in the private law treaty and the Supplemental Fund Convention 
were set at unrealistically low levels.  
 Accordingly, in 1992, both the private law treaty and the Supplemental Fund Convention 
were significantly revised, which resulted in the levels of compensation being increased. 
Therefore, the 1969 private law treaty and the fund were renamed as the 1992 Civil Law 
Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention, and they entered into force on May 30, 1996 (“the 
1992 Conventions”). 
 The 1992 Conventions (as subsequently amended in 2003) raised the amount of available 
compensation to the sum of $292 million, a significant increase from the 1969/1971 levels. For 
large oil tankers (one hundred forty thousand units of tonnage), it was provided that their liability 
would be $127.3 million with the balance paid by the fund based on contributions from the large 
oil companies. 





from the 1969 private law treaty (although when inflation is factored in the calculation, it is far 
less expansive than it initially appears), the 1992 conventions also narrowed the definition of 
pollution damage from the 1969 civil law treaty. 
 Specifically, the 1992 convention limits the operative definition of “pollution damage” by 
adding the following provision, which did not appear in the 1969 private law treaty, “…provided 
that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such 
impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken 
or to be undertaken.”24 
 Clearly, the addition of this provision was a concession to the Non-State Actors 
(shipping, oil, and insurance) to limit their exposure in the event of a supersized disaster.  
 The 1992 Conventions rendered TOVALOP and CRISTAL redundant because it was 
perceived there was no need for two sources of compensation from the same entities. 
Consequently, both entities disbanded in 1997.25 
 Finally, in 2005, an additional level of compensation was established by means of a 
Supplementary Fund. This raised the total available amount for an oil spill disaster to $1.064 
billion dollars. This amount includes available compensation under the 1992 Conventions as 
amended, and the additional liability under the 2005 convention is paid by the international oil 
companies. 
 Ratification of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention have 
been widespread. As of March 20, 2018:  
 a. 137 States are parties to both Conventions; 





 c. 31 States are parties to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, but not to the 1992 
Fund Convention.26 
 
V.         The Exxon Valdez Disaster – 1989 
 
 Through the post-1969 period, the United States, through its constitutional processes that 
required ratification by a two-thirds vote of the United States Senate, ratified neither the Brussels 
private law treaty nor the Supplemental Fund Convention. The American position was that 
despite the seemingly impressive numbers that were attached to the treaty and fund, the amount 
of compensation available would be totally inadequate in the event of a Torrey Canyon-type 
disaster. 
 On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez, whose voyage had begun in California and whose 
destination was the Trans-Alaska Pipeline terminal at Valdez, Alaska, ran aground on Bligh Reef 
in Valdez. While the subsequent oil spill was relatively small (it did not even make the list of the 
thirty-five largest oil spills in history), the Exxon Valdez incident in many ways paralleled the 
impact of the Torrey Canyon over twenty years previously. The damage, cleanup costs, and 
media attention were massive, and the existing international regimes would have been totally 
incapable of properly compensating all impacted parties. 
 The optics of the disaster were staggering. Television crews swarmed to the site, and 
Americans witnessed the damage caused by approximately eleven million gallons of spilled oil. 
As thick black sludge washed onto the formerly pristine coast, wildlife activists scurried around 





those individuals who previously had not considered themselves part of the now well-organized 
environmental movement were outraged by the daily images.27  
 The cleanup costs were stupendous. Bearing in mind that the original limits at Brussels in 
1969 were fourteen million dollars, and that the TOVALOP-CRISTAL combination provided for 
a total of thirty million dollars, the total cleanup cost for the Exxon Valdez was estimated to be 
between $5.3 and $6 billion dollars!28 Further, it was estimated the total economic cost of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill was $16.5 billion dollars!29 None of the existing regimes could even come 
close to providing proper clean up and fair compensation to victims. 
 Accordingly, in 1990, Congress acted unilaterally and passed the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA),30 which was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush. 
 
A.       Damage as Defined Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
 
 OPA has an incredibly broad, all-encompassing definition of the terms of removal costs 
and liability. Specifically, the statute provided that the “responsible party” would be responsible 
for “all removal costs.”31 It is noteworthy that, unlike the Brussels regime, liability for removal 
was unlimited without any caps whatsoever. This broad liability provision reflected the strength 
of the environmental movement in the United States combined with the perception in the United 
States that the oil companies were greedy, super wealthy entities who could and should pay for 






B. Liability as Defined Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
 
 Further, the specific damages for which compensation was due from the party found 
liable includes: 
a. Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or use of loss of natural resources.”32 
b. Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal 
property, which shall be recovered by a claimant who owns or leases that property.”33 
c. Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by 
any claimant who so uses natural resources that have been injured, destroyed, or lost.”34 
d. Damages equal to the net losses of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares due to 
the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, or natural resources.”35 
e. Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, 
destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources.” 36 
f. Damages for net costs of providing increased or additional public services during or after 
removal activities, including protection from fire safety or health hazards caused by a 
discharge of oil.”37 
 The scope of liability for damage under OPA is breathtaking. Besides the use of the strict 
liability standard (which also is incorporated in Brussels and its progeny), OPA, with very few 
exceptions, contains no damage caps and, further, does not preempt any American state from 
undertaking independent action against the ship or the cargo owner. As will be seen below, 
however, one of the very few exceptions for damage caps was granted to offshore drilling 





 Further, the categories of damages that can be recovered are beyond anything 
contemplated by the Brussels regime and its progeny. By way of example, the government can 
recover taxes that are not paid because of the destruction of facilities that provided all types of 
governmental revenue, and the subsequent loss of the revenue stream. Further, lost profits are 
recoverable, as are increased expenses for public services, such as hazmat crews and other 
emergency services.          
 In short, OPA is everything that Brussels and its progeny are not – a system of 
compensation in which the defendant faces open-ended liability for its errors or omissions. There 
are no escape clauses, and enforcement, in contradistinction to the international regime, is 
backed up by the full power of the United States Department of Justice and the individual state 
equivalents. 
 
C. Sources of Revenue for Compensation of Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act 
 
 The most important innovation of OPA was the abandonment of the formula for 
compensation that had been the guiding principle of the private law treaty and the 1971 
compensation fund and would continue to be used in the 1992 treaty and its compensation fund. 
 Specifically, the regime established at Brussels incorporated a compensation scheme 
whose first tier was payment of damage by marine insurers (P&I Clubs and marine insurance 
companies), and whose second tier was payment of damages by contributions from international 
oil companies. This was the essence of the compromise reached at Brussels. In sharp contrast, 





(i.e., the large international petroleum companies) played any roles in the OPA compensation 
scheme. Instead, the United States government used its massive taxing power to establish a one-
billion-dollar Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“the Trust Fund”), which was funded by a five cents 
per barrel tax collected from the oil industry on all oil produced or imported into the United 
States,38 as well as from transfer from existing trust funds, such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Liability Fund, interest on the principal of the Trust Fund derived from United States Treasury 
instruments, and recovery from those held responsible for oil spills.39 Accordingly, it was clear 
that the cargo owners (the oil companies) would be the parties ultimately responsible under OPA 
to pay damage claims arising from massive oil spills. The net result of Exxon Valdez and OPA 
was that the United States abandoned the multilateral treaty approach in favor of the unilateral 
OPA. 
 As a side note, although the litigation by the United States government against Exxon for 
damage caused by the Exxon Valdez was settled in 1991, the settlement permitted the federal 
government to reopen litigation in the event of “unknown damages.” This is precisely what 
occurred and the administration of George W. Bush pursued these claims. It was only in 2015 
that the final claims were dropped by the federal government, and all litigations were deemed 






VI. The Deepwater Horizon Disaster40 
 
 In 2010, twenty-one years after the Exxon Valdez disaster, the Deepwater Horizon 
environmental catastrophe occurred. The Deepwater Horizon was a drilling rig was owned by 
Transocean, the largest owner of drilling equipment in the world, and was leased to British 
Petroleum (BP), which was using it to drill for oil at the Macondo Field in the Gulf of Mexico in 
the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the rig caused a 
blowout, which resulted in four million barrels of oil leaking into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven 
lives were lost. Further, the economic repercussions were enormous – destruction of livelihoods 
for fishermen, resort owners, and those in the tourist industry on the Gulf Coast, as well as the 
havoc wreaked on the environment. 
 Drilling rigs were not covered by the Brussels regime, which was limited to ships. 
Further, OPA had a seventy-five million-dollar cap on liability for damages caused by oil rigs. It 
was clear that damages would total in the billions of dollars, but there was no compensatory 
scheme in place besides ordinary lawsuits, which, in turn, would take many years if not decades, 
to wend their way through the American judicial system. 
 The United States government acted with its full power, and compelled BP to waive the 
seventy-five million-dollar-cap. Further, as a result of American governmental pressure, BP put 
twenty-nine billion dollars in escrow as security for pending liability claims. 
 Nonetheless, Deepwater Horizon demonstrated the inadequacies of all existing 
compensation schemes, whether established by an international regime or by unilateral State 





VII. Post-Brussels Conference: Stresses on the International Regime Summed Up 
 
 The post-Brussels activities by IMCO, including the establishment of the Supplemental 
Compensation Fund in 1971, the adoption of the 1992 Convention, and their subsequent 
modification, are demonstrative of the interactions inherent in the regime formation process. The 
question of compensation was initially resolved by shifting the burden of liability to the 
insurance interests – the P&I Clubs and the traditional marine insurers. While the insurers 
reluctantly abandoned the traditional maritime standard of negligence in favor of strict liability, 
they refused to raise the actual amount of compensation (fourteen million dollars) beyond what 
they deemed an insurable risk. 
 Accordingly, the oil interests became liable for compensation beyond the fourteen-
million-dollar mark. They, however, did not give an open-ended commitment to compensate 
injured parties for any and all damages. Instead, initially through TOVALOP (backed up by 
CRISTAL), they essentially retained the power to control compensation on their own terms and 
conditions. Even with the introduction of the IMCO compensation funds in 1971 and 1992, there 
is no evidence that the oil interests gave an unconditional guarantee of compensation. To the 
contrary, the 1992 Treaty narrowed the definition of liability, and thereby further limited the oil 
exposure of the oil companies. 
 Further, the United States and Canada, based on a growing environmental awareness, 
refused to ratify the 1969 private law treaty. Moreover, in the case of the United States, the 
traumatic Exxon Valdez environmental catastrophe, an exogenous event, made it clear that the 





based upon insurers, and contributions from oil companies – led to a total abandonment of the 
idea of participation in an international regime, and thereby cemented this country’s decision to 
proceed unilaterally. Under this unilateral approach, liability was unlimited, and taxation of oil 
would provide the source of compensation to injured parties rather than insurance and oil 
industry contributions. 
 This American unilateral approach did not significantly weaken the Brussels regime. In 
fact, per the chronology of events attached hereto, the 1992 Protocol to Amend the International 
Convention of Civil Liability and the 1992 Fund Convention cover approximately 97,698 of the 
gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping. Nonetheless, the unilateral American approach 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
This study opened with a hypothesis on which factors led to the formation of an 
international regime to deal with marine oil spills at the 1969 Brussels Conference sponsored by 
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). As emphasized in this 
dissertation, the Brussels Conference offers fertile ground for analysis because it went far beyond 
the usual agenda of such conferences. Specifically, it did not deal with garden variety research 
proposals, technical or safety issues, or recommendations for action. Rather, it set up a fully-
fledged international legal regime that established both enforceable standards of liability and 
specific mandatory levels of compensation to those injured by marine oil spills.  
 Four possible explanations for the formation of this regime were offered: 
 
I. The first explanation was the emergence, in the period 1941 to 1966, of norms of Public 
International Law based on the “polluter pays principle,” which essentially opened the possibility 
under international law of a victim of oil pollution obtaining compensation for injuries from the 
ship that caused the injury. 
 This explanation evidently does not provide an adequate basis for understanding why the 
regime was formed. While, as indicated in Chapter III, the Trail Smelter Arbitration and the 
Helsinki Rules both established the Public International Law rule of the illegality of the pollution 
of transnational resources, as well as the “polluter pays” principle, there was no mention of any 
of this in the 1969 private law treaty, the 1971 Fund Convention, or the 1992 Civil Law 
Convention. Further, there is no mention of these rules in the IMCO documents that were 
produced contemporaneously with the Brussels Conference.  
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 Moreover, and possibly most significantly, there is no mention of the “polluter pays” rule 
in the 1972 Declaration of the United States Conference on the Human Environment, which is 
widely seen as the founding document of the international environmental movement. 
Specifically, while the document does call for the maintenance of environmental integrity in 
Principles 6 and Principle 7, the omission of this “polluter pays” rule raises fundamental issues 
of its importance in international environmental law. 
 Therefore, by tracing the “polluter pays” rule to determine what happened at the Brussels 
Conference and in its aftermath, one can conclude based on the existing evidence, that these 
rules, which developed during the period 1941 to 1966, were essentially irrelevant to the 
outcome of the Brussels Conference.  
 
II. The second explanation is the emergence of environmentalism as an issue on the public 
agenda, particularly the issue of oil spills resulting from tanker crashes, which became part of the 
public agenda through an inordinate amount of media coverage. 
 There is little doubt that the Torrey Canyon episode was the first environmental disaster 
of the electronic media era. It received front package coverage (both in the electronic and print 
media) in the United States, as well as Europe. Adding to the media drama were images of the 
ship being bombed with napalm by the Royal Air Force in an attempt to burn off the leaking 
petroleum. 
 Moreover, as has been observed, a shipwreck leaking oil captures the public imagination 
far more effectively than an ordinary oil spill emanating from land-based oil tanks, even if the 
latter has greater environmental impact than the former (Kiern).  
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 Further, it was during this period that the environmental movement began to gain traction 
in the United States, as well as other areas of the world. Therefore, during the hearings in the 
United States Senate on the ratification of the private law treaty, effective presentations against 
the treaty were made by traditional conservationist lobbyists, such as the Sierra Club and the 
National Audubon Society, as well as individuals such as Allan I. Mendelsohn, the former State 
Department negotiator.  
 Clearly, the Torrey Canyon episode, with its disastrous environmental impact, was a 
sufficient reason for the British government to request an urgent meeting of IMCO to address the 
major issues raised by the disaster within ten days of the conclusion of the incident. Needless to 
say, the long, two and a half year negotiation process, described in Chapter IV, which 
fundamentally centered on evasion of responsibility for compensation by the impacted parties, 
cannot be explained simply by the rise of a global environmental consciousness. Accordingly, 
this explanation is confirmed to the extent that the Torrey Canyon was a necessary part of the 
process, but is far from sufficient in explaining what occurred. 
 
III. The third explanation is the inadequate remedies for compensation to victims of oil 
pollution damage under existing domestic laws and institutions. 
 There is no question that the domestic law in many States provided inadequate legal 
remedies to pay claims arising from significant oil pollution damage. As was seen in Chapter II, 
the owners of the Torrey Canyon filed a Petition in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York to determine that the total liability of the owners totaled just fifty 
dollars. 
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 Yet, in a very real sense, the issue of “inadequate compensation” is a very slippery, 
nebulous term to quantify. As has been observed, there are those who maintain that since society 
as a whole benefits from international transport of oil, the risk should be spread among society at 
large. Further, in a variation of this argument, the shipping industry maintained that since the oil 
industry was enormously profitable, it should bear the primary financial risks involved in the 
transport of oil, while the oil industry countered that it could not be held accountable for the acts 
of negligent ship captains and crews (Sperdokli).  
 Therefore, while both domestic and international law did not provide effective remedies 
to those impacted by oil spills, the real question was not only how much compensation would be 
available for injured parties, but who would be responsible for payment. Therefore, this 
explanation was a necessary part of the process, but is far from sufficient in explaining the 
results of the conference. This then brings this analysis to the most likely explanation in 
understanding what happened at Brussels. 
 
IV. The fourth explanation is that the interactions among States, IMCO, and Non-State Actors 
(insurance, shipping, and petroleum) who, in the case of Non-State Actors, were guided by 
market forces that led to the inclusion in the private law treaty of terms based on these market 
forces to the exclusion of other possible factors, such as an approach to the issue based on 
environmental integrity being the highest good, irrespective of the financial costs involved.  
 To determine whether this explanation describes the outcome of the Brussels Conference, 
it is necessary to review briefly contemporary international relations theory, especially 
international regimes and regime complexes, and see how these paradigms explain what 
occurred at Brussels. 
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A. International Regimes 
 
Chapter III describes the evolution of international relations theory from realism to a 
transnational system approach, and then to the study of international regimes and regime 
complexes. Clearly the series of events beginning at Brussels in 1969 and running for decades 
afterwards is consistent with the formation of a regime complex to deal with the issue of marine 
oil pollution. This regime formation process itself, both at Brussels and afterwards, can be 
described in the following terms: 
1. The regime originated on the contraction track. The participants met with the specific 
intent of establishing a, “‘constitutional’ contract laying out a regime to govern the 
activity in question” (Young).  
2. It was a reactionary (O’Hagan) that arose to deal with the specific problem – in this case 
marine oil pollution. Like other reactionary regimes, it does not have the staying power of 
an anticipatory regime, which has the flexibility to meet changing conditions.  
3. The formation process in terms of the negotiations at Brussels is consistent with the 
neoliberal approach found in the writings of Keohane and Young. Specifically, the 
multiple actors (both State and Non-State) in the process are inconsistent with a realist 
approach, which would lead one to conclude that a dominant power (hegemon) was 
essentially dictating the terms of the treaties at Brussels. The United States opposed the 
process (the United States never ratified the private law treaty), and opted instead for 
unilateral action with the passage of the Water Quality Improvement Act (WQIA) in 
1970 and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in 1990. The Brussels treaties have been ratified by 
States under whose flags sail more than ninety-seven percent of the world’s merchant 
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shipping. It is clear that the United States did not and could not act as a hegemon and 
thereby derail the Brussels process.  
It is manifest that the case at hand is marked by the opposite of the realist approach, and 
accordingly, it is posited that the neoliberal approach describes the events at Brussels. 
Specifically, the roles of multiple actors, both State and Non-State, such as the CMI, the national 
Maritime Law Associations, the petroleum companies, the P&I Clubs and international insurance 
companies, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and IMCO to name but some, 
reflect a diverse negotiating universe at Brussels, which was an attempt to find an acceptable 
outcome that would have satisfied the needs of at least some of the participants. 
Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, there was no evidence that the cognitive school of 
thought was relevant to the outcome at Brussels. Specifically, given the fact that the Brussels 
Conference was ostensibly about forming a legal regime to deal with preservation of the marine 
environment, one would have thought that a knowledge-based approach, in which there were 
shared values on the preservation of the environment among key decision-makers, would have 
shaped the negotiations, as well as their outcome. Instead, the opposite scenario was dominant. 
The insurance and shipping interests had three major concerns: that the traditional maritime 
standard of fault (as opposed to strict liability) be incorporated into the private law treaty; that 
the limits of liability be set as low as possible; and that the cargo owners (i.e. the international 
petroleum companies), rather than negligent shipowners, bear most of the financial and legal 
responsibility for paying for oil pollution damage.  
Conversely, based on a cognitive approach to international regimes, there is no evidence 
of a real discussion on what steps the major actors (Non-State and State) could undertake 
together to preserve the fragile marine environment. There was a marked absence of substantive 
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efforts to demonstrate in this study the major points of discussion centered on shifting the burden 
of liability from shipping interests to insurance interests, and then to petroleum interests.  
If this is indeed the case, and if, further, an international regime is defined as “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international” (Krasner), it is somewhat challenging to 
incorporate the outcome of the Brussels Conference into a framework that implies a 
commonality of interest among the participants. While, as was observed in Chapter IV, the 
American, Canadian, and Irish delegations did share some of these values, the countervailing 
value of market viability held by other States seemed to have carried the day.  
 
B. Regime Complexes 
 
1. The Private Law Treaty as the Initial Component of a Regime Complex 
 
Regime theory was expanded to incorporate the concept of regime complexes that result 
from “the rising density of international institutions” (Raustiala and Victor). Further, because of 
the density of international institutions, “it is increasingly difficult to isolate and ‘decompose’ 
individual organizations for study” (Raustiala and Victor). The regime complex centering on 
compensation for marine oil pollution encompasses the private law treaty negotiated at Brussels 
in 1969, the separate 1970 Canadian legislative initiative, the 1970 WQIA and the 1990 OPA. 
The narrative of this study stresses the complicated interactions at Brussels among participating 
States, IMCO, and an array of Non-State Actors, such as the CMI, the P&I Clubs, insurance 
companies, the international petroleum companies, and special purpose entities such as 
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TOVALOP and CRISTAL, which formed the first regime in the regime complex. Figure VI-I 
illustrates their interactions at Brussels in 1969. As is self-evident, many Actors (State as well as 
Non-State) and a Public International Organization were involved in the negotiating process that 
produced the treaties at the end of the conference.  
Further, because the international regime established at Brussels encountered only one 
institution (the private law treaty), forum shopping, which is a component of a regime complex, 
did not exist in 1969, and probably does not even exist today because the United States, which 
remains the only major non-participant in the Brussels regime, claims exclusive jurisdiction over 
a limited geographic area that abuts against the United States and its territories.  
Further, the bargaining among the actors that produced the private law treaty at Brussels 
demonstrates another characteristic relevant to the study of regime complexes. An international 
regime is not a level playing field because, “The institutional slate is not clean. Ideas, interests, 
and expectations frequently are already aligned around some existing rules and concepts” 
(Raustiala and Victor). Thus, the Non-State Actors at Brussels entered the negotiations with firm 
ideas on whether negligence or strict liability would be the criteria that would form the basis of 
any future claim for damages.  
Moreover, each Non-State Actor came into the conference with a preconceived notion of 
the market forces and business realities that shaped their negotiating stances. For the shipping 
companies and their alter egos in the insurance industry, their negotiating stance was shaped by 
their knowledge of what was, and what was not, insurable. For the petroleum industry, the issue 
was their bottom line and how it would be impacted if, pursuant to any treaty, they were being 
asked to become partners in liability with the negligent ship crews who were the root cause of 
the problem. Therefore, the oil industry initially refused to participate in any regime in which the  
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shipping and insurance companies were not parties of the first instance against whom a claim 
would be filed.  
C. The Role of Non-State Actors in International Regimes and Complexes  
 
A core issue of this study was to identify the role of interest groups at the Brussels 
Conference in particular, and in international regimes and complexes in general. Some of the 
existing literature stresses the American interest group analogy, which is perceived as centering 
on, “campaign contributions and electoral pressure, strategic information transmission of 
expertise and grassroots representation and mobilization” (Bloodgood). 
There is no evidence that these three mechanisms were actually utilized at Brussels, 
although they were used in the context of the American political system at the time that the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 was being debated in Congress. 
Instead, this study of the Brussels Conference has revealed, based on the domestic 
interest group analogy, that the dominant form of interaction between IMCO, Non-State Actors 
and national delegations in shaping the Conference’s outcome was clientism, which describes a 
symbiotic relationship between the regulators and the regulated.  
1.  Clientism 
 
A prerequisite for the analysis based on clientism is an assumption that Public 
International Organizations do have a propensity for seeking support from those outside the 
agency – that in fact, Public International Organizations are not neutral, or even “benevolent” 
and in fact, these factors may detract from the organization’s stated mission (Strange, Cox and 
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Jacobson, and Frey, but see Dahlberg who argues for strengthened international agencies to deal 
with various strategic international agencies to confront environmental issues).  
Therefore, IMCO, as described in Chapter IV, for many years prior to Brussels had a very 
close relationship with the CMI, and in fact, on occasion actually produced the draft treaties that 
formed the basis of treaties circulated and then approved at IMCO meetings. Further, in the 
period from 1967 to 1969, both the CMI and IMCO worked at parallel but also intersecting 
efforts to produce draft treaties on the issue of liability. 
Moreover, the leadership of the Brussels Conference, which ostensibly was run by 
IMCO, a Public International Organization, but in practical terms, was run by the leaders of the 
CMI, who played triple roles as members of their State delegations, leaders of the IMCO 
conference, while simultaneously representatives of the shipping/insurance interests. Figure VI-2 
and VI-3 illustrate the overlapping roles of Dr. Walter Muller and Albert Lilar at Brussels, two of 
the most influential leaders at the Brussels Conference.  
Further, in the case of the United States delegation, clientism was manifested by the 
strategic placement of leaders of the American maritime industry into the ranks of those who 
officially represented the United States at the Brussels Conference. Moreover, an organ of 
administrative pluralism, the Shipping Coordinating Committee, was heavily involved in 
formulating the American position at Brussels. Conversely, there is no evidence that 
environmental groups played any role whatsoever in the United States preparation for the 
Brussels Conference, and there certainly were no representatives of any environmental group in 
any capacity (e.g. members of the delegation or advisors to the delegation) incorporated into the 
American delegation. Figure VI-4 illustrates the politics of access relevant to the American 
delegation of Brussels.  
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2. Regulatory Capture 
 
The close relationships between IMCO and the CMI, and the overlapping identifications 
between IMCO, the CMI, industry representatives, and State delegations, led to the concomitant 
question of regulatory capture (i.e. the domination and even capture by interests) of the agency 
that ostensibly is tasked with the regulation of these very interests. This phenomenon has been 
studied extensively in the context of domestic systems, and there has been a very limited amount 
of research on this in international relations. Among the conclusions drawn about international 
environmental regimes is that regulatory capture is a possibility, but has been offset by the 
existence of countervailing groups (Victor, Rausytala, Skolnikoff). Further, many scholars do not 
even mention the possibility of regulatory capture in their work on international environmental 
regimes (Hurrell and Kingsbury). The evidence at Brussels clearly indicates that IMCO was 
captured by the shipping industry and its alter egos, the P&I Clubs and the international insurers. 
IMCO, in fact, identified with the insurance and shipping interests and vice versa to the extent 
that the actual dollar amounts of liability in the private law treaty could not have been 
incorporated in its terms unless and until the London insurers consented to this proposal. 
Accordingly, not only was there regulatory capture of IMCO, but the insurers actually acted as a 
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3. Self-Regulation as a Manifestation of Non-Decisions 
 
Another angle to analyze the events leading up to Brussels and afterwards is by approaching 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL through the paradigm of self-regulation and non-decision, which 
refers to the process by which an interest argues that the most efficient way to deal with an issue 
is to allow it to establish its own regulatory scheme and to police itself. By taking this approach, 
the interest seeks to coopt outside initiatives, and thereby deflect any regulatory regime imposed 
by an outside legal authority. 
The role played by TOVALOP and CRISTAL, especially in the years from 1969 to 1976, 
in providing financial backup to the regime established by the private law treaty (1969) but prior 
to the coming into force of the 1971 International Fund Convention in 1976, allowed both of 
these entities to have an input into the payment of any compensation to impacted parties above 
and beyond the figure established at Brussels that insurers were required to pay. This self-
regulation allowed the shipping and oil companies to police themselves during this time period, 
and, in a sense, act as a judge and jury in the determination of the amounts of compensation to be 
paid to the injured parties. In fact, it was only after the 1992 conventions were agreed to that 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL became totally redundant and obsolete, and consequently, 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL disbanded in 1997. 
 
D. Insurance Companies as Non-State Actors 
 
This study emphasizes the role of the P&I Clubs and insurance companies, such as 
Lloyd’s of London, in establishing the limits of liability at the Brussels Conference. More 
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specifically, the finalization of the terms of the private law treaty required the assent of the 
London insurers who, as previously indicated, acted as a veto group with the power to abort the 
proposed international regime unless their demands were acceded to by the assembled delegates 
at the Conference sponsored by IMCO, a Public International Organization. 
It has been observed that despite the immense wealth and economic power in 
international insurance companies (the largest insurance companies have assets in excess of five-
hundred billion dollars), there has been a reluctance to undertake scholarly research on their roles 
in the transnational system (Strange, Haufler). Even some of those who do write about the 
significance of the role played by insurance companies fail to follow up in a subsequent work 
about international environmental regimes (Haufler).  
It is therefore concluded that the only way to understand fully the terms of the private law 
treaty is to integrate the role of insurance companies into the analysis. 
 
V. The Use of a Critical Case Study 
 
The final issue addressed in this chapter is the utility of a critical or crucial case study as 
a research model. Distilled to its essence, this study analyzes the results of the Brussels 
Conference in terms of regime formation, and with specific emphasis on the roles of Non-State 
Actors (shipping, oil, and insurance interests on its outcome). The stakes were immense – who 
was going to be financially liable in the event of an oil spill disaster. The outcome was analyzed 
by using theories developed in regime formation (as well as regime complexes), and the use of 
the domestic interest group analogy.  
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At a certain level, it can be argued that the uniqueness of the Brussels Conference lends 
itself to a critical case study if for no other reason than that the private law treaty stands separate 
and apart from any other environmental conferences prior to or since 1969. Most international 
environmental regimes lack any enforcement provisions (Green, Mitchell). The conferences and 
programs that are of headline-making quality (Kyoto and Paris) are essentially voluntary efforts 
to comply with certain guideline on the emissions of greenhouse gases.  
In sharp contrast, Brussels and its progeny addressed the marine oil pollution issue by 
imposing liability of up to one billion dollars on offenders. Whether or not these remedies are 
adequate to deal with the issue is not the operative question. What is relevant is that no other 
treaty approaches (or possibly even exists) that replicates the Brussels model. Therefore, to 
compare the results of Brussels with other cases (environmental regimes) that deal primarily with 
technical issues and voluntary guidelines (Green) may be a useless exercise. 
Moving beyond the factual uniqueness of the Brussels case, the question arises as to the 
epistemological value of a detailed study of the factors and actors that led to the drafting of the 
private law treaty. Within the paradigms of political science, there is a significant resistance to 
the use of a critical case study, and the compelling reasons against their use have been laid out 
with clarity in the Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane, and Verba). 
Nonetheless, there are those who advocate the use of significant case studies (Campbell, 
Ragin, and Flyvberg). Among the reasons given is that, at the end of the day, there is no 
predictive theory in social science. Accordingly, in the absence of social science formulating 
context-independent theory, what else is left but context dependent knowledge? (Flyvberg).  
Therefore, this study of the Brussels Conference and its aftermath incorporates research 
findings that either conflict with existing theory or are not accounted for in existing theory.  
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Specifically, regime theory beginning with Keohane and Nye in the 1970s through the 
more recent studies by Raustiala and Victor, Sell and Parkash, and Keohane and Victor were 
predicated on a view that the transnational system and its component regimes and regime 
complexes, consisted of distinct and separate entities – States, Public International Organizations 
and Non-State Actors – all of whom operated on independent tracks. 
This study, however, concludes that in the case of Brussels, the power centers were not 
distinct, and, in fact, there was an overlap of key Non-State Actors (e.g. Lord Devlin, Dr. Albert 
Lilar, and Dr. Walter Muller among others) who were embedded in State delegations and in 
IMCO, and yet in their professional lives represented the insurance and shipping interests, which 
were the subject of regulation at Brussels. The existence of this phenomenon calls into question 
those studies that fail to note the existence and importance of this overlap, and by this omission 
conclude, among other things, that regulatory capture does not exist in international 
environmental regimes, and that Public International Organizations are neutral institutions who 
focus exclusively on their stated missions without any other considerations. 
Further, by emphasizing the tactic of Non-State Actors who were operating at Brussels in 
substantially the same way as they act in domestic legislative systems (i.e. clientism and self-
regulation non-decisions – TOVALOP and CRISTAL), this study moves the analysis of regime 
formation and regime complexes into previously unexplored territory. Specifically, Non-State 
Actors attempting to influence the outcome of a conference, such as the one held in Brussels in 
1969, do more than merely mobilize opinion, motivate voters and get them to vote, and provide 
crucial information to the formal decision-making persons. Instead they attempt to influence 
directly the outcome of the regime formation process through the use of conventional interest 
group strategies used to lobby members of a domestic legislature. This process has been, for the 
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most part, largely ignored by researchers and theorists. Accordingly, if the existence of this 
phenomenon can be found in similar studies that might be conducted, this then might cause the 
recalibration of theories of regime formation. 
 
 
VI. What Was Accomplished at Brussels 
 
This dissertation emphasized theoretical and legal issues in the establishment of an 
international regime to provide compensation for those impacted by oil spills on the high seas. 
Among the issues discussed was regime formation in a transnational international system, the 
role of Non-State Actors in the process, and strategies used by Non-State Actors. 
The unspoken issue is whether anything practical was accomplished by the complex 
process described in this study. The answer is that the regime did and continues to compensate 
victims of oil spill damage. Attached in the Appendix as item 3, is Annex I to the financial 
statement of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund of 1992 [the revised version of 
the 1969 Civil Liability Treaty and the 1971 Supplemental Fund] for the period ending on 
December 31, 2016. 
A review of the Comments of the Directors indicates that sums in excess of one-hundred 
million British pounds have been paid as compensation to victims of oil spill damage since the 
inception of the 1992 Oil Pollution Compensation Fund. Additionally, significant compensation 
has been paid by the original 1969 treaty and 1971 Supplemental Fund, which are still applicable 
to those States that ratified the original 1969 and 1971 agreements but did not ratify the 1992 
Compensation Fund. 
These accomplishments, while impressive, are diminished, however, by two factors. 
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First, given the extent of damage measured in the billions of dollars in incidents like the 
Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon (both of which are discussed in Chapter 5), the level 
of compensation provided by the Brussels system of compensation is highly inadequate. 
Second, the United States, the key player in the world economy, has opted not to join the 
Brussels regime and instead, through the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, has elected to 
take a unilateral approach to the issue. 
While clearly, a half measure is preferable to inaction, the question that arises is whether 
an entirely different approach is feasible. This alternative approach is discussed in the next and 
final segment of this study. 
 
VII. Looking Beyond 
 
This dissertation stressed the intertwined roles of large international entities, such as 
IMCO, the CMI, the international oil companies, the multinational insurance companies, and 
States in the formulation of policy on the issue of liability for oil spills on the oceans. 
In recent years, an alternate approach to the issue of the management of international 
resources to mitigate pollution has been suggested, which represents a radical break from the 
legal-institutional paradigm. Specifically, green international political economy (“green theory” 
or “the green approach”) essentially turns the legal-institutional model on its head, and then 
proceeds to move into uncharted territory. Green theory’s point of departure is the realization 
that despite all of the domestic and international activity in the realm of what might loosely be 
termed “pollution control” over the past half-century (i.e. the studies, research, legislation, 
treaties et. al.), there has been a “visible absence of substantive policy responses to handle these 
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issues, both in the United States and the rest of the world.”1 Accordingly, it has been suggested 
that a new approach is required to deal with ecological issues:  
A Green or ecological approach understands the international political economy as an 
open subsystem of the largely closed planetary ecosystem, with which human society is 
deeply intertwined and fundamentally dependent. Because of this view, the relative size 
of any political-economic subsystem within a larger ecosystem becomes a central 
analytic device for Green IPE, as do exchanges between various subsystems. It is an 
inherently social (or human ecological process).2 
 
Green theory’s intellectual progenitors include Leopold Kohr, an Austrian born 
economist whose 1957 book, The Breakdown of Nations, was a cri de coeur over the 
consequences of large States and mass industrialization.3 
In 1973, E.F. Schumacher made the following observation about organizations: 
The higher level must not absorb the functions of the lower one, on the assumption that 
being higher, it will automatically be wiser and fulfill them more efficiently. Loyalty can 
grow only from the smaller units to the larger (and higher) ones, not the other way around 
– any loyalty is an essential element in the health of any organization. The Principal of 
Subsidiary Function implies that the burden of proof always lies on those who want to 
deprive a lower level of its function, and thereby of its freedom and responsibility in that 
respect; they have to prove that the lower level is incapable of fulfilling this function 
satisfactorily and that the higher level can do much better.4 
 
 In a similar vein, Eric Helleiner, who has written extensively on international finance, is 
generally credited as being the first major scholar to identify a theory of Green International 
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Economy.5 He observed that the slogan that best describes green thinking is “think globally, act 
locally.”6 Here, act locally, “is meant to convey the idea that people should focus their energies 
primarily on improving the quality of life and solving problems within communities where they 
live,” and in general refers to a, “deep commitment to the decentralization of political-economic 
life and the strength and value of local communities.”7 
 “Think globally” is somewhat more difficult to define, but refers to several phenomena 
such as a belief that global institutions, such as the G-7 and the European community, become 
more democratic and more responsive to the people of the world; the creation of “global civil 
society” groups that would promote the world economy to push for green goals; the creation of a 
world economy in which, “relatively autonomous local economies would exist within national 
economic spaces, which in turn would function fairly independently within broader regional and 
global economic structures;” and the elimination of “Koyaanisqaatsi,” a Hopi Indian word 
describing a life out of balance.8 
 In terms of the practical application of Green theory to the issue of the pollution of 
transnational resources, it is clear that in recent years, the beginnings of the “think globally, act 
locally” approach have begun to emerge, which have been described as follows: 
Consider the United Nations climate change negotiations in Paris {2015}. As Oxford 
professor and activist Thomas Hale has explained, the Paris Agreement of last December 
represents a paradigm shift in international agreements, from a ‘regulatory’ model of 
enforceable legal obligations to a ‘catalytic and facilitative’ model that both spurs and has 
a wide range of actors meeting rolling schedules of increasing commitments. That model, 
in turn, can work only if state parties to an agreement formally include non-state and 
substate actors – or as they insisted on being called in Paris “non-Party stakeholders’. 
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According to a study released during the Paris negotiations, more than 7,000 cities from 
more than 99 countries and some 5,000 companies from 88 countries made climate 
commitments. The cities represent 11 percent of the world’s population and about 32 
percent of the global gross domestic product, and the companies represented over $38 
trillion in revenue.9 
 
The reference to Non-Party Stakeholders reflects the increasing role given to these entities in the 
ongoing efforts to include non-conventional Non-State Actors in the international policymaking 
process in the area of environmental protection. 
 A Non-Party Stakeholder is defined in the United Nations Framework Convention on the 
Climate Change as: 
Entities that are not Parties (national governments). Non-Party Stakeholders therefore 
include civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other sub-national 
authorities, local communities, and indigenous people.10 
 
The increased participation by Non-Party Stakeholders in the various United Nations Specialized 
Agencies and other international entities is reflected, by way of example only, in the recent 
publication by the United Nations Framework Convention or Climate Change, which published a 
forty-seven page document that consisted of a list of the submissions Non-State Party 
Stakeholders in the area of the climate change. Each of these diverse entities (e.g. the Mountain 
Institute, Alliance for Global Water Adoption, and Gesellschaft für international 
Zusammenarbeit, to name but three of these Non-Party Stakeholders) had submitted a position 
paper reflecting its concerns to the United Nations.11 
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 The Non-Party Stakeholders submissions are diverse and essentially reflect the interests 
of the submitting entity within the context of the recipient international organization’s mandate. 
By way of example, the Purdue University Department of Political Science in its submission to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change made the following suggestion 
for a course of action that would: 
support knowledge-related capacity building within the UNFCCC process especially with 
regard to providing science-based learning opportunities for Parties in the form of 
materials/documents, in-session presentations or other, more creative formats and 
exercises (e.g. serious games).12 
 
 Accordingly, it is undeniable, that in the twenty-first century, the existence and role of 
Non-State Actors in the policymaking process in international environment matters is 
ascendant.13 What is not clear at this time, of course, is the actual ability of these Non-State 
Actors, be they Non-Party Stakeholders or other, to be relevant to the policymaking process. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that these new approaches represent a path forward in the regulation of 
ocean pollution and other transnational environmental issues.  
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1969 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO INTERVENTION ON THE 
HIGH SEAS IN CASES OF OIL POLLUTION CASUALTIES 
Adopted in Brussels, Belgium on 29 Nov 1969  
The States Parties to the present Convention, 
Conscious of the need to protect the interests of their peoples against the grave consequences of a 
maritime casualty resulting in danger of oil pollution of sea and coastlines, 
Convinced that under these circumstances measures of an exceptional character to protect 
such interests might be necessary on the high seas and that these measures do not affect the 
principle of freedom of the high seas, 




1. Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as may be 
necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or 
related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil; following upon a 
maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to 
result in major harmful consequences. 
2. However, no measures shall be taken under the present Convention against any warship 




For the purposes of the present Convention: 
 
1. "maritime casualty" means a collision of ships, stranding or other incident of navigation, 
or other occurrence on board a ship or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent 
threat of material damage to a ship or cargo; 
2. "ship" means: 
 
(a) any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever, and 
 
(b) any floating craft, with the exception of an installation or device engaged in the 
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3. "oil" means crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil and lubricating oil; 
 
4. "related interests" means the interests of a coastal State directly affected or threatened 
by the maritime casualty, such as: 
(a) maritime coastal, port or estuarine activities, including fisheries activities, 
constituting an essential means of livelihood of the persons concerned; 
(b) tourist attractions of the area concerned; 
 
(c) the health of the coastal population and the well-being of the area concerned, 
including conservation of living marine resources and of wildlife ; 
5. "Organization" means the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. 
 
ARTICLE Ill 
When a coastal State is exercising the right to take measures in accordance with Article I, the 
following provisions shall apply: 
(a) before taking any measures, a coastal State shall proceed to consultations with other 
States affected by the maritime casualty, particularly with the flag State or States; 
(b) the coastal State shall notify without delay the proposed measures to any persons 
physical or corporate known to the coastal State, or made known to it during the 
consultations, to have interests which can reasonably be expected to be affected by those 
measures. The coastal State shall take into account any views they may submit; 
(c) before any measure is taken, the coastal State may proceed to a consultation with 
independent experts, whose names shall be chosen from a list maintained by the Organizations; 
(d) in cases of extreme urgency requiring measures to be taken immediately, the coastal 
State may take measures rendered necessary by the urgency of the situation, without prior 
notification or consultation or without continuing consultations already begun; 
(e) a coastal State shall, before taking such measures and during their course, use its best 
endeavours to avoid any risk to human life, and to afford persons in distress any assistance 
of which they may stand in need, and in appropriate cases to facilitate the repatriation of 
ships' crews, and to raise no obstacle thereto; 
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(f) measures which have been taken in application of Article I shall be notified without 
delay to the States and to the known physical or corporate persons concerned, as well as to the 
Secretary- General of the Organization. 
ARTICLE IV 
 
1. Under the supervision of the Organization, there shall be set up and maintained the list of 
experts contemplated by Article III of the present Convention, and the Organization shall make 
necessary and appropriate regulations in connexion therewith, including the determination of 
the required qualifications. 
2. Nominations to the list may be made by Member States of the Organization and by 
Parties to this Convention. The experts shall be paid on the basis of services rendered by the 
States utilizing those services. 
ARTICLE V 
 
1. Measures taken by the coastal State in accordance with Article I shall be proportionate to 
the damage actual or threatened to it. 
 
2. Such measures shall not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the end 
mentioned in Article I and shall cease as soon as that end has been achieved; they shall not 
unnecessarily interfere with the rights and interests of the flag State, third States and of any 
persons, physical or corporate, concerned. 
 
3. In considering whether the measures are proportionate to the damage, account shall be 
taken of: 
 
(a) the extent and probability of imminent damage if those measures are not taken; and 
 
(b) the likelihood of those measures being effective; and 
 




Any Party which has taken measures in convention of the provisions of the present 
Convention causing damage to others, shall be obliged to pay compensation to the extent of 
the damage caused by measures which exceed those reasonably necessary to achieve the end 
mentioned in Article I. 
ARTICLE VII 
 
Except as specifically provided, nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice any 
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otherwise applicable right, duty, privilege or immunity or deprive any of the Parties or any 
interested physical or corporate person of any remedy otherwise applicable. 
ARTICLE VIII 
 
1. Any controversy between the parties as to whether measures taken under Article I were 
in contravention of the present Convention, to whether compensation is obliged to be paid 
under Article VI, and to the amount of such compensation shall, if settlement by negotiation 
between the Parties involved or between the Party which took the measures and the 
physical or corporate claimants has not been possible, and if the Parties do not otherwise 
agree, be submitted upon request of any of the parties concerned to conciliation or, if 
conciliation does not succeed, to arbitration, as set out in the Annex to the present 
Convention. 
2. The Party which took the measures shall not be entitled to refuse a request for 
conciliation or arbitration under provisions of the preceding paragraph solely on the grounds 
that any remedies under municipal law in its own courts have not been exhausted. 
ARTICLE IX 
 
1. The present Convention shall remain open for signature until 31 December 1970 and 
shall thereafter remain open for accession. 
2. States Members of the United Nations or any of the Specialized Agencies or of the 
International Atomic Energy Agencies or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice may become Parties to this Convention by: 
(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; 
 
(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval followed by ratification, 





1. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of a 
formal instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General of the Organization. 
2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after the entry 
into force of an amendment to the present Convention with respect to all existing Parties or 
after the completion of all measures required for the entry into force of the amendment with 






1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on 
which Governments of fifteen States have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, 
acceptance or approval or have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Secretary-General of the Organization. 
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it the 
present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State 




1. The present Convention may be denounced by any Party at any time after the date on 
which the Convention comes into force for that State. 
2. Denunciation shall be affected by the deposit of an instrument with the Secretary-
General of the Organization. 
3. A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be specified in 




1. The United Nations where it is the administering authority for a territory, or any State 
Party to the present Convention responsible for the international relations of a territory, shall as 
soon as possible consult with the appropriate authorities of such territories or take such other 
measures as may be appropriate, in order to extend the present Convention to that territory and 
may at any time by notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization declare 
that the present Convention shall extend to such territory. 
2. The present Convention shall, from the date of receipt of the notification or from such 
other date as may be specified in the notification, extend to the territory named therein. 
3. The United Nations, or any Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 of 
this Article may at any time after the date on which the Convention has been so extended to 
any territory declare by notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization 
that the present Convention shall cease to extend to any such territory named in the 
notification. 
4. The present Convention shall cease to extend to any territory mentioned in such 
notification one year, or such longer period as may be specified therein, after the date of 
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receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General of the Organization. 
ARTICLE XIV 
 
1. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending the present Convention 
may be convened by the Organization. 
2. The Organization shall convene a Conference of the States Parties to the present 
Convention for revising or amending the present Convention at the request of not less than 
one-third of the Parties. 
ARTICLE XV 
 
1. The present Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organization. 
 
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization shall: 
 
(a) inform all States which have signed or acceded to the Convention of: 
 
(i) each new signature or deposit of instrument together with the date thereof; 
 
(ii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Convention together with the date of 
the deposit; 
(iii) the extension of the present Convention to any territory under paragraph 1 of Article 
XIII and of the termination of any such extension under the provisions of paragraph 4 of that 
Article stating in each case the date on which the present Convention has been or will cease 
to be so extended; 
(b) transmit certified true copies of the present Convention to all Signatory States and to 
all States which accede to the present Convention. 
ARTICLE XVI 
 
As soon as the present Convention comes into force, the text shall be transmitted by the 
Secretary-General of the Organization to the Secretariat of the United Nations for 




The present Convention is established in a single copy in the English and French languages, both 
texts being equally authentic. Official translations in the Russian and Spanish languages shall be 
prepared and deposited with the signed original. 
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In witness whereof the undersigned* being duly authorized by their respective Governments 
for that purpose have signed the present Convention. 
Done at Brussels this twenty-ninth day of November 1969. 
 
ANNEX 




Provided the Parties concerned do not decide otherwise, the procedure for conciliation shall be in 
accordance with the rules set out in this Chapter. 
Article 2 
 
1. A Conciliation Commission shall be established upon the request of one Party 
addressed to another in application of Article VIII of the Convention. 
 
2. The request for conciliation submitted by a Party shall consist of a statement of 
the case together with any supporting documents. 
 
3. If a procedure has been initiated between two Parties, any other Party the nationals or 
property of which have been affected by the same measures, or which is a coastal State 
having taken similar measures, may join in the conciliation procedure by giving written 
notice to the Parties which have originally initiated the procedure unless either of the latter 
Parties object to such joinder. 
Article 3 
 
1. The Conciliation Commission shall be composed of three members: one nominated 
by the coastal State which took the measures, one nominated by the State the nationals or 
property of which have been affected by those measures and a third, who shall preside over 
the Commission and shall be nominated by agreement between the two original members. 
2. The Conciliators shall be selected from a list previously drawn up in accordance 
with the procedure set out in Article 4 below. 
 
3. If within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the request for conciliation, 
the Party to which such request is made has not given notice to the other Party to the 
controversy of the nomination of the Conciliator for whose selection it is responsible, or 
if, within a period of 30 days from the date of nomination of the second of the members 
of the Commission to be designated by the Parties, the first two Conciliators have not 
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been able to designate by common agreement the Chairmen of the Commission, the 
Secretary-General of the Organization shall upon request of either Party and within a 
period of 30 days, proceed to the required nomination. The members of the Commission 
thus nominated shall be selected from the list prescribed in the preceding paragraph. 
 
4. In no case shall the Chairman of the Commission be or have been a national of 
one of the original Parties to the procedure, whatever the method of his nomination. 
Article 4 
 
1. The list prescribed in Article 3 above shall consist of qualified persons designated 
by the Parties and shall be kept up to date by the Organization. Each Party may designate 
for inclusion on the list four persons, who shall not necessarily be its nationals. The 
nominations shall be for periods of six years each and shall be renewable. 
2. In the case of the decease or resignation of a person whose name appears on the list, 
the Party which nominated such person shall be permitted to nominate a replacement for 




1. Provided the Parties do not agree otherwise, the Conciliation Commission shall establish 
its own procedures, which shall in all cases permit a fair hearing. As regards examination, the 
Commission, unless it unanimously decides otherwise, shall conform with the provisions of 
Chapter III of The Hague Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes of 18 
October 1907. 
2. The Parties shall be represented before the Conciliation Commission by agents whose 
duty shall be to act as intermediaries between the Parties and the Commission. Each of the 
Parties may seek also the assistance of advisers and experts nominated by it for this purpose 
and may request the hearing of all persons whose evidence the Party considers useful. 
3. The Commission shall have the right to request explanations from agents, advisers and 
experts of the Parties as well as from any persons whom, with the consent of their 
Governments, it may deem useful to call. 
Article 6 
 
Provided the Parties do not agree otherwise, decisions of the Conciliation Commission shall be 
taken by a majority vote and the Commission shall not pronounce on the substance of the 





The Parties shall facilitate the work of the Conciliation Commission and in particular, in 
accordance with their legislation, and using all means at their disposal: 
(a) provide the Commission with the necessary documents and information; 
 




The task of the Conciliation Commission will be to clarify the matters under dispute, to 
assemble for this purpose all relevant information by means of examination or other means, and 
to endeavour to reconcile the Parties. After examining the case, the Commission shall 
communicate to the Parties a recommendation which appears to the Commission to be 
appropriate to the matter and shall fix a period of not more than 90 days within which the 
Parties are called upon to state whether or not they accept the recommendation. 
Article 9 
 
The recommendation shall be accompanied by a statement of reasons. If the recommendation 
does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the Commission, any Conciliator 




A conciliation shall be deemed unsuccessful if, 90 days after the Parties have been notified of 
the recommendation, either Party shall not have notified the other Party of its acceptance of the 
recommendation. Conciliation shall likewise be deemed unsuccessful if the Commission shall 
not have been established within the period prescribed in the third paragraph of Article 3 
above, or provided the Parties have not agreed otherwise, if the Commission shall not have 
issued its 





1. Each member of the Commission shall receive remuneration for his work, such 
remuneration to be fixed by agreement between the Parties which shall each contribute an 
equal proportion. 
2. Contributions for miscellaneous expenditure incurred by the work of the Commission 





The parties to the controversy may at any time during the conciliation procedure decide in 
agreement to have recourse to a different procedure for settlement of disputes. 




1. Arbitration procedure, unless the Parties decide otherwise, shall be in accordance with 
the rules set out in this Chapter. 
 
2. Where conciliation is unsuccessful, a request for arbitration may only be made within a 
period of 180 days following the failure of conciliation. 
Article 14 
 
The Arbitration Tribunal shall consist of three members: one Arbitrator nominated by the coastal 
State which took the measures, one Arbitrator nominated by the State the nationals or property of 
which have been affected by those measures, and another Arbitrator who shall be nominated by 
agreement between the two first-named, and shall act as its Chairman. 
Article 15 
 
1. If, at the end of a period of 60 days from the nomination of the second Arbitrator, the 
Chairman of the Tribunal shall not have been nominated, the Secretary-General of the 
Organization upon request of either Party shall within a further period of 60 days proceed to 
such nomination, selecting from a list of qualified persons previously drawn up in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 4 above. This list shall be separate from the list of 
experts prescribed in Article IV of the Convention and from the list of Conciliators prescribed 
in Article 4 of the present Annex; the name of the same person may, however, appear both on 
the list of Conciliators and on the list of Arbitrators. A person who has acted as Conciliator in 
a dispute may not, however, be chosen to act as Arbitrator in the same matter. 
2. If, within a period of 60 days from the date of the receipt of the request, one of the Parties 
shall not have nominated the member of the Tribunal for whose designation it is responsible, 
the other Party may directly inform the Secretary-General of the Organization who shall 
nominate the Chairman of the Tribunal within a period of 60 days, selecting him from the list 
prescribed in paragraph 1 of the present Article. 
3. The Chairman of the Tribunal shall, upon nomination, request the Party which has not 
provided an Arbitrator, to do so in the same manner and under the same conditions. If the Party 
does not make the required nomination, the Chairman of the Tribunal shall request the 
Secretary- General of the Organization to make the nomination in the form and conditions 
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prescribed in the preceding paragraph. 
4. The Chairman of the Tribunal, if nominated under the provisions of the present Article, 
shall not be or have been a national of one of the parties concerned, except with the consent of 
the other Party or Parties. 
5. In the case of the decease or default of an Arbitrator for whose nomination one of the 
Parties is responsible, the said Party shall nominate a replacement within a period of 60 days 
from the date of decease or default. Should the said Party not make the nomination, the 
arbitration shall proceed under the remaining Arbitrators. In the case of decease or default of the 
Chairman of the Tribunal, a replacement shall be nominated in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 14 above, or in the absence of agreement between the members of the Tribunal within 
a period of 60 days of the decease or default, according to the provisions of the present Article. 
Article 16 
 
If a procedure has been initiated between two Parties, any other Party, the nationals or property 
of which have been affected by the same measures or which is a coastal State having taken 
similar measures, may join in the arbitration procedure by giving written notice to the Parties 




Any arbitration Tribunal established under the provisions of the present Annex shall decide 
its own rules of procedure. 
Article 18 
 
1. Decisions of the Tribunal both as to its procedure and its place of meeting and as to 
any controversy laid before it, shall be taken by majority vote of its members; the absence 
or abstention of one of the members of the Tribunal for whose nomination the Parties were 
responsible shall not constitute an impediment to the Tribunal reaching a decision. In cases 
of equal voting, the Chairman shall cast the deciding vote. 
2. The Parties shall facilitate the work of the Tribunal and in particular, in accordance with 
their legislation, and using all means at their disposal: 
(a) provide the Tribunal with the necessary documents and information; 
 
(b) enable the Tribunal to enter their territory, to hear witnesses or experts, and to visit the 
scene. 
 





1. The award of the Tribunal shall be accompanied by a statement of reasons. It shall be final 
and without appeal. The Parties shall immediately comply with the award. 
2. Any controversy which may arise between the Parties as regards interpretation and 
execution of the award may be submitted by either Party for judgment to the Tribunal which 
made the award, or, if it is not available, to mother Tribunal constituted for this purpose in 









International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 




THE STATES PARTIES TO THE PRESENT CONVENTION, 
CONSCIOUS of the dangers of pollution posed by the worldwide maritime carriage of oil in 
bulk, 
CONVINCED of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available to persons who 
suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from ships, 
DESIRING to adopt uniform international rules and procedures for determining questions of 
liability and providing adequate compensation in such cases, 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
Article I 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
1. "Ships" means any sea-going vessel and any seaborn craft of any type whatsoever, actually 
carrying oil in bulk as cargo. 
2. "Person" means any individual or partnership or any public or private body, whether corporate 
or not, including a State or any of its constituent subdivisions. 
3. "Owner" means the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of 
registration, the person or persons owning the ship. However in the case of a ship owned by a 
State and operated by a company which in that State is registered as the ship's operator, "owner" 
shall mean such company. 
4. "State of the ship's registry" means in relation to registered ships the State of registration of the 
ship, and in relation to unregistered ships the State whose flag the ship is flying. 
5. "Oil" means any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and 
whale oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship. 
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6. "Pollution damage" means loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by 
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape 
or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures and further loss or 
damage caused by preventive measures. 
7. "Preventive measures" means any reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident 
has occurred to prevent or minimize pollution damage. 
8. "Incident" means any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same origin, which 
causes pollution damage. 
9. "Organization" means the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. 
Article II 
This Convention shall apply exclusively to pollution damage caused on the territory including 
the territorial sea of a Contracting State and to preventive measures taken to prevent or minimize 
such damage. 
Article III 
1. Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at the time of an 
incident, or where the incident consists of a series of occurrences at the time of the first such 
occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been 
discharged from the ship as a result of the incident. 
2. No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that the damage: 
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an 
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or 
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party, 
or 
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or other 
authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of 
that function. 
3. If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially either from an act or 
omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who suffered the damage or from the 
negligence of that person, the owner may be exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to 
such person. 
4. No claim for compensation for pollution damage shall be made against the owner otherwise 
than in accordance with this Convention. No claim for pollution damage under this Convention 
or otherwise may be made against the servants or agents of the owner. 
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5. Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of the owner against third 
parties. 
Article IV 
When oil has escaped or has been discharged from two or more ships, and pollution damage 
results therefrom, the owners of all the ships concerned, unless exonerated under Article III, shall 
be jointly and severally liable for all such damage which is not reasonably separable. 
Article V 
1. The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in respect of 
any one incident to an aggregate amount of 2,000 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage. 
However, this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed 210 million francs. 
2. If the incident occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the owner, he shall not be 
entitled to avail himself of the limitation provided in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
3. For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of 
this Article the owner shall constitute a fund for the total sum representing the limit of his 
liability with the Court or other competent authority of any one of the Contracting States in 
which action is brought under Article IX. The fund can be constituted either by depositing the 
sum or by producing a bank guarantee or other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation of the 
Contracting State where the fund is constituted, and considered to be adequate by the Court or 
another competent authority. 
4. The fund shall be distributed among the claimants in proportion to the amounts of their 
established claims. 
5. If before the fund is distributed the owner or any of his servants or agents or any person 
providing him insurance or other financial security has as a result of the incident in question, 
paid compensation for pollution damage, such person shall, up to the amount he has paid, acquire 
by subrogation the rights which the person so compensated would have enjoyed under this 
Convention. 
6. The right of subrogation provided for in paragraph 5 of this Article may also be exercised by a 
person other than those mentioned therein in respect of any amount of compensation for 
pollution damage which he may have paid by only to the extent that such subrogation is 
permitted under the applicable national law. 
7. Where the owner or any other person establishes that he may be compelled to pay at a later 
date in whole or in part any such amount of compensation, with regard to which such person 
would have enjoyed a right of subrogation under paragraphs 5 or 6 of this Article, had the 
compensation been paid before the fund was distributed, the Court or other competent authority 
of the State where the fund has been constituted may order that a sufficient sum shall be 
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provisionally set aside to enable such person at such later date to enforce his claim against the 
fund. 
8. Claims in respect of expenses reasonably incurred or sacrifices reasonably made by the owner 
voluntarily to prevent or minimize pollution damage shall rank equally with other claims against 
the fund. 
9. The franc mentioned in this Article shall be a unit consisting of sixty-five and a half 
milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. The amount mentioned in paragraph 1 of 
this Article shall be converted into the national currency of the State in which the fund is being 
constituted on the basis of the official value of that currency by reference to the unit defined 
above on the date of the constitution of the fund. 
10. For the purpose of this Article the ship's tonnage shall be the net tonnage of the ship with the 
addition of the amount deducted from the gross tonnage on account of engine room space for the 
purpose of ascertaining the net tonnage. In the case of a ship which cannot be measured in 
accordance with the normal rules of tonnage measurement, the ship's tonnage shall be deemed to 
be 40 per cent of the weight in tons (of 2240 lbs) of oil which the ship is capable of carrying. 
11. the insurer or other person providing financial security shall be entitled to constitute a fund in 
accordance with this Article on the same conditions and having the same effect as if it were 
constituted by the owner. Such a fund may be constituted even in the event of the actual fault or 
privity of the owner but its constitution shall in that case not prejudice the rights of any claimant 
against the owner. 
Article VI 
1. Where the owner, after an incident, has constituted a fund in accordance with Article V, and is 
entitled to limit his liability, 
(a) no person having a claim for pollution damage arising out of that incident shall be entitled to 
exercise any right against any other assets of the owner in respect of such claim; 
(b) the Court or other competent authority of any Contracting State shall order the release of any 
ship or other property belonging to the owner which has been arrested in respect of a claim for 
pollution damage arising out of that incident, and shall similarly release any bail or other security 
furnished to avoid such arrest. 
2. The foregoing shall, however, only apply if the claimant has access to the Court administering 
the fund and the fund is actually available in respect of his claim. 
Article VII 
1. The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil 
in bulk as cargo shall be required to maintain insurance or other financial security, such as the 
guarantee of a bank or a certificate delivered by an international compensation fund, in the sums 
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fixed by applying the limits of liability prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1 to cover his liability 
for pollution damage under this Convention. 
2. A certificate attesting that insurance or other financial security is in force in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention shall be issued to each ship. It shall be issued or certified by 
the appropriate authority of the State of the ship's registry after determining that the requirements 
of paragraph 1 of this Article have been complied with. The certificate shall be in the form of the 
annexed model and shall contain the following particulars: 
(a) name of ship and port of registration; 
(b) name and principal place of business of owner; 
(c) type of security; 
(d) name and principal place of business of insurer or other person giving security and, where 
appropriate, place of business where the insurance or security is established; 
(e) period of validity of certificate which shall not be longer than the period of validity of the 
insurance or other security. 
3. The certificate shall be in the official language or languages of the issuing State. If the 
language used is neither English nor French, the text shall include a translation into one of these 
languages. 
4. The certificate shall be carried on board the ship and a copy shall be deposited with the 
authorities who keep the record of the ship's registry. 
5. An insurance or other financial security shall not satisfy the requirements of this Article if it 
can cease, for reasons other than the expiry of the period of validity of the insurance or security 
specified in the certificate under paragraph 2 of this Article, before three months have elapsed 
from the date on which notice of its termination is given to the authorities referred to in 
paragraph 4 of this Article, unless the certificate has been surrendered to these authorities or a 
new certificate has been issued within the said period. The foregoing provision shall similarly 
apply to any modification which results in the insurance or security no longer satisfying the 
requirements of this Article. 
6. The State of registry shall, subject to the provisions of this Article, determine the conditions of 
issue and validity of the certificate. 
7. Certificates issued or certified under the authority of a Contracting State shall be accepted by 
other Contracting States for the purposes of this Convention and shall be regarded by other 
Contracting States as having the same force as certificates issued or certified by them. A 
Contracting State may at any time request consultation with the State of a ship's registry should it 
believe that the insurer or guarantor named in the certificate is not financially capable of meeting 
the obligations imposed by this Convention. 
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8. Any claim for compensation for pollution damage may be brought directly against the insurer 
or other person providing financial security for the owner's liability for pollution damage. In such 
case the defendant may, irrespective of the actual fault or privity of the owner, avail himself of 
the limits of liability prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1. He may further avail himself of the 
defences (other than the bankruptcy or winding up of the owner) which the owner himself would 
have been entitled to invoke. Furthermore, the defendant may avail himself of the defence that 
the pollution damage resulted from the wilful misconduct of the owner himself, but the 
defendant shall not avail himself of any other defence which he might have been entitled to 
invoke in proceedings brought by the owner against him. The defendant shall in any event have 
the right to require the owner to be joined in the proceedings. 
9. Any sum provided by insurance or by other financial security maintained in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be available exclusively for the satisfaction of claims under this 
Convention. 
10. A Contracting State shall not permit a ship under its flag to which this Article applies to trade 
unless a certificate has been issued under paragraph 2 or 12 of this Article. 
11. Subject to the provisions of this Article, each Contracting State shall ensure, under its 
national legislation, that insurance or other security to the extent specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Article is in force in respect of any ship, wherever registered, entering or leaving a port in its 
territory, or arriving at or leaving an off-shore terminal in its territorial sea, if the ship actually 
carries more than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo. 
12. If insurance or other financial security is not maintained in respect of a ship owned by a 
Contracting State, the provisions of this Article relating thereto shall not be applicable to such 
ship, but the ship shall carry a certificate issued by the appropriate authorities of the State of the 
ship's registry stating that the ship is owned by that State and that the ship's liability is covered 
within the limits prescribed by Article V, paragraph 1. Such a certificate shall follow as closely 
as practicable the model prescribed by paragraph 2 of this Article. 
Article VIII 
Rights of compensation under this Convention shall be extinguished unless an action is brought 
thereunder within three years from the date when the damage occurred. However, in no case 
shall an action be brought after six years from the date of the incident which caused the damage. 
Where this incident consists of a series of occurrences, the six years' period shall run from the 
date of the first such occurrence. 
Article IX 
1. Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the territory including the territorial sea of 
one or more Contracting States, or preventive measures have been taken to prevent or minimize 
pollution damage in such territory including the territorial sea, actions for compensation may 
only be brought in the Courts of any such Contracting State or States. Reasonable notice of any 
such action shall be given to the defendant. 
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2. Each Contracting State shall ensure that its Court s possess the necessary jurisdiction to 
entertain such actions for compensation. 
3. After the fund has been constituted in accordance with Article V the Courts of the State in 
which the fund is constituted shall be exclusively competent to determine all matters relating to 
the apportionment and distribution of the fund. 
Article X 
1. Any judgment given by a Court with jurisdiction in accordance with Article IX which is 
enforceable in the State of origin where it is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review, shall 
be recognized in any Contracting State, except: 
(a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; or 
(b) where the defendant was not given reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to present his 
case. 
2. A judgment recognized under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be enforceable in each 
Contracting State as soon as the formalities required in the State have been complied with. The 
formalities shall not permit the merits of the case to be re-opened. 
Article XI 
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to warships or other ships owned or 
operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service. 
2. With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and used for commercial purposes, each 
State shall be subject to suit in the jurisdictions set forth in Article IX and shall waive all 
defences based on its status as a sovereign State. 
Article XII 
This Convention shall supersede any International Conventions in force or open for signature, 
ratification or accession at the date on which the Convention is opened for signature, but only to 
the extent that such Conventions would be in conflict with it; however, nothing in this Article 
shall affect the obligations of Contracting States to non-Contracting States arising under such 
International Conventions. 
Article XIII 
1. The present Convention shall remain open for signature until 31 December 1970 and shall 
thereafter remain open for accession. 
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2. States Members of the United Nations or any of the Specialized Agencies or of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
may become Parties to this Convention by: 
(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; 
(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval followed by ratification, acceptance 
or approval; or 
(c) accession 
Article XIV 
1. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of a formal 
instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General of the Organization. 
2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after the entry into 
force of an amendment to the present Convention with respect to all existing Contracting States, 
or after the completion of all measures required for the entry into force of the amendment with 
respect to those Contracting States shall be deemed to apply to the Convention as modified by 
the amendment. 
Article XV 
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which 
Governments of eight States including five States each with not less than 1,000,000 gross tons of 
tanker tonnage have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval 
or have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the Organization. 
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it the present 
Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State of the 
appropriate instrument. 
Article XVI 
1. The present Convention may be denounced by any Contracting State at any time after the date 
on which the Convention comes into force for that State. 
2. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument with the Secretary-General of 
the Organization. 
3. A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be specified in the 




1. The United Nations, where it is the administering authority for a territory, or any Contracting 
State responsible for the international relations of a territory, shall as soon as possible consult 
with the appropriate authorities of such territory or take such other measures as may be 
appropriate, in order to extend the present Convention to that territory and may at any time by 
notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization declare that the present 
Convention shall extend to such territory. 
2. The present Convention shall, from the date of receipt of the notification of from such other 
date as may be specified in the notification, extend to the territory named therein. 
3. The United Nations, or any Contracting State which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 
of this Article may at any time after the date on which the Convention has been so extended to 
any territory declare by notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization that 
the present Convention shall cease to extend to any such territory named in the notification. 
4. The present Convention shall cease to extend to any territory mentioned in such notification 
one year, or such longer period as may be specified therein, after the date of receipt of the 
notification by the Secretary-General of the Organization. 
Article XVIII 
1. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending the present Convention may be 
convened by the Organization. 
2. The Organization shall convene a Conference of the Contracting States for revising or 
amending the present Convention at the request of not less than one-third of the Contracting 
States. 
Article XIX 
1. The present Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organization. 
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization shall: 
(a) inform all States which have signed or acceded to the Convention of: 
(i) each new signature or deposit of instrument together with the date thereof; 
(ii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Convention together with the date of the 
deposit; 
(iii) the extension of the present Convention to any territory under paragraph 1 of Article XVII 
and of the termination of any such extension under the provisions of paragraph 4 of that Article 




(b) transmit certified true copies of the present Convention to all Signatory States and to all 
States which accede to the present Convention. 
Article XX 
As soon as the present Convention comes into force, the text shall be transmitted by the 
Secretary-General of the Organization to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration 
and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article XXI 
The present Convention is established in a single copy in the English and French languages, both 
texts being equally authentic. Official translations in the Russian and Spanish languages shall be 
prepared and deposited with the signed original. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments for that purpose have signed the present Convention. 




CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE OR OTHER FINANCIAL SECURITY IN RESPECT OF 
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE 
Issued in accordance with the provisions of Article VII of the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969. 
Name of ship  Distinctive number or letters  Port of registry  Name and address of owner  
This is to certify that there is in force in respect of the above-named ship a policy of insurance or 
other financial security satisfying the requirements of Article VII of the International convention 
on civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969. 
Type of Security 
Duration of Security 





This certificate is valid until 
Issued or certified by the Government of 
(Full designation of the State) 
At On 
(Place) (Date) 
Signature and Title of issuing or certifying official. 
Explanatory Notes: 
1. If desired, the designation of the State may include a reference to the competent public 
authority of the country where the certificate is issued. 
2. If the total amount of security has been furnished by more than one source, the amount of each 
of them should be indicated. 
3. If security is furnished in several forms, these should be enumerated. 
4. The entry "Duration of Security" must stipulate the date on which such security takes effect. 
[Explanatory Notes appeared in original text.] 
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